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1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will be concerned with children who are involved in achievement-related 
activities, in particular cognitive tasks. The main focus will be on changes in task 
behavior due to individual motive structure and experimental changes in motivational 
factors. Thus the aim of this thesis is to shed some light on a number of factors that 
supposedly influence task behavior. Especially, changes in task behavior caused by 
changes in motìvatìonally relevant situational factors are studied. The dynamic aspects 
mentioned in the title of this thesis should be understood as referring to temporal 
changes in activities. They are caused by the sheer passage of time (or trials) or by the 
involvement in an activity. They are not related to behavior or psychological processes 
that might be called psycho-dynamic in other senses (like in psycho-analysis). 
Since the inception of psychology as a science aiming to study human behavior, 
questions about the causes of behavior have been in the focus of motivation theories. 
Numerous scientists have, at one time or another, conceived a theory of motivation, 
i.e., a theory which can explain why a person acts in a certain way. In the early years 
human beings were considered to behave in a rational way and to be able to regulate 
their behavior by their own finee will, i.e., human behavior is regulated by rational 
(easily understandable) reasons. After the publication of Darwin's book about the 
"Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection" in 1859, the notion became 
prominent that the behavior of human beings (like that of all other animals) is to a large 
extent, or even entirely, regulated by instincts, needs and habits (see Heckhausen, 
1980a). Gradually motivation theories shifted to the idea that motivational influences on 
behavior consist of a combination of both personality and situational factors. One of the 
first proponents of this idea is Lewin (1935). The majority of motivation theories from 
that time onwards followed the principle that behavior is determined by a combination 
of personality and situational factors. 
This thesis is confined to motivation in relation to achievement-related behavior. In 
the early Fifties of this century McClelland, Atkinson and Heckhausen began to do 
research in the domain of achievement motivation. McClelland's research was primarily 
directed towards the validation of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) as a 
measuring device for the achievement motive. Atkinson concentrated his research on 
the construction of a formal model for achievement-regulated behavior, and thus gave 
the impetus for experimental studies into achievement motivation. Heckhausen tried to 
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integrate all the insights from the work of McClelland and Atkinson into one conceptual 
model for achievement motivation (for a review see De Bruyn, 1979; Heckhausen, 
1980a). 
In the Seventies motivation theories shifted from an episodic to a dynamic 
viewpoint. From the explanation of a single action or behavioral episode performed at a 
certain moment in time, the focus of the theory shifted to the explanation of the stream 
of behavior that can be observed when an individual is followed for some time. The 
most important object for study became changes in activity or dynamic processes. Why 
does the individual stop doing one thing and starts performing a new activity? Can the 
instigators of actions be observed or deduced? Where do these instigators come from? 
One of the most elaborated theories in the domain of this dynamic conception of 
achievement motivation is described in The Dynamics of Action' by Atkinson and 
Birch (1970). The core of this theory is a model which contains the motivational factors 
related to task performance. With the help of this model it should be possible to predict 
changes in task behavior from changes in the motivational factors. In this dynamic 
model of task behavior motivation is influenced by a number of forces, which in their 
turn are influenced by three factors: the motive structure of the individual (a personality 
factor), the difficulty level of the task, and the incentive value connected with success 
or failure at the task (two situational factore). The dynamics-of-action model does not 
explicitly consider the influence of external factors (such as extrinsic rewards or 
information about task performance) on task behavior. Empirical data as well as 
theories of intrinsic motivation and reformulations of achievement theories demonstrate 
that these external factors do influence task behavior. In this thesis, therefore, the 
influence of extrinsic rewards and performance feedback on task behavior is studied. 
The studies, reported in this thesis, can be placed within the framewoik of research 
on achievement motivation as carried out at the University of Nijmegen. In Nijmegen 
research into achievement motivation started with the construction of a questionnaire, 
measuring achievement motivation and fear of failure, by Hermans ( 1968), based on 
Atkinson's theory (1957,1958). In the years that followed much research was centered 
around this measurement device and the theoretical implications drawn from it 
(Hermans, 1971). Developments in the achievement motivation theory in the mid 
Seventies (especially in the woric of Heckhausen, 1974,1977) resulted in new areas for 
study. A considerable number of the studies, that followed in the wake of this renewed 
interest in achievement motivation theories, are reported in De Bruyn (1979) and 
Bergen and Roede (1983). 
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Currently research into achievement motivation is approached in two different 
ways. One approach is devoted to the motivational processes accompanying learning at 
school. Studies about the measurement of motivation of both pupils and teachers in 
actual classroom interaction have been reported in a number of theses (Bergen, 1981; 
Smits, 1982; de Kuijer, 1985; Alberts, 1986; Mooij, 1987) and by Boekaerts (1985) 
and Boekaerts and van Lieshout (1982). In the second approach motivational processes 
are studied by way of fundamental research. Insights from achievement motivation 
theories have been translated into hypotheses about task behavior (in or out of the 
classroom) of elementary school children. These hypotheses are subsequently 
investigated in experimental situations (see De Bruyn and van den Bereken, 1982, 
1983; van den Bereken, 1983; Poulie, van den Bereken and Jansen, 1985; van den 
Bereken, 1986). 
The research reported in this thesis belongs to the second approach. This implies 
that the studies reported here intend to clarify theoretical aspects of achievement 
motivation theory. 
Chapter 2 supplies an overview about the evolution of achievement motivation 
theories. First a number of concepts from the theories of Freud, Murray and Lewin are 
described, which are incorporated into Atkinson's achievement motivation theory. Next 
the work of the early proponents from the achievement motivation theory (McClelland, 
Atkinson and Heckhausen) is briefly reviewed. From an episodic explanation of 
achievement-related behavior the theory shifts towards a dynamic conception of 
achievement motivation. This development of a dynamic principle and its use in the 
reformulation of the achievement motivation theory is reported in the next few sections. 
The Chapter ends with the description of a number of problems inherent in the 
dynamics-of-action model. In particular, these problems are the measurement of the 
factors incorporated in die mathematical model for motivation. 
In Chapter 3 the influence of two external factors, in particular the influence of 
extrinsic rewards and performance feedback, on task motivation and thereby on task 
performance are described. In the dynamics-of-action model these two factors are not 
referred to in the description of the motivational process. However, from other theories 
of motivation (for example theories of intrinsic motivation) and the empirical data 
associated with them it is apparent that these factors ¿2 influence task behavior. In this 
Chapter a number of studies is reviewed in which the influence of these factors is 
investigated. In addition, a number of factors which have a moderating effect on these 
factors is described. 
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In Chapters 4 to 7 several experiments with respect to changes in task behavior, 
due to changes in dynamic aspects of the task situation, are reported. In Chapter 4 an 
experiment is reported which studies whether hypotheses about task choice, as deduced 
from the dynamics-of-action model, are applicable to children. The few experimental 
attempts to validate the theoretical conceptions of the dynamics-of-action model have all 
been performed with adults (mostly college students) as subjects. According to 
Heckhausen (1980b), children at the age of 10 to 12 should already possess the 
cognitive requirements necessary to react to motivational factors in accordance with the 
way motivation is conceived by the dynamics-of-action model. However, to the 
author's knowledge this theoretical statement has yet to be tested. Therefore, it seems 
opportune to check whether children in a dynamic task situation behave as predicted by 
the dynamics-of-action model. A dynamic task situation is a situation in which subjects 
are confronted with a set of tasks or task items, a number of which they have to choose 
and solve. Chapter 4 has been previously published as part of the proceedings of the 
First Workshop on Achievement and Task Motivation (Houtmans, 1986). 
The experiment reported in Chapter 4 is a replication of an experiment by Kuhl and 
Blankenship (1979b) with children as subjects. In order to replicate this experiment, the 
task used by Kuhl and Blankenship had to be adapted for children. The results from 
this experiment are comparable to Kuhl and Blankenship's results, but they are less 
convincing. In order to investigate whether this is caused by the age difference between 
both subject groups or by the change in the task, the reactions of children and adults in 
a dynamic task situation are explicitly compared in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 6 the influence of extrinsic rewards on task behavior in a dynamic task 
situation is studied. Two experiments are reported in which correct task performance is 
associated with different kinds of extrinsic reward. The extrinsic reward can either be 
congruent with the intrinsic reward (i.e., the extrinsic reward will be higher for tasks of 
higher difficulty levels) от it can be incongruent with the intrinsic reward (i.e., the child 
will receive the same amount of extrinsic rewards independent of the difficulty level of 
the task). The effect of these external rewards on motivational behavior (such as task 
choice, sequence of difficulty levels chosen, solution times, number of tasks solved 
correctly and number of tasks on which subjects gave up) is reported. Chapter 6 will be 
submitted for publication. 
In Chapter 7 an experiment is reported in which the influence of performance 
feedback on task behavior is studied. In this experiment children either do or do not 
receive feedback about their task performance on previous trials after each trial. The 
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influence of this information on motivational behavior (such as task choice, and 
sequence of difficulty levels chosen) is reported. Chapter 7 has been previously 
published as part of the proceedings of the Second Workshop on Achievement and 
Task Motivation (Houtmans, in press). 
Chapter 8 reviews conclusions and implications of the results of the experiments 
reported here for the theory, for educational practice and for diagnosis and treatment. 
Due to the fact that the experimental Chapters from this manuscript are or will be 
published some overlap between the two theoretical Chapters and the introductory parts 
of the experimental Chapters is inevitable. 
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IO 
2 . HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION 
THEORY 
2 . 1 . Introduction 
One of the questions that lies at the heart of psychology is 'Why do people show a 
particular kind of behavior in a particular context?'. It seems that people sometimes 
perform activities purely because they want to perform them, while at other times they 
perform activities which they don't like but have to perfonn because of some outside 
force. The question 'Why do people behave the way they do?' can be translated into 
'What are the motives behind the behavior people show?' Quite a number of theories 
(from psycho-analysis to behaviorism) have tried to shed some light on this question. 
This thesis does not concern itself with behavior in general, but will be restricted to one 
particular area of behavior, namely achievement-oriented behavior. The main question 
of this thesis is how achievement-oriented behavior is influenced by motivation and 
motives. 
2 .2 . The precursors 
There are a number of theories which have influenced the development of the theory 
of achievement motivation, primarily through the concepts they have contributed. In 
this section the three most important precursors will be described. The first is Freud 
(cited in Heckhausen, 1980a), who introduced the concept of the unconscious. The 
second is Murray (1938), who gave a description of 20 basic human needs. The third is 
Lewin (1935), who introduced the concept of valence into his field theory. 
2 .2 .1 . Freud and the unconscious 
The most important principle in Freud's theory of motivation (as described in his 
book 'Triebe und Triebschicksale' of 1915, cited in Heckhausen, 1980a) is the 
principle of drive reduction. An individual constantly tries to reach a state of 
homeostasis in which drives are at a low level. Drive decrease is accompanied by 
feelings of pleasure, while drive increase is accompanied by feelings of discomfort. 
The forces and conflicts associated with the dynamic drive mechanism are the causes of 
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the active directedness of human behavior and in this way form the basis of human 
behavior sequences. Another important point in Freud's theory is that human behavior 
is determined by both conscious and unconscious processes. In fact unconscious 
processes are even more important than conscious ones, considering the fact that 
unconscious processes working within the individual cause most conscious acts. 
Unfulfilled drives linger in the unconscious and influence the actual behavior of the 
individual. Subsequent motivation theories have used this principle, especially with 
regard to the measurement of motives: projective measurement techniques are based on 
Freud's idea of the (often unconscious) influence of motives on behavior (see section 
2.3.2.). 
2 . 2 . 2 . Murray and the need for achievement 
In 1938 Murray proposed a list of 20 basic human needs. A need should explain 
similarities in behavior which occur despite the fact that a subject is observed in 
different situations and in different time periods. 'A need is a construct (a convenient 
fiction or hypothetical concept) which stands for a force (the physico-chemical nature of 
which is unknown)... which organizes perception, apperception, intellection, conation 
and action in such a way as to transform in a certain direction an existing, unsatisfying 
situation.' (1938, pp. 123-124); '... we may loosely use the term 'need' to refer to an 
organic potentiality or readiness to respond in a certain way under given conditions. In 
this sense a need is a latent attribute of an organism.' (1938, p. 61). 
One of these needs is the need for achievement (nAch). The need for achievement is 
defined by Murray (1938, p. 164) as the desire To accomplish something difficult. To 
master, manipulate or organize physical objects, human beings or ideas. To do this as 
rapidly and as independently as possible. To overcome obstacles and attain a high 
standard. To excel one's self. To rival and surpass others. To increase self-regard by 
the successful exercise of talent.' According to Murray, the need for achievement is 
usually associated with the following activities: 'To make intense, prolonged and 
repeated efforts to accomplish something difficult. To work with singleness of purpose 
towards a high and distant goal. To have the determination to win. To try to do 
everything well. To be stimulated to excel by the presence of others, to enjoy 
competition. To exert will power, to overcome boredom and fatigue.' 
Needs are measured with the help of a projective measurement device: the TAT (the 
Thematic Apperception Test; Morgan and Murray, 1938). The TAT consists of a 
number of rather vague drawings accompanied by a number of questions about each 
drawing. Based on these questions subjects have to tell stories about the drawings. 
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Their thoughts, feelings and actions are subsequently scored according to a scoring 
manual (Murray, 1943), and thus the needs that are prominent in the subject can be 
deduced. 
2.2.3. Lewin and the concept of valence 
In Le win's motivation theory (the so-called Field Theory, 1935) both the external 
situation (the environment) and the intonai situation (the person) play an important 
role. According to Lewin, behavior is a function of personal and situational factors. 
Both the environment and the person can be divided into a number of corresponding 
areas. Areas in the person are called needs от motives, they represent particular goals of 
the individual. The corresponding areas in the environment represent objects or courses 
of action through which these goals can be reached. Areas in the person, which are 
activated, are said to be in a state of tension. Lewin's theory is based on the principle of 
homeostasis, implying that the ideal state for the individual is a balance of tension in all 
areas. If an area in the person is activated, a corresponding area in the environment 
acquires either a positive or a negative valence (a force which either attracts or repels the 
person). In other words, in the environment the individual perceives an object or course 
of action which will reduce the tension and which ultimately leads to goal-directed 
behavior. When the goal area is reached, the need is satisfied, the tension dissipates, 
the valence is reduced to zero, and the behavior stops. When an action to reach a certain 
goal is interrupted, the corresponding area in the person remains in a state of tension. 
This results in an unfínished action tendency, which will express itself in behavior 
when it is not dominated by other tendencies. The existence of unfinished action 
tendencies is demonstrated in experiments by Zeigamik (1927) and Atkinson (1953), in 
which subjects remembered more unfinished than finished tasks, and in experiments by 
Ovsiankina (1928), in which subjects, during presumably unobserved breaks in the 
experiment, resumed unfínished tasks more often than finished tasks. In later theories 
of motivation this unfinished action tendency returns in the form of the inertial tendency 
(Atkinson, 1964). 
2 . 3 . The theory of achievement motivation 
The most important names in the early years of research about achievement 
motivation are McClelland, Atkinson and Heckhausen. McClelland and Atkinson use 
concepts from the precursory theories of human motivation in general to build a 
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comprehensive theory of achievement motivation. Heckhausen uses both results from 
experiments and theoretical insights to fomiulate a broad theoretical framework about 
motivation and action. In this section the ideas of McClelland, Atkinson and 
Heckhausen will be described. 
2 . 3 . 1 . McClelland 
The first studies about the achievement motive have been performed by McClelland 
(McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell, 1953). According to McClelland, the 
achievement motive is primarily aroused when a particular performance is judged 
against a standard of excellence, i.e., subjects with a high achievement motive will try 
to achieve success in trying to reach a standard of excellence. McClelland uses the TAT 
to measure the strength of the achievement motive. Based on the stories subjects tell on 
the TAT, they are divided into two categories: subjects motivated by hope of success 
(they are motivated by a positive expectation about task performance) and subjects 
motivated by fear of failure (they are motivated by a negative expectation about task 
performance). Subjects motivated by hope of success show an approach tendency (they 
want to perform a task), while subjects motivated by fear of failure show an avoidance 
tendency (they do not want to perform the task). After telling stories about the TAT 
drawings, subjects really had to perform a task in either a relaxed atmosphere (in which 
the experimenter explained that individual results were unimportant) or in an 
achievement-oriented atmosphere (in which the experimenter emphasized the 
importance of the result of each individual). Performance in both conditions differed in 
a predictable way, depending on the score on the TAT. A high TAT score is related to 
better performance in the achievement-oriented than in the relaxed condition, while a 
low TAT score corresponds with worse performance in the achievement-related than in 
the relaxed condition. 
2 .3 .2 . Atkinson 
According to Atkinson and Litwin (1960), McClelland's findings can be explained 
by test-anxiety. In order to distinguish better between the two competing motives of 
hope of success and fear of failure they introduced a new measure for the fear of failure 
motive, namely the Test Anxiety Questionnaire (TAQ; Mandler and Sarason, 1952). 
When both the TAT and the TAQ are administered, subjects can be divided into four 
groups: subjects primarily motivated by hope of success (with a high score on the TAT 
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and a low score on the TAQ), subjects primarily motivated by fear of failure (with a 
low score on the TAT and a high score on the TAQ), subjects with low scores on both 
the TAT and the TAQ and subjects with high scores on both the TAT and the TAQ. 
In an achievement-oriented situation subjects will experience both hope of success 
and fear of failure (Atkinson, 1964). Whether a subject will or will not perform a task 
depends on the outcome of the conflict between both motives, i.e., the conflict between 
the approach and the avoidance tendency. In other words, the resultant motivation to 
perform a task depends on the strength of both tendencies, which are determined by a 
combination of situational and personal factors (Atkinson, 1964). The factors 
dependent on the person are the motive to hope for success (Mg) and the motive to want 
to avoid failure (Mf). Motives are latent traits to strive for particular goals which are 
activated by appropriate cues from the situation. In this case these goals are striving to 
achieve feelings of success and to avoid feelings of failure. The situational factors, 
which play a part in determining the ultimate motivation to perform a particular task, are 
the subjective probability of success (Pj) or failure (Pf) at that task and tta incentive 
value of success (1^ or the negative incentive value of failure (-If). 
All these variables (the motive to hope for success, the motive to want to avoid 
failure, the probability of success, the probability of failure, the incentive value of 
success and the incentive value of failure) are combined into a model (Atkinson, 1964). 
Both the approach and avoidance tendency to perform a certain activity are expressed in 
a mathematical equation. The equation with respect to the approach tendency is as 
follows: 
TS=MS*PS*IS 
In words: the strength of the tendency to approach an achievement-oriented task (T
s
) is 
a multiplicative function of the strength of the motive to hope for success (М^, the 
subjective probability of success (Pg) and the incentive value of success (Ij). 
The equation with respect to the avoidance tendency is as follows: 
TpM^P^-If 
In words: the strength of the tendency to avoid an achievement-oriented task (Tf) is a 
multiplicative function of the strength of the motive to avoid failure (Mf), the subjective 
probability of failure (Pf) and the negative incentive value of failure (-If). 
To calculate the tendencies in both equations the variables have to be substituted 
with real values. The motive to hope for success is substituted by the score on the TAT, 
while the motive to avoid failure is substituted by the score on the TAQ. The subjective 
probability of success is equal to the expectation that a task will be performed 
successfully, based on earlier experiences with this kind of task or on information 
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supplied by the experimenter. The subjective probability of failure is the complement of 
the subjective probability of success. Together they add up to one: 
P f = l - P « 
Success on a task with a higher difficulty level is more satisfying than success on an 
easier task. To capture this relationship the incentive value of success is defined in 
terms of the probability of success as follows: 
is = i - P s 
The following is also assumed: failure at an easier task is more shameful than failure at 
a difficult task: 
I f = l - P f 
The strength of the résultant tendency от motivation to really perform a task can be 
expressed as the algebraic sum of the approach and the avoidance tendencies: 
T
res =
 T
s
 + Tf 
TreS = ( M s * P s * I s ) + ( M f * P f * - I f ) 
Tres = (M, * Ρ, * (1 - Ps» + (M f * (1 - Ps) * -Ps) 
T
r e s
 = ( M
s
- M f ) * ( ( l - P s ) * P s ) 
Subjects with a high positive resultant achievement motivation like to engage in 
achievement-oriented tasks, while subjects with a high negative resultant achievement 
motivation will try to avoid achievement-oriented tasks as much as possible. For 
subjects with M
s
 higher than M f the resultant achievement motivation is at a maximum 
when the probability of success is .50 (a task with an intermediate level of difficulty), 
while for subjects with a higher Mf than M
s
 the resultant achievement motivation is at a 
minimum when the probability of success is .50. Both the resultant approach and the 
resultant avoidance motivation decreases if the difficulty level of a task increases or 
decreases beyond .50. According to the model, there is an inverse U shaped 
relationship between motivation and difficulty level of a task. 
This description allows the following hypotheses about the behavior of success­
and failure-oriented subjects. Subjects with a higher M
s
 than Mf will show the highest 
approach motivation for tasks with an intermediate level of difficulty. Therefore, these 
tasks will be chosen in a choice situation, and subjects will work longer and more 
intensely on this kind of tasks. Subjects with a higher Mf than M
s
 will show the highest 
avoidance motivation for tasks of an intermediate level of difficulty. In a choice 
situation these tasks will be avoided as much as possible while extremely easy or 
extremely difficult tasks, for which shame about failure is minimal, will be chosen 
instead. These hypotheses became the subject of a large number of investigations (for 
an extensive literature review see Kloep, 1982). While the first hypothesis is generally 
supported, the second one is not. Even failure-oriented subjects predominantly appear 
16 
to choose tasks of an intermediate level of difficulty. In contrast to achievement-
oriented subjects, however, their choices are spread somewhat more over all levels of 
difficulty. Atkinson and Feather (1966) explain this result by pointing out that the 
population of subjects used in these investigations (mostly college students) contains 
only a very small number of extremely failure-oriented persons. In addition they point 
out that other motives (like the need to confonn oneself to a social group) also are 
important when explaining task choice. 
2 .3 .3 . Heckhausen 
In Germany Heckhausen and his research group evaluated and extended Atkinson's 
achievement motivation theory. In this thesis three main areas of Heckhausen's work 
will be reviewed: the construction of a German version of the TAT, the way in which 
achievement-oriented behavior develops in children and the formulation of a cognitive 
process model of motivation. 
A German version of the TAT. 
In Heckhausen's view (1968) it should be possible to measure both the hope of 
success and the fear of failure with the same instrument, instead of using the TAT for 
the hope of success and a questionnaire for the fear of failure (as became common 
practice in the research group around Atkinson). Therefore, he developed a German 
version of the TAT, which consists of six pictures of German school and occupational 
settings, three of which depict an achievement situation that will probably lead to 
failure, while the other three depict an achievement situation that will probably lead to 
success. Two different scoring manuals have been constructed to measure both the 
hope of success and the fear of failure motive. Except for scores on both motive 
variables this instrument yields two other measures: the total motivation (which is the 
sum of the score on the hope of success and the fear of failure motive) and the net hope 
(which is the score on the hope of success motive minus the fear of failure motive). In 
Germany this revised measurement instrument is used extensively in research about 
achievement motivation. In addition it provided the basis for the development of other 
instruments like the semi-projective LeistungsMotiv-Gitter (LM-Gitter, Achievement 
Motivation-Grid; Schmalt, 1973). 
Achievement-oriented behavior in children, 
Another important part of Heckhausen's work is research on the way in which the 
achievement motive develops during childhood. A number of prerequisites must be 
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fulfilled before behavior can be called achievement-oriented. First, the result of an 
action must be either a success or a failure and the result must be neither too easy nor 
too difficult to reach. Second, it is necessary to be able to differentiate actions with 
regard to difficulty level. Third, there must be a standard against which the actual result 
is judged. Fourth, the result should be caused by the person who performs the action in 
order to allow self-evaluation based on action outcomes. 
According to Heckhausen (1974, 1980b), there seems to be an age-bound 
succession of developmental characteristics of achievement-oriented behavior which 
corresponds to four stages of theory construction. The first stage is the analysis of 
achievement motivation. Achievement-oriented behavior is implied when children want 
to attain a certain outcome through certain actions, see the outcome as self-produced, 
and attribute it to their own competence. This stage presupposes four cognitive 
prerequisites. Children should be able to center on self-produced outcomes, they 
should be able to attribute causes to their own action outcome, they should be able to 
distinguish between degrees of task difficulty and personal competence and they should 
be able to distinguish between ability and effort. 
The second stage of theory construction is the risk-taking model. The risk-taking 
model implies that there is a multiplicative relation between success probability and 
incentive value. This stage presupposes the following cognitive prerequisites: children 
must have an idea about their subjective probability of success, furthermore they have 
to be aware of the fact that there is a relation between success probability and incentive, 
the next step is the realisation that this relation is a multiplicative connection between 
success probability and incentive. 
The third stage erf theory construction centers on attribution theory. Initially children 
have only a global concept of their own competence. This global concept is gradually 
differentiated into a causal concept of stable ability and a causal concept of variable 
effort. To disentangle these two concepts for the attribution of an actual outcome, 
children need causal schemata for ability and effort. In addition, children have to be 
aware that attributions to ability and effort are connected with affective differences: with 
regard to self-evaluation attribution to ability generates a different kind of affect than 
attribution to effort. 
The fourth stage of theory construction deals with the conception of the achievement 
motive as a self-reinforcing (or self-evaluating) system. Self-evaluation and its 
incentive value is related to three variables: differential weighting of the incentive value 
of success and failure, the existence of a discrepancy between anticipated outcome and 
actual outcome, and causal attribution of the action outcome. The cognitive 
prerequisites connected with this stage are: children should have an individual pattern of 
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weighting the incentives of success and failure, they should have an individually 
preferred personal standard and attribution pattern for success and failure. 
A cognitive process model of motivation. 
Heckhausen's third major contribution to the field of motivation theory is the 
formulation of a cognitive process model of motivation. In this model attributional 
factors as well as action consequences (such as self-evaluation, other-evaluation, side-
effects and superordinate goals) and their valences are incorporated. In fact 
Heckhausen's motivation model (1977) can be described as a self-evaluation system: 
depending on the aspiration level (the standard with which subjects compare their own 
outcome) self-evaluation is either positive or negative. 
According to Heckhausen (1974), motives can be described as individual 
differences in goal representations and expectations for actions that are not caused by 
differences in situations. For example, different individuals have different expectations 
about the outcome of an action in similar situations, and, consequently, they will react 
differently. In addition, individuals with the same expectations about action outcomes 
can connect different values with the consequences of their actions and thus react 
differently in the same situation. Motives explain differences in individual 
particularities, which evolve in interactions with certain basic situations during the 
development of the child. For every kind of basic situation individuals have a 
corresponding motive system. Depending on prior experiences, the motive system is 
more oriented towards or away from situations reflecting the motive, i.e., there is either 
more hope of satisfaction or more fear of dissatisfaction. Motives never lead to actions 
directly, but have to be awakened by situational factors which influence the momentary 
motivation and thus direct behavior. Motivation is a situationally dependent short-
lasting event which results from the interaction between motives and situational 
parameters. It encompasses all factors and processes necessary for beginning and 
continuing actions. 
Motivational models, like Heckhausen's (1977), are devised to explain goal-
directedness of behavior and individual differences in choice of activities, in intensity 
and in persistence of effort. Motivational processes are described in terms of 
interactions between value dispositions (motives) and two motive relevant aspects of 
the perceived situation: the incentive value of an event and the probability that this event 
can be attained. Both factors are combined multiplicatively (i.e., an Expectancy χ Value 
model). The individual chooses that alternative for which this product (the so-called 
valence) is maximal, i.e., the pay-off from the immediate outcome and from the long-
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run consequences should be maximal. Thus the resultant motivational tendency 
connected with the biggest valence is expressed in behavior. 
Heckhausen's cognitive model, in contrast to Atkinson's, contains several types of 
expectancies, each associated with its own valence. First, there are situation-outcome 
expectancies, which indicate the degree to which the present situation will lead to a 
desired outcome apart from any contribution of the actor. In the second place, there are 
action-outcome expectancies, which represent the probability that the present situation 
can be changed to yield the desired outcome through the actor's own actions. In the 
third place, there are action-by-situation-outcome expectancies, indicating extraneous 
and variable circumstances of the situation that may impede or facilitate the actor's 
action (such as fatigue or social support). Finally, there are outcome-consequence 
expectancies, indicating the degree to which outcomes produced by oneself or other 
agencies are instrumental for the occurrence of consequences with particular incentive 
values. Three different kinds of valences are connected with these expectancies: 
situation valence (the outcome of the situation when the person does not perform any 
action), action valence (the outcome when the person performs a certain action which 
will lead to a desired consequence) and outcome valence (the sum of valences of each 
perceived consequence of the outcome). The motivational process consists of an 
integration and comparison of all these expectancies and valences. 
Another important point in Heckhausen's model, which is related to the self-
evaluation component of his theory, is the causal attribution of outcomes. Outcomes of 
actions may be attributed to external or internal causes (Weiner, 1982). If the actor can 
attribute an outcome to an internal cause (such as ability or effort) than the outcome 
valence is greater than when it is attributed to ал external cause (such as task difficulty, 
time or energy required for a task, support or hindrance). Internal causal attribution is 
primarily related to the action-outcome expectancy, while external causal attribution is 
primarily related to the action-by-situation-outcome expectancy. However, the internal 
factors ability and effort do not determine the action-outcome expectancy by 
themselves. They always have to be adapted to the external factor of task difficulty. 
This implies that internal attribution of causes is only meaningful in tasks which are 
neither too difficult nor too easy. 
Heckhausen's process model for motivation can be divided into five phases 
(Heckhausen, 1980a). The first phase is the instigation, in this phase stimuli in the 
situation that instigate action are important. The second phase is motivation, in this 
phase the expected consequences of actions play an important part (both immediate 
consequences, especially self-evaluation, and long term consequences like other-
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evaluation). This phase culminates in a resultant action tendency which indicates the 
beginning of the third phase: the performance. The dominant action tendency will be 
expressed in behavior. The fourth phase is self-evaluation. In this phase the result of an 
action is compared with a standard of excellence. It can either be above, equal to or 
below this standard. This discrepancy determines the outcome of self-evaluation. A 
prerequisite for self-evaluation is that the person himself caused the outcome. A sixth 
phase consists of the weighting of other outcome consequences. 
Motive-like constructs (or individual differences) can be tied to six parameters in 
this model. First, there are individual differences in weighting the incentives of 
superordinate goals. In the second place, the incentives of success and failure with 
regard to self-evaluation are weighted differently. Third, the revisability of action 
outcome expectancies following successes or failures differs due to the ascription of 
causes to either stable or variable factors. In the fourth place, the instrumentality of the 
outcome for self-evaluation differs. In the fifth place the instrumentality of the outcome 
for reaching superordinate goals differs and, in the sixth place, the susceptibility for 
incentives (extrinsic consequences of an outcome) differs. 
2 . 4 . A dynamic reformulation for the achievement motivation theory 
Motivation theory, as formulated up to this point, has been developed to explain the 
performance of a subject on a single task. Neither future nor past plays any part in 
explaining the performance on this single task. The point of departure is a subject who 
from a state of inactivity begins to perform a task, returning to inactivity after task 
performance. No account is taken of the changes task performance can bring about in 
the subject 
The theory more or less implies that humanity can be divided into two groups: those 
who want to engage in achievement-oriented tasks and those who try to avoid such 
tasks as much as possible. However, even avoidance-motivated subjects at one time or 
another perform achievement-oriented tasks. This implies, that besides the motive to 
hope for success and the motive to want to avoid failure, other motives play a role in 
determining whether or not someone will perform a particular task. Moreover, actions 
in the past and expectations for the future also influence the way subjects behave in the 
present. This dynamic aspect of human behavior has been incorporated in a 
reformulation of the theory of achievement modvation. 
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2.4.1.The risk-taking model for achievement motivation 
The theory, described thus far, is an example of the expectancy-value approach to 
behavior (Atkinson and Feather, 1966; Feather, 1959). This approach implies that 
people always take two factors into consideration before performing an activity, namely 
the expectation of success and the value (or the utility) this success has for them. 
Atkinson's risk-taking model (1957) extended the existing expectancy-value models 
with two concepts: the motive structure of the subject, and a linear inverse relation 
between the expectancy of success {or failure) and the incentive value of success (or 
failure). This second concept implies that the incentive value does not have to be 
measured, if the probability of success is known. In addition, if the probability of 
success is known, the probability of failure is also known (they sum up to 1). Except 
for the motive variables, all other variables in the formula for the resulting tendency can 
be expressed in terms of the probability of success. 
Atkinson's model (1957) is concerned with a single person performing a single 
activity at a particular moment in time. In this model a person with a particular motive 
structure is confronted with a task which has a known probability of success and at 
which success or failure has no other consequences than self-evaluations (emotions and 
perceived competence). The model should explain a number of facets of achievement-
oriented behavior, such as individual differences in choice of difficulty level of a task, 
and individual differences in persistence and effort. 
The resultant tendency to approach or avoid an achievement-oriented task reaches its 
highest value when the success probability is .50. In fact this implies that subjects with 
a high fear of failure will never engage in achievement-oriented tasks. However, in real 
life everyone engages in achievement tasks at one time or another. The risk-taking 
model, as described thus far, only seems to be applicable in a very special situation: 
subjects, in whom no other motives besides the achievement-related ones (hope of 
success and fear of failure) are activated, work at an achievement-oriented task, while 
the outcome of this task has only self-evaluatory consequences, the valence in this 
situation being affective self-evaluation after success or failure (pride or shame). In 
addition the model is only applicable when subjects have to choose between similar 
tasks, differing only in the expectancy of success. It cannot explain the choice between 
two different kinds of tasks, because in that case other tendencies are also important. 
Atkinson (1964) tried to amend these problems by suggesting that there were other 
motives, for example the affiliation motive, which also influence task behavior. 
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Besides other motives, task behavior also seems to be influenced by the existence of 
inertial tendencies (Atkinson and Cartwright, 1964). When subjects have to stop an 
activity, before they are finished, in favor of another activity, an inertial tendency is 
created that will remain active until a force operates on it. Thus, an inertial tendency is a 
tendency emanating from an earlier activity which was interrupted and thus not 
satisfied. The expression 'inertial tendency' is a sort of catch-all phrase for all the 
influences which the previous task still has on the new task and all the other, not task 
dependent, influences on the person. The inertial tendencies (T(-¡j) are also incorporated 
into the approach and avoidance tendencies: 
Ts = (M s *P s *I s ) + TGi 
T f =(M f *P f *I f ) + TGi 
Ultimately these new insights were used to formulate a new general theory of 
motivation, the so-called dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1970, 1974, 
1978). 
2.4 .2 . The dynamics-of-action model 
Unlike the episodic theory in which it is assumed that people start at a task from a 
state of inactivity and balance, this new theory states that subjects are constantly active 
or motivated for a number of different (competing) activities simultaneously. The main 
part of the theory, therefore, shifts from explaining a single activity to explaining the 
switch from one activity to another. The activity which is expressed in behavior is 
connected with the dominant resultant action tendency. Forces, emanating from the 
situation, and the individual's repertory of inertial tendencies, can change the hierarchy 
of tendencies, and eventually will induce subjects to switch to another activity. A 
change in environment or stimulation, therefore, is very often (but not always) 
accompanied by a change in activity. 
The theory is built on a single Principle of Change of Activity (Atkinson and Birch, 
1970), that is captured in three statements. First, there is a hierarchy of inertial 
tendencies (already active and differentiated states of motivation). This concept explains 
the possibility of spontaneous activity or the emission of a particular activity in the 
complete absence of an appropriate stimulus. Secondly, there is the selective impact of 
the immediate physical surroundings. This statement defines the instigating forces to 
which the individual will be exposed. Thirdly, there is a selective effect of 
reinforcement and punishment histories of particular activities in similar situations. 
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The behavior, that people engage in, is regarded as the expression of the strongest 
resultant action tendency which is composed of the sum of two components. The first 
component is the action tendency or a tendency to actually perform an activity. The 
second component is the negaction tendency or a tendency EQÎ to perform an activity. 
Action and negaction tendencies wax and wane through the influence of a number of 
different forces. For the action tendency these are the instigating and consummatory 
forces, while for the negaction tendency these are the inhibitory force and the force of 
resistance. All these forces together determine the strength of the motivation to begin 
with an action and to continue performing that action. To gain a better understanding of 
the theory the forces will now be described. 
The instigating force represents environmental influences that cause an increase in 
the strength of the action tendency. This force develops when an activity has been 
intrinsically satisfying in the past or when the activity has been previously rewarded. 
Whenever an activity is expressed in behavior, the consummatory force starts to 
increase causing a decrease in the action tendency. In other words, engaging in an 
activity causes a decrease in the action tendency to continue engaging in that activity. 
The inhibitory force represents environmental influences that cause an increase in 
the strength of the negaction tendency. This force develops when a certain activity has 
been frustrated or punished in the past. By definition a negaction tendency produces 
resistance to an activity, it dampens or blocks the performance of the activity. 
However, it does not consume (or reduce) the strength of the original action tendency. 
Analogous to the decreasing effect of the consummatory force on the action tendency, 
engaging in resistance to an activity causes the force of resistance to increase and 
thereby decrease the negaction tendency or the resistance to an activity. As a result of 
resistance the action tendency, that is opposed, will become even stronger than without 
resistance. The sudden withdrawal of an inhibitory force should, therefore, produce a 
transitory surge in the level of the action tendency (Atkinson and Birch, 1974). 
Atkinson, Bongort and Price (1977) summarize the basic assumptions of the 
dynamics-of-action model as follows: 
'If a certain kind of activity has been intrinsically satisfying or previously 
rewarded in a particular situation, there will be an instigating force (F) for 
that activity, attributable in part to the strength of motive in the person and 
in part to the magnitude of incentive for that activity in that situation. This 
will cause a more or less rapid arousal and increase in the strength of an 
inclination to engage in that activity, an action tendency ÇT), depending on 
the magnitude of the force. If a certain kind of activity has been frustrated 
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or punished in the past, there will be an inhibitory force (I) and a more or 
less rapid growth in the strength of a disinclination to act This is what we 
now call a negacúon tendency (N) and conceive as a tendency not to do it. 
The duration of these forces will determine how strong the action 
tendency or negaction tendency becomes. The latter, the tendency not to 
do something, will produce resistance to the activity. It opposes, blocks, 
dampens; that is, it subtracts from the action tendency to determine the 
resultant action tendency (T = Τ -Ν). The resultant action tendency 
competes with other resultant action tendencies for other incompatible 
activities. The strongest of them is expressed in behavior. The expression 
of an action tendency in behavior is what reduces it. Engaging in activity 
produces a consummatory force (C), which depends in part on the 
consummatory value (c) of the particular activity and in part on the 
strength of tendency being expressed in behavior (i.e., С = cT). 
Similarly, the resistance to an action tendency, produced by the opposition 
of a negaction tendency, constitutes an analogous force of resistance (R), 
which reduces, in a comparable way, the strength of the negaction 
tendency.' 
The forces are all brought together in a mathematical model from which changes in 
behavior can be predicted. This model is based on the Principle of Change in Activity. 
The Principle of Change of Activity can also be represented by a formula: 
WA 
F B 
where tß/A is the time at which a subject decides to stop performing activity A and to 
start performing activity B, 
Рд is the instigating force for activity A, 
сд is the consummatory value for performing activity A, 
Ig is the inhibitory force for activity B, 
rB is the resistance value for activity B, 
Tßj is the initial instigating force for activity B, and 
Fg is the instigating force for activity B. 
In Figure 2.1 the Principle of Change of Activity is illustrated in a situation in which 
a subject is motivated by three different action tendencies. 
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Figure 2.1 An illustration of the Principle of Change of Activity from the dynamics-
of-action model of Atkinson and Birch, in which the sequence and 
duration of individual actions from three different motive ranges (a, b and 
c) are shown. F is the instigating force, С is the consummatory force, с is 
the consummatory value, Τ is the action tendency, Τ is the resultant action 
tendency, I is the inhibitory force, R is the force of resistance, r is the 
disinhibiting value, N is the negaction tendency, ΔΤ and ΔΝ represent 
changes in Τ and N compared to the previous time unit. (Adapted from 
Figure 12.18 page 635, Heckhausen, 1980a.) 
2,4.3.Some critical remarks with regard to the dynamics-of-action 
model 
All in all the dynamics-of-action model is a very complicated theory. The 
hypotheses, that can be deduced from the model, are often to difficult to follow through 
in all their implications (Heckhausen, 1980a). To calculate which resultant action 
tendency will be dominant at what time, the variables in the mathematical formula have 
to be substituted with numerical values. For example, which values should be 
substituted for the strength of the instigating and the inhibiting force? Atkinson and 
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Birch (1974) only supply some preliminary ideas, based on the earlier risk-taking 
model, for the empirical specification of these variables. The operationalisation and 
measurement of the hypothetical parameters has been largely neglected until now. As a 
result empirical evidence for the dynamic model is still scarce. To date there have been 
only a few experiments performed with respect to task choice in a dynamic choice 
situation (Kuhl and Blankenship, 1979a, 1979b; Schneider, 1978) and some 
experiments with respect to the consummatory value of success and failure 
(Blankenship, 1982). Instead, the dynamic model seems to function more as a heuristic 
device for the integration of different theoretical ideas. One of the biggest problems of 
the model is that cognitions are not yet incorporated: the relationship between cognition 
and action is as yet unspecified. There is no place for cognitive control while 
performing an activity and there is also no self-evaluation with its accompanying 
motivational influences. 
2.5 . Problems connected with the achievement motivation theory 
There are a number of problems connected with the formulation of the achievement 
motivation theory. In particular, it proves to be difficult to replace variables in the 
equations, used by the theory for prediction of behavior change, with numerical values 
representing their real life counterparts. In the first place a measure for the motive 
variable has to be selected, then a representation for the subjective probability of 
success has to be found. Last but not least, a representation for the incentive value of 
success or failure has to be selected. 
2 . 5 . 1 . Measuring the motive to hope for success and the motive to avoid 
failure. 
One of the main controversies in the field of motive research centers around the 
measurement of motives (Heckhausen, 1980a; De Bruyn, Alberts and Peters, 1979). 
The most ideal way to measure motivation would be to bring subjects in all kinds of 
motivational situations and observe their reactions. But this is simply not possible. As 
an alternative there are two conceptually different ways of measuring motives, i.e., 
with respondent or with operant techniques (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell, 
1953). With respondent measures, or questionnaires, subjects are asked to rate the 
degree to which a number of descriptions about themselves are true. In this case 
subjects have to respond by choosing one of a number of predetermined answers to a 
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Situation supplied by the test leader. When measuring motives with an operant 
procedure subjects can reply in any way they want. They are not restricted in their 
answers. Moreover, the answer is more lifelike because subjects respond to possible 
real life situations. One disadvantage of this kind of measurement is the ambiguity of 
the situation: both the test situation is ambiguous (because the stimuli used are very 
complex), and the test behavior is ambiguous (because subjects have complete freedom 
of answering). Consequently, it is difficult to decide on parameters for both test 
situation and test behavior with the same meaning for different individuals when they 
are compared to one another. However, the main advantages of the projective 
techniques remain that they are ecologically more valid and that they activate more 
realistic motivational experiences. 
Both McClelland and Atkinson focus on affects when defining the achievement 
motive. McClelland (1958) defines the need for achievement as the positive or negative 
affect aroused in situations involving competition with a standard of excellence, where 
performance can be evaluated as successful or unsuccessful. Atkinson (1964) defines 
the motive to achieve as the capacity for taking pride in accomplishment and the motive 
to avoid failure as the capacity for reacting with shame and embarrassment when the 
outcome of performance is failure. Both formulations are rooted in the psychoanalytic 
school of motivation, attesting to the influence of Murray and Freud. Therefore, the 
analysis of fantasy by means of the TAT (Morgan and Murray, 1938) is considered the 
best approach for measuring the need for achievement. The TAT is based on Freud's 
projection mechanism. Projection is a defense mechanism: people project their own 
feelings and behavior to other people. To use projection in motive measurement, the 
pictures of the TAT have to constitute situations of the achievement motive domain. 
Measurement consists of a content analysis of the stories subjects write to various 
pictures designed to elicit achievement themes. Subjects see the pictures for 20 seconds 
and subsequently have to answer four questions: 1) What is happening? Who are the 
persons? 2) What has led up to this situation? That is, what has happened in the past? 
3) What is being thought? What is wanted? By whom? 4) What will happen? What 
will be done? A scoring manual has been developed in order to make reliable scoring of 
TAT stories possible (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell, 1953). To construct a 
score for the achievement need, the amount of comments in which achievement 
motivation is expressed as a concern to compete with a standard of excellence, in the 
content of the stories, is rated. 
In the beginning only a single achievement motive, which ranged from negative 
(trying to avoid achievement situations) to positive (trying to approach achievement 
situations), was measured using the TAT pictures. Heckhausen (1963) conceives the 
28 
achievement situation as influencing two achievement-related motives: hope of success 
and fear of failure, which both should be measured by the TAT. Atkinson and Litwin 
(1960) decide to measure both motives with different measuring devices: the hope of 
success is measured with the TAT, while fear of failure is measured by the TAQ. 
There are a number of advantages of projective measures as compared to respondent 
measures. The first advantage is that subjects can give very diverse answers which are 
suited to their own situations (they are not forced to restrict their answers). The second 
advantage is that subjects don't really know what is measured in this way, therefore, 
they will not consciously try to falsify their responses or give socially desirable 
answers. However, there is also a disadvantage connected with measuring the 
achievement motive with the help of the TAT. The achievement motive may be elicited 
in different situations for different subjects. Thus, not everyone will show his or her 
true level of achievement motive with respect to the pictures that comprise the TAT. 
There should, in fact, be pictures from many different fields of life to measure the level 
oí achievement motive for a large number of subjects. 
In contrast to projective measures, questionnaires either force subjects to choose 
between two alternatives which supposedly describe them, or ask subjects to indicate 
the agreement or disagreement with a statement. Correlations between scores on 
projective measurement devices with scores on questionnaires appear to be very low. 
This result leads to the conclusion that these different approaches to measuring the need 
for achievement in fact measure different things. According to Kuhl (1982), the 
thinking process with regard to measurement devices based on fantasy seems to be 
dominated by principles related to the attractiveness of goals and the possible fulfilment 
of wishes. People fantasize about goals they want to reach, no matter whether or not 
they think they actually can reach these goals. Under fantasy conditions cognitions may 
be more influenced by the pleasure principle than by the reality principle. The thinking 
process with regard to questionnaires seems to tap a process aiming at a realistic 
assessment of the chances of success, instead of being primarily determined by wish 
fulfilment. 
According to Fineman (1977), trait measures should fulfil a number of 
psychometric requirements. The first one is that the items should be sufficiently 
homogeneous since they are considered to tap a unitary construct. In general, however, 
the reliability coefficients of the TAT seem to be very low. Therefore, there seems to be 
little confidence that the TAT is measuring a unitary psychological construct. A second 
psychometric requirement of any trait measure is that the test scores are stable over 
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time. Scores on the TAT, however, appear not to be stable over time, but instead 
appear to be sensitive to conditions of testing, they are not even supposed to have a 
high test-retest reliability. A third psychometric requirement for trait measures is that the 
validity should be high. Although contrary to everyday practice, it may well be the case 
that with projective techniques the reliability of a test should be inferred through its 
validity. The proponents of using the TAT as a measuring device for the achievement 
motives disagree with Fineman about the importance of high reliability scores. 
McClelland (1958), for example, suggests that the stability of motivational dispositions 
should be inferred indirectly from the validity. Atkinson, Bongort and Price (1977) 
demonstrated the validity of the TAT for measuring the achievement motives, despite a 
very low internal consistency. They performed a computer simulation in which the time 
hypothetical subjects spend in telling achievement-related stories could predict the 
motive structure of the subjects. 
According to Fineman (1977), TAT measurement is not validated by experiments in 
which a number of hypotheses derived from achievement theory are tested. On the 
other hand, as an interactional predictor of performance and as a predictor of several 
aspects of achievement motivation theory, the TAT appears to possess a reasonable 
amount of construct validity. 
Problems with the validity, reliability, time-consuming and complicated test 
administration and scoring of the TAT, led Gjesme and Nygârd (1970) to construct a 
new measurement device: the Achievement Motives Scale (AMS). The AMS is a 
questionnaire, measuring both the hope of success and the fear of failure motive (which 
are viewed as relatively stable personality characteristics), based on the theory of 
Atkinson (1958). According to this theory, the achievement motives should be 
construed as the capacity to anticipate certain affects in situations in which performance 
is compared to a standard of excellence. Because the motives are strongly related to 
affects, a questionnaire that intends to measure these motives should consist of items 
referring to these affects as opposed to items referring to criterium behavior. In this 
latter case the motive concept, as defined by the items, already contains the behavior 
that has to be predicted and ends in establishing a relation between behavior and 
behavior, instead of the intended relation between criterium and motive. The motive to 
approach success is characterized as a capacity to anticipate pleasure or pride, and the 
motive to avoid failure as a capacity to anticipate pain or embarrassment, resulting from 
performance in a particular situation. In order for these affects to manifest themselves in 
the situation there must be insecurity as to the outcome of the performance. In addition, 
the situations described in the items should constitute the same probability of success 
and failure for all subjects taking the test. In order to reliably measure the achievement 
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motives, the items should not be specific but, instead, the achievement situation should 
be described as general as possible. Specific situations can be differentially challenging 
for different persons, resulting in individual differences in motivation which are not 
related to differences in motives (Nygârd and Gjesme, 1973). 
The Achievement Motives Scale consists of two subscales of 15 items each. The 
first 15 items refer to positive affects and are meant to measure the motive to hope for 
success, the second 15 items refer to negative affects and are meant to measure the 
motive to avoid failure. The items are kept rather vague by using terms like "do 
something" or "be busy with something" without referring to any specific task. The 
difficulty level of each item is kept constant for all subjects by additions like "the 
problem, that I probably can solve" or "the task, that seems slightly difficult". The 
AMS is a Likert scale: answers are scored with 4, 3,2 or 1 points, depending on how 
characteristic the item is for the person. The test results in two scores, one for the 
motive to achieve success (Ms) and one for the motive to avoid failure (Mj·). 
For the AMS, as originally formulated by Gjesme and Nygârd (1970), there are a 
number of studies concerning the reliability and validity of the device. Nygârd (1977) 
studies the reliability and stability over time of Ms and Mf and concludes that the AMS 
is sufficiently reliable (alpha coefficients for Ms varied between .60 and .81 and for Mf 
between .81 and .91) and stable over time (a test-retest reliability for Ms of .71 and for 
Mf of .65 was found). A factor analysis on the items of the AMS reveals three factors: 
fear of failure or a feeling of discontent in a challenging or demanding situation, a 
feeling of satisfaction in a situation that estimates own capacity and is experienced as 
slightly difficult, and a feeling of satisfaction when doing a difficult task. The 
correlation between the Ms and Mf items is slightly negative, the common variance 
being not more than 10%. These findings indicate that the two subscales of the AMS 
indeed measure different motive dimensions (Nygârd, 1977). 
According to Nygârd (1977), a high Ms score indicates high involvement in 
achievement situations, while a high Mf score indicates a high resistance against 
achievement situations. This statement implies that there should be a relation between 
school achievement and scores on the AMS. Nygârd (1977) finds a moderate relation, 
with correlations for Ms ranging from .20 to .54, and for Mf ranging from -.10 to -.63, 
which he explains by the fact that school achievement is only partly determined by 
motivation and by the fact that the school situation does not have to appeal to motives. 
Rand (1978) also finds a relation between scores on the AMS with scores on 
achievement tests: children with higher scores on Ms score higher on achievement tests, 
while children with higher scores on Mf score lower on achievement tests. Children 
with higher scores on Ms are more persistent and work more intensely at the task, 
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which is exactly the definition of Ms. Nygârd (1977) also demonstrates a relation 
between persistence and scores on the AMS. Gjesme (1974) reports a number of 
studies in which he shows that pupils high in Ms and low in Mf show more 
achievement-oriented activity then pupils low in Mj and high in Mf and, in this way, he 
provides a validation for measuring motives by means of the AMS. 
Rand (1978) shows that the Mf scale oí the AMS is moderately correlated (.44) with 
the Test Anxiety Scale. Analyses by Nygârd (1977) and Rand (1978) show that there 
are no or only very small correlations between a ly detection scale and the AMS, 
leading to the conclusion that the AMS is not influenced by a tendency to give social 
desirable answers. 
In summary, it can be said that the AMS proves to be a reliable and valid instrument 
to measure the achievement motives. Based on the positive findings in research with the 
AMS in Norway the items have been translated in Dutch and the scale was used in 
research in the Netherlands (Poulie, van den Bereken and Jansen, 1985; van den 
Bereken, 1986; Houtmans, 1986). The data which have been collected in these studies 
are used to calculate measures for reliability and validity of the Dutch version of the 
AMS and in addition are used to begin the construction of norm groups for scores on 
the Ms and the Mf (Houben, 1987). The Dutch version of the AMS is found to be 
reliable (for Ms alpha coefficients of .88 and for Mf alpha coefficients of .91 are 
found). The test also proves to be stable over time (test-retest reliability for Ms is .55 
and for Mf it is .57). The stability coefficients show that half of the variance is stable 
over time and thus caused by the motive disposition, while the other half is caused by 
situational parameters. A general conclusion is that the AMS is a reliable instrument. 
The correlation between Ms and Mf items is .24, the shared variance of both 
subscales is thus only 6%, Therefore, it can be concluded that the subscales measure 
two independent constructs. A factor analysis of the AMS scores also shows that all 
items load predominantly on two different factors. 
Comparable to the findings with the Norway version of the AMS, Ms scores 
correlate positively with school achievement, while M f scores correlate negatively with 
school achievement. The AMS has also been correlated with other questionnaires. 
There is a moderately positive correlation between the p-scale of Hermans (1971) PMT-
k (which is the subscale measuring the achievement motive) and the Ms score of the 
AMS, and between the FM score of Hermans PMT-k (which measures negative fear of 
failure) and the Mf score of the AMS. There are low to moderate correlations between 
scales which presumably measure the same construct, i.e., between the AMS and the 
PMT-k, the SSAT (Situation Specific Anxiety Test; Bergen, 1981) and the TCM (Test 
for Cognitive Motivation; Smits, 1982). While the AMS primarily measures affects 
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connected with achievement motivation, the other scales are primarily directed towards 
behavior in achievement situations. The correlation between the AMS and tests 
measuring other constructs (such as intelligence and social desirability) appears to be 
low. 
De Bniyn, Alberts and Peters (1979) found that both with regard to its theoretical 
background and with regard to its psychometric qualities the AMS compares favorably 
with other questionnaires, in particular with the PMT-k (Hermans, 1971). Therefore, in 
this thesis the Dutch translation of the Achievement Motives Scale is used to measure 
the motive structure of the subjects. 
2 .5 .2 . Measuring the subjective probability of success 
Another variable for which it is difficult to fill in a concrete value is the subjective 
probability of success on a task or the difficulty level of a task. According to Kuhl 
(1982), experimental manipulation and psychometric assessment of subjective 
probabilities has proved to be extremely difficult. These problems may be simply a 
result of the fact that subjective probability is not a phenomenological construct. If 
people are not used to calculating probabilities, it may well be difficult to induce them to 
use these same probabilities. 
Nevertheless, in experiments about achievement motivation, people have been 
confronted with subjective probabilities of success. This is done in three different 
ways. Firstly, in some studies subjects are asked to supply a value for the success 
probability of different tasks. However, Atkinson and his colleagues did not express 
great confidence in subjects' statements about subjective probability. Such statements 
are instrumental actions and, like other actions, they too must be understood as the 
expression of situationally aroused motivational tendencies (Atkinson and Feather, 
1966). Secondly, in other studies norm-referenced values are supplied. These values 
are sometimes calculated on the basis of the performance of a group of people, but 
more frequendy they are fictitious group norms (Feather, 1961, 1963; Weiner, 1965, 
1966). According to Heckhausen (1977), to induce subjective probabilities of success it 
is insufficient to tell subjects what percentage of a reference group has mastered a task 
at a particular difficulty level. Besides reference norms, estimates of the probability of 
success also depend on the evaluation of their own competence and on the expected 
investment of effort (the more effort is invested, the higher the expectancy of success 
should be). Thirdly, in still other studies an objective measure of difficulty is supplied. 
In these studies more emphasis is placed on the control of objective task characteristics 
that are supposed to induce various expectancies of success (Heckhausen, Schmält and 
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Schneider, 1985). However, for a number of tasks it is very difficult to decide the 
probability of success at that task. With some tasks of a physical nature it is probably 
possible to judge the difficulty of the task by simply looking at it (i.e«, shooting a ball 
into a goal area is easier if the goal area is bigger than if it is smaller). However, for 
most mental tasks it is difficult to decide the probability of success by simply looking at 
the task, since there are usually no direcdy visible objective task characteristics 
indicating die difficulty of the task. 
Although the subjective probability of success has been operationalized in a number 
of different ways, there is as yet no obvious measurement procedure. The most 
promising approach seems to be a measure based on objective task characteristics. 
However, the definition of these task characteristics in the case of mental tasks is as yet 
quite difficult. Another approach is to look at objective measures based on task 
performance. As an example of such a measure indicating subjective probability of 
success, Schneider (1978) suggested the decision time for choosing a certain task. 
In this thesis subjects are confronted with cognitive tasks (perceptual mazes and 
anagrams) for which there are no directly visible objective task characteristics indicating 
the difficulty of the task. Since even adults are not used to working with probabilities 
(Kuhl, 1982), it must be difficult for children to differentiate between tasks with 
different probabilities of success. For children success or failure at the previous trial 
should have a large effect on the expectation of success at the following trial and thus 
on the probability of success. Therefore, verbal descriptions for the difficulty levels of 
the tasks, ranging from "very easy" to "very difficult", are used. Through extensive 
practice sessions children are acquainted with the tasks and with the number of tasks 
they can solve of each difficulty level. The practice sessions are meant to consolidate 
the "subjective probabilities of success", i.e., the difficulty level of the task. At the very 
least the sequence of difficulty levels can be kept constant by confronting children with 
a number of practice trials. 
2.5.3. Assessing the incentive value 
Another problem is that the dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1970) 
implies that the incentive value of success at a task is linearly related to the probability 
of success at that task. When, in a number of experiments, success-oriented subjects 
appeared to choose tasks with a higher than intermediate level of difficulty, the relation 
between difficulty level and incentive value was redefined (see Heckhausen, Schmält 
and Schneider, 1985). However, the problem of subjects choosing tasks of all levels of 
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difficulty could not be solved by revisions of the model. Another problem is that the 
theory does not concern itself with the case in which there are other incentives 
associated with task performance, besides success at the task at hand. In practice, this 
implies that the theory is not applicable to most situations in which people perform 
activities, since in real life most activities are associated with other incentives, besides 
the feelings of satisfaction at finishing a task. In the next Chapter the influence of 
extrinsic rewards on task behavior is reviewed. 
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3 . THE INFLUENCE OF REWARD AND INFORMATION ON TASK 
MOTIVATION 
3 . 1 . Introduction 
The dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1974), as described in Chapter 
2, concerns itself primarily with instigating or inhibitory forces emanating from the 
stimulus situation and from the performance of at resistance to an activity. The strength 
of the instigating and inhibitory forces for perfonning a particular activity differs for 
each individual. However, for each individual the initial value of these forces (i.e., the 
value which the forces have when an individual starts to think about performing the 
activity) is conceived as relatively constant. It is the result of a developmental process. 
During this process external influences, like rewards and punishments, determine the 
strength which each force finally will reach. When the motivational system is 
established, at the age of 10 to 12, the strength of the forces has reached its ultimate 
value and will only change for the duration of a particular behavioral sequence as a 
result of performing a particular activity. 
The dynamics-of-action model intends to explain "intrinsic" or task inherent 
motivation. According to this model, the motivation to perform a certain task only 
depends on the individual and on the task at hand. The variables which are important in 
this theory are motive strength of the individual, probability of success at a certain task 
(assumed to reflect the difficulty level of the task) and the incentive value of success 
and failure at that task (which is only related to affective self-evaluation and not to any 
other consequences tied to task completion). There is no room for any extrinsic 
variables which could influence the motivation of a subject. In real life, however, 
besides the difficulty level of the task and the corresponding incentive value of task 
completion, a number of factors can influence task motivation. In contrast to the 
theories of achievement motivation, most theories of intrinsic motivation do concern 
themselves with extrinsic factors influencing the motivation process. In this Chapter 
task behavior will be described as a process consisting of a number of stages. The 
influence of two extrinsic factors (reward and information) on task behavior will be 
described, both from the viewpoint of intrinsic motivation theories and achievement 
motivation theories. 
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3 2. A process model for task behavior 
In studies about human information processing the time elapsing between a stimulus 
and !he response to this stimulus, is divided into a number of successive parts, 
presumably representing different cognitive processes or stages (Sternberg, 1969). 
Similarly, task performance could also be seen as a process consisting of a number of 
motivational phases. The separate phases can be recognized by the decisions a subject 
makes in trying to reach the task solution or to avoid the task altogether. 
When subjects are confronted with a task, they are in fact confronted with a large 
number of decisions. They can, for example, ignore the task and do something else 
instead They can also decide to engage in the task. If they decide to engage in the task, 
they are again confronted with a number of alternative options. They must now decide 
in which way they will perform the task. This decision may partly depend on the 
previous decision. If they decide to engage in the task because they really want to 
perform it, then they perhaps will perform it differendy compared to the situation in 
which they are forced by some external agent to engage in the activity. In other words, 
if a task represents the intrinsic choice of an individual, than task performance may 
differ from the case in which a task is prescribed. When subjects really start to perform 
the activity, they again have several options regarding the way in which they decide to 
do this. They can decide to work as fast as possible or they can try to deliver high 
quality work. In other words, subjects can opt for either speed or accuracy. The task 
can be an overleamed and rather simple task, it can be a highly complex and unknown 
kind of task, or anything between these two extremes. Depending on the task structure 
subjects can make several decisions regarding the way in which they will go about the 
task. They have to decide how much effort they are willing to spend on the task, and 
how long they will persist in trying to find the right answer (this will mainly be the case 
when the task is rather complex). If they are confronted with several similar tasks of 
which they are able to solve only a limited number, they have to choose which ones 
they will try to solve. 
In summary, it appears that subjects who are confronted with a task are in fact 
confronted with a number of performance-related decisions. At every step of the 
solution process the subject has to decide how to proceed. The two main factors 
influencing the way in which subjects handle a task they are confronted with 
(particularly a cognitive task), are intelligence (or ability) and motivation. 'Ability' 
gives an indication about the maximum possible performance on a particular task in 
ideal circumstances; 'motivation' determines the actual performance at a particular task. 
Suppose a subject is very good at mathematics. If this person is confronted with a 
number of simple arithmetic tasks, he should be able to perform those tasks very well. 
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According to his ability, these tasks should not present any problem for this subject. 
The simplicity of the tasks can, however, have an adversive effect on the motivation to 
perform them. Therefore, subjects can perform inadequately due to motivational 
faeton, despite high ability in this area. 
In every phase of the process of task solution motivation will influence the actual 
task performance. Most theories of motivation, however, restrict their attention to a 
limited number of these phases. According to theories of achievement motivation, for 
example, motivation has an influence on task choice, CHI the intensity with which a task 
is performed, and on the persistence or the time a subject is willing to spend on finding 
the solution to a task. Motivation to perform a task is usually seen as being determined 
by a combination of external and internal factors. According to the achievement 
motivation theories (cf., Atkinson and Birch, 1974), the internal factors are 
represented by the motive structure of the subject, in particular by the strength of the 
motive to avoid failure and the strength of the motive to hope for success. The external 
or situational factors are the difficulty level of a task and the incentive value, which 
success or failure, has for the subject 
There are two other factors which may also influence the motivation of a subject to 
perform a task, but which are often ignored in theories of achievement motivation. 
These factors are the external incentives associated with correct task solution (i.e., 
children earn a good grade when performing well at an exam, besides being satisfied 
with their performance or feeling competent) and the feedback or information subjects 
get about how well they are doing on the task. Of course rewards for correct task 
solution and information about task performance do not constitute two independent 
factors influencing motivation and, thereby, task performance. There is a clear relation 
between them: receiving rewards is one way of receiving feedback. There is as yet no 
complete motivation theory of task performance encompassing the role of reward and 
feedback. In the following sections studies about the influence of rewards and feedback 
on motivation are summarized. 
3 .3 . The influence of extrinsic rewards on motivation and performance 
In this section the influence of rewards on motivation, and, thereby, on task 
performance, will be investigated. First, the role of rewards or incentive values within 
the framework of the dynamics-of-action model will be studied. Then, the role of 
rewards within the framework of theories of intrinsic motivation will be investigated. 
And, at the end of this section, a number of variables will be mentioned which 
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moderate the influence of incentives on motivation. In the studies reported here, the 
influence of rewards can be discerned in two dependent variables. In the first place the 
influence is reflected in the choice fat certain tasks and in the second place it is reflected 
in an increase in performance at a task. 
3.3.1.The influence of rewards in the dynamics-of-action model 
In the dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1974), difficulty level of a 
task and incentive value of success or failure are assumed to be inversely related. In 
other words, the difficulty level of a task detennines the incentive value of success or 
failure at that task. Consequently, the incentive value of success at a difficult task is 
higher than the incentive value of success at an easy task. The incentive value of 
success must be understood as positive affect, in particular as feelings of pride, the 
incentive value of failure as negative affect, in particular as feelings of shame. As such 
these incentives are intrinsic, and Ш defined by the situation a person finds himself in. 
Apart from these feelings of pride and shame associated with task completion, other 
consequences of task outcome are not considered in any explicit way to be of influence. 
In other words, the dynamics-of-action model does not deal with the fact that success at 
a task could be externally rewarded or failure at a task could be punished, while these 
external rewards (and punishments) could, subsequently, influence motivation. 
Thus the question remains whether the feelings of pride and shame are the only 
incentives when a person performs a task. According to Heckhausen (1968), there are 
other types of incentives, independent of success probability, such as personal 
importance of a task, which are neglected in research in the area of achievement 
motivation. All these incentives hardly ever have been studied in relation to the dynamic 
theory of motivation. In contrast, there is an extensive body of research in the realm of 
intrinsic motivation about the influence of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. 
3.3.2.The influence of rewards in theories on intrinsic motivation 
Incentive values as defined by the dynamics-of-action model are conceptually 
comparable to intrinsic incentives as defined by theories of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 
1975; de Charms, 1968). In both cases a person performs a particular task because he 
wants to reach a specific goal. Intrinsic motivation is defined as performing a task for 
no other reason than the positive feelings or satisfaction inherent in task participation 
and completion, i.e., the intrinsic incentive (Bates, 1979). What happens to this 
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intrinsic motivation if children receive an extrinsic reward (money, course credit, a 
Good Players Award) for performing a task they formerly performed without receiving 
any rewards for it? The consequences of an extrinsic reward appear to depend on the 
nature and the salience of the reward (Deci and Ryan, 1980). Material rewards (such as 
money and small prizes) decrease intrinsic motivation, even when contingent on 
successful task completion, while verbal praise has no devastating effect on intrinsic 
motivation (Weiner and Mander, 1978). According to Anderson, Manoogian, and 
Reznick (1976), rewards in general are detrimental to intrinsic motivation. They claim 
that rewards generally result in a change in attributions. People start to believe that their 
motivation to work at the task is due to the reward they expect to receive, and not to the 
intrinsic satisfaction associated with performing the task. This effect in particular occur» 
if the reward is expected or contingent on performance, salient and irrelevant to the 
activity's content (such as prizes, awards, and money). On the other hand intrinsic 
motivation is increased when the reward consists of verbal reinforcement. 
Rewards contingent on sheer participation in an activity lead to a decreased interest 
in that activity, especially if it is in itself an entertaining or stimulating enterprise (Deci, 
1971). Receiving unexpected rewards does not decrease intrinsic motivation (Lepper, 
Greene and Nisbett, 1973; Lepper and Greene, 1975). Rewards that are inherent in the 
task content increase intrinsic motivation (Kruglanski, Riter, Amitai, Margolin, Shabtai 
and Zaksh, 1975). In general, it seems to be the case that intrinsic motivation to display 
an activity decreases (de Charms, 1968; Deci, 1975) if an intrinsically rewarding 
activity is associated with an extrinsic reward. It seems that subjects begin to dislike the 
activity. They will not perform it anymore, unless it is again associated with an 
extrinsic reward. However, rewards do not always show a devastating effect on 
performance: rewarding a subject for a boring task, for example, increases the 
satisfaction with this task. 
According to Pittman, Emery, and Boggiano (1982), subjects can have either an 
intrinsic or an extrinsic motivational orientation. An intrinsic motivational orientation is 
connected with features such as novelty, challenge, and the opportunity for mastery 
experiences, while an extrinsic motivational orientation is connected with features such 
as predictability and simplicity. If subjects are confronted with conditions in which 
rewards are contingent on task performance and not on sheer task participation, than an 
intrinsic orientation is related to a preference for difficult and challenging tasks (i.e., 
tasks which are likely to show a gain in competence over time, and which are 
somewhat unpredictable and fun). An extrinsic orientation is related to a preference for 
tasks which are simple and predictable. These preferences are carried over to other 
settings, even if the contingencies are no longer active. 
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3 . 3 . 3 . Combining extrinsic and intrinsic rewards 
According to the classical Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy theories (Vroom, 
1964), both intrinsic and extrinsic incentives should add up to give the total reward for 
a job (Finder, 1976). However, as already described, Deci's research (1971, 1975) 
shows that extrinsic rewards are detrimental to intrinsic modvation for a task. External 
rewards may shift the justification for working cm a task from internal causes (working 
on a task for its own sake, because it is an enjoyable enterprise) to external causes 
(working for the money or grade earned with it). Consequently, the justification for 
performing the task will disappear when the external reward is taken away. In addition, 
the intrinsic motivation for performing the task will also be undermined. Finder (1976) 
supplied evidence for Deci's theory. He showed that people who are paid under a 
noncontingent schedule derive more intrinsic motivation from their job, express more 
work sadsfaction, and higher degrees of intrinsic motivation than people who are paid 
according to a more contingent schedule. 
Heckhausen (1977) also concludes that intrinsic and extrinsic rewards for 
performing an activity do not simply add up. He reports two experiments in which 
tasks of different difficulty levels (and thus with different intrinsic incentives) are 
associated with an identical extrinsic reward. In one experiment (Heckhausen, 1968) 
subjects had to choose eight tasks for a presumably important admission type test. They 
were told that, regardless of the difficulty level, all right task solutions would be scored 
with the same weight. All subjects chose tasks of the lower difficulty levels. There 
was, however, a difference between success- and failure-oriented subjects: success-
oriented subjects chose tasks of a slightly higher difficulty level. This result indicates 
that success-oriented subjects are less liable to yield to an extrinsic incentive if it 
conflicts with the intrinsic incentive based on task difficulty. In other words, success-
oriented subjects stuck more closely to the task relevant clues. In another experiment 
Shapira (1976) presented subjects with tasks of seven difficulty levels of which one 
had to be chosen. A correct task solution would either be rewarded by a salient 
monetary reward, independent of task difficulty level, or would not be rewarded at all. 
In the condition with the monetary reward subjects chose the second easiest task, while 
in the condition without the extrinsic reward they chose the second most difficult task. 
3 .3 .4 . Factors moderating the influence of rewards on task performance 
A number of factors which moderate the influence of rewards on motivation will be 
reviewed in this section. The first factor, which is often forgotten when the influence of 
42 
rewards on task performance is studied, is the attainment value of a task (Sorensen, 
1976). The attainment value is the value a subject connects with success at the task. In 
other words, how important is success at a task for the subject? Sorensen found that, 
when material rewards are connected with task solution, performance level does not 
differ for tasks high or low in attainment value. When more intrinsic rewards are 
connected with task solution, performance level differs for tasks high or low in 
attainment value: for verbal praise, performance level is slightly higher for tasks high in 
attainment value; for knowledge of results, performance level even is significantly 
higher for tasks high in attainment value. This finding implies that, in the case in which 
no rewards are connected with task solutions, attainment value is an important factor in 
determining task performance. 
A second factor which moderates the influence of rewards on performance is the 
feeling of self-efficacy (Schunk, 1984). Self-efficacy (or sense of competence) refers to 
personal judgements about how well one can perfonn actions in specific situations. 
Information about self-efficacy is supplied by performance indexes. Efficacy appraisal 
is an inferential process that involves weighting the relative contributions of both ability 
and nonability factors (task difficulty, effort expended etc.). If children receive 
performance-contingent rewards, and set goals which they try to attain, then self-
efficacy is judged higher, and, consequently, performance appears to improve on a post 
test. This may be due to the fact that rewards and setting goals may have caused a 
higher goal commitment and thereby increase the intrinsic motivation to work at the 
task. Therefore, it is important to ascertain that feelings of self-efficacy can be 
manifested when intrinsic motivation to work should be increased. 
A third factor which moderates the influence of rewards on task performance is 
ability. Winnick and Murphy (1976) found that for high ability subjects there is no 
difference in performance level when task outcome has no consequence, when a reward 
is given for a correct task solution, or when an incorrect response is punished by a loss 
of tokens. For low ability subjects, on the other hand, performance level is higher in 
the condition in which correct task solution is associated with a reward than m the 
condition in which task outcome has no consequence or incorrect responses are 
punished. This finding implies that low ability subjects may be more susceptible to the 
influence of rewards than high ability subjects. 
A fourth factor which moderates the influence of rewards on task performance is 
constituted by goals and intentions. Rosswork (1977, citing Locke, 1968) claims that 
incentives do not affect performance unless they also affect goals and intentions. When 
subjects set themselves specific difficult goals, higher levels of performance are reached 
than in the case of nonspecific goals, regardless of incentives connected with task 
outcome. If conscious goals or intentions are accepted by the subjects, they maintain 
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behavior at a given level, despite manipulations of incentive value. According to Locke 
(1968), goals and intentions are a necessary condition for most kinds of behavior. 
Incentives will affect behavior only through their effects on goals and intentions. In a 
number of studies it is found that the harder the goal the higher the level of 
performance. However, this conclusion is only tme if subjects accept the goals which 
they attempt to reach. If they reject the goals, the performance level is low. External 
goal setting can have both positive and negative effects on task performance 
(Mossholder, 1980). An individual may feel less competent and less self-determined if 
he has to meet an externally set goal, and in this way his motivation for the task at hand 
may decrease. If, on the other hand, the task is boring, goal setting may increase 
interest in the task. Mossholder found that assigning specific difficult goals for an 
interesting task reduces intrinsic motivation with respect to that task, while assigning 
specific difficult goals for a boring task increases intrinsic motivation. Subjects 
assigned to a goal condition report that their performance efforts are due to this goal 
setting more often than subjects in the condition without specific goals. Goal-induced 
stimulation seems to elicit the relative increase in task interest for subjects on the boring 
task. However, during break periods subjects do not continue to work on these boring 
tasks. Without explicit task goals subjects are motivated by characteristics of the task 
itself. Aside from the positive effect of goal setting as stimulating subsequent 
performance, it also affects the reason for performing a task, and, therefore, can have a 
negative effect on the feelings of self-competence of the subject. According to Jackson 
and Zedeck (1982), goal setting should be most effective on complex (cognitive) tasks 
where they cue the subject to generate, test, and implement alternative solution 
strategies. With simple (manual) tasks strategy development is not so important and, 
consequently, goal setting is less useful in improving performance. Locke's finding 
(1968) that "the harder the goal, the higher the level of performance" seems to 
contradict Atkinson's risk-preference theory (Atkinson, Bastian, Earl and Litwin, 
1960) in which performance is generally better at tasks of an intermediate level of 
difficulty. This contradiction is caused by the difference between task or goal 
assignment and task or goal acceptance. Difficult tasks will be accepted less readily than 
tasks of moderate difficulty levels (especially in an unnatural laboratory situation). If, 
however, a person accepts a difficult task, he is bound to try hard to realize it. Locke 
claims that the effects of incentives on performance depend on their relation with goals 
and intentions. Money, for example, induces subjects to do jobs or set goals they 
would not set themselves otherwise or out of their own free will, i.e., it commits them 
to tasks they would not otherwise undertake. 
A fifth factor which moderates the influence of rewards on performance is the 
relative salience of controlling and informational aspects of the reward (Daniel and 
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Esser, 1980). Uninteresting or boring tasks can be made more interesting by the 
addition of an external reward. When the negative effect of a change in the locus of 
causality is minimal (i.e., there is low initial interest in the task) or prevented (i. е., a 
task in which the reward is integral), the reward leads to more intrinsic motivation. 
According to Hughes, Sullivan, and Beaird (1986) and Harackiewicz (1979), 
controlling rewards, such as money, have a negative effect on the intrinsic motivation 
for a task, while informational rewards, such as positive feedback, have a positive 
effect on intrinsic motivation. In classroom situations performance-contingent grades 
(which provide information about competence and effective performance at a task) 
appear to maintain and enhance intrinsic motivation to work at the task. 
3.4. The influence of feedback or information about task performance 
on motivation and performance 
In this section the influence of feedback or information about task performance on 
motivation and, thereby, on subsequent task performance will be investigated. When 
performing a task, subjects usually want to know at the end whether they are successful 
or not. This knowledge may influence task performance on the following trials. In 
other words, feedback or knowledge of results may influence subsequent task 
performance and, therefore, should be considered as a motivating factor in motivation 
theories. First the role which feedback plays within the framework of the dynamics-of-
action model will be studied. Then the role of feedback in other motivation theories will 
be investigated. The function feedback has for the individual working at a task will be 
investigated. Finally, some factors which moderate the effect of feedback on task 
performance will be described. 
3.4.1.The influence of feedback in the dynamics-of-action model 
In this section the degree to which the dynamics-of-action model considers feedback 
or knowledge of results as a motivating factor with regard to task performance will be 
investigated. As far as task outcome is concerned, the dynamics-of-action model only 
pays attention to the incentive value associated with success or failure at a task. The 
theory does not explicitly concern itself with the information subjects can deduce from 
success or failure at a task, which can have an effect on subsequent task choice and task 
performance. 
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However, in an implicit way the theory is concerned with task outcome. Engaging 
in a task results in the development of a consummatory force that reduces the tendency 
to continue with this particular task. For both success and failure the consummatory 
force grows, although the growth rate is smaller in the case of failure than in the case of 
success (Blankenship, 1982). The dynamics-of-action model, therefore, predicts that 
task choice (for both success and failure at the previous task) should be affected in the 
following way: engaging in a task reduces the tendency to keep engaging in the same or 
a similar task. 
In most studies for which the dynamics-of-action model supplies the theoretical 
background, feedback about task outcome is readily available. The tasks used in these 
studies are almost exclusively of a physical nature and, therefore, feedback about task 
outcome is rather obvious (either the ring landed over the peg or not, either the ball is 
pushed through the gate or not). However, in some studies subjects have to compete 
with real or fake norms about the performance of their peers in order to experience 
success or failure at a task. In this case success or failure is not self-evident, and the 
test leader has to tell the subjects whether they were successful or not. However, 
whether feedback is self-evident or is supplied by the test leader, its influence on task 
choice and performance has not played a prominent part in studies about the dynamics-
of-action model. 
With regard to the dynamics-of-action model there are only a few studies that look 
explicitly at the effect of feedback on either performance level or subsequent task 
choice. One of these is a study by Schneider and Posse (1982). The usual finding in 
studies about task choice is a bell-shaped curve, indicating that most subjects (both 
success- and failure-oriented subjects) predominantly choose tasks of an intermediate 
level of difficulty. Schneider and Posse found that this bell-shaped curve, which results 
if the data of a number of subjects are pooled, is not a good representation of the choice 
sequence of each individual subject. When studying the data of a single subject it 
appears that the difficulty level chosen for the following task is strongly related to the 
result (success or failure) of the previous task. Following success, subjects usually 
choose a task with a higher difficulty level, while after failure they usually choose a 
task with the same level. The same pattern of results appears in a study by Rijsman 
(1975). He compared the effects of success and failure both in the context of a skill and 
a chance task. For the skill task his results are similar to those of Schneider and Posse. 
For the chance task he found а тсне unsystematic pattern, subjects appear to change the 
difficulty level of the task independent of success or failure at the previous task. 
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3.4 .2 .The influence of feedback in other motivation theories 
Feedback about task performance has played a role in a number of areas of 
achievement motivation research. One of these areas is Weiner's cognitive theory of 
achievement motivation (1980,1982). The basic assumption of attribution theory is that 
subjects are constantly trying to understand why they experienced success or failure at a 
certain task; they are trying to detennine the causal factors that can explain their 
performance. According to Weiner (1980), subjects use a variety of sources of 
information (such as information about prior performance on similar tasks, information 
about performance on different tasks, information about performance of other 
individuals) to reach this goal. One of the main questions of attribution theory is 
whether the attribution patterns of success- and failure-oriented subjects differ. 
Another area in which feedback about task performance is studied, is the theory 
about shifts in aspiration level (Moulton, 1965; Heckhausen, 1980a). The main 
objective of these studies is the effect of success and failure on the choice of a 
subsequent task, or in what way does aspiration level change after success or failure at 
the previous task? Success- and failure-oriented subjects appear to differ in the way in 
which they use the information from success and failure at an earlier task to choose the 
difficulty level of the next task. In general, failure-oriented subjects show more atypical 
shifts than success-oriented subjects, i.e., failure-oriented subjects more often choose a 
task with a lower difficulty level after success and a task with a higher difficulty level 
after failure than success-oriented subjects do. 
3.4.3.The function of feedback in motivation theories 
Feedback, as studied in motivation theories, serves a number of different functions 
for the individual. In the first place, feedback indicates the correct solution to a task. 
Kulhavy (1977) studied the relation between feedback and learning yields. He found 
that feedback will increase the amount of learning only, if it is given after subjects have 
supplied their own answer and if the test is not too difficult. If the latter two factors are 
accounted for, feedback is important since it allows subjects to correct their mistakes, 
confirms correct responses and tells the student how well the content is understood. 
Feedback also facilitates performance because it corrects inaccurate information 
obtained during instruction (Kulhavy, White, Topp, Chan, and Adams, 1985). 
A second function of feedback is ability assessment and self-evaluation. 
Achievement-oriented individuals have been shown to be interested in diagnostic ability 
assessment (Trope, 1975) and desirious of objective ability feedback (McClelland, 
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1961). Information or feedback about past performance has a facilitating effect on 
subsequent performance (Thomas and Ward, 1983). By means of feedback attention is 
focused on how much is being done and in this way the subject is motivated to try 
harder or persist longer at a task. Feedback also changes performance goals and thus 
enhances subsequent performance. It can also influence self-evaluation (such as 
satisfaction with performance). In this way feedback can influence the choice of 
difficulty level of a task which a person wants to solve. The choice of the first difficulty 
level varies between subjects, possibly as a function of motive strength. The difficulty 
level chosen at the next trial is a function of the difficulty level chosen previously, the 
outcome and the level of satisfaction with this outcome. When the stated outcome 
probability for a task (i.e., the objective success probability serving as an index of task 
difficulty) is not confirmed by the feedback experienced (i.e., the subjective success 
probability experienced by the subject), persistence and effort expended is affected by 
the evaluative reactions of subjects, for example, by their satisfaction with their 
feedback scores. In this way self-evaluative reactions can influence motivated behavior 
(Thomas, 1983). 
A third function of feedback is to give information about the causes of success and 
failure. Man is a rational information-gathering being, trying to understand the causal 
structure of the world. Performing at tasks high or low in difficulty level results in 
relatively little information about ability and effort expenditure. Both success- and 
failure-oriented subjects show a preference for tasks of intermediate levels of difficulty 
because those tasks confer the highest amount of satisfaction (both for positive and 
negative feelings accompanying winning or losing) and information about their own 
ability and effort expenditure (Meyer, Folkes and Weiner, 1976). 
3 . 4 . 4 . Factors moderating the influence of feedback on task performance 
There is a variety of factors which moderate the effect of feedback on performance. 
The first one is the salience of the feedback. Mitchell, Rothman, and Liden (1985) 
found that information about the performance of others (normative information) only 
has an effect on performance if it is presented as information about work presumably 
done by another subject and not if it is supplied by a summary chart on a wall. 
A second factor is goal setting. According to Locke and Shaw (1984), there is a 
linear relationship between the difficulty level of the goal subjects try to reach, and their 
performance. This is contrary to Atkinson's risk preference theory (Atkinson, Bastian, 
Earl and Litwin, 1960) in which performance is optimal at tasks of intermediate 
difficulty. The difference between both theories lies in the amount of feedback subjects 
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receive, i.e., in the goals assigned in the experiments. In Locke and Shaw's experiment 
there is feedback about how well subjects have to perform to be in the winning group, 
while in Atkinson's experiment subjects only consider their individual probability of 
success at each task. This implies that in Atkinson's experiment subjects have to set 
their own goals and it is, therefore, not self-evident which goal subjects are trying to 
reach. When there are no goals supplied for the subjects they will pay more attention to 
self-evaluation stimuli. This will result in higher performance levels for success-
oriented subjects and lower performance levels for failure-oriented subjects, compared 
to a situation in which the self-evaluation stimuli are not so prominent (Bossong and 
Löffler, 1985). 
A third very important factor moderating the influence of feedback on performance 
is the degree of the resultant achievement motivation of the subject. Success- and 
failure-oriented subjects differ in task choice and performance when receiving 
feedback. Success-oriented subjects show an increase in performance if they receive 
feedback about their previous performance, while performance of failure-oriented 
subjects does not differ in conditions with and without feedback (Matsui, Okada, and 
Kakuyama, 1982). Success-oriented subjects request information about their 
performance more often when the task difficulty is intermediate than when it is high or 
low. The converse is true for failure-oriented subjects (Halisch and Heckhausen, 
1977). In these cases feedback serves a self-evaluating function based on retrospective 
estimations of one's ability and expended effort. Information search may represent part 
of the self-monitoring process: subjects seek information about their performance in 
order to compare this performance with a criterion. Information can lead to uncertainty 
reduction about the task outcome and it can regulate effort expenditure. Achievement 
motivation research has not yet taken the feedback function of information search into 
account. When information is given during an ongoing activity it can influence the 
outcome and effort regulation during the task. In an experiment in which feedback 
about each task is supplied before subjects start with a new task, Halisch and 
Heckhausen (1977) found that feedback modifies output of effort in opposite directions 
for success- and failure-oriented subjects. After failure feedback success-oriented 
subjects increase performance speed, while failure-oriented subjects slow down. 
Success feedback has a reverse effect, but only slightly so. Success-oriented subjects 
regard failure as due to insufficient effort which can be overcome; failure-oriented 
subjects regard failure as due to stable causes that can not be influenced by effort. Lerch 
(1976) claims that in achievement situations success-oriented subjects choose tasks 
with probability levels at which the information about success is at a maximum, while 
failure-oriented subjects avoid tasks with probability levels at which the information 
about failure is at a maximum. According to Schneider and Eckelt (1975), all subjects 
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show a smaller decrease in performance after failure than after success. This implies 
that subjects put more effort in the task after failure. However, failure-oriented subjects 
show less decrease after failure than success-oriented subjects. In McClelland, 
Atkinson, Oark, and Lowell's formulation (1953), need-for-achievement may be 
summarized as an acquired motivational system in which knowledge of success at a 
reasonably difficult task has reinforcing properties, regardless of the primary drive-
reducing consequences of that success. Thus achievement motivation may clearly be 
expected to interact with the reinforcement component of feedback, particularly in a 
learning task (Peterson and Farley, 1974). Resultant Achievement Motivation is 
significantly related to performance under a 100 percent feedback schedule, but not 
under a 50 percent feedback schedule. For success-oriented subjects the 100 percent 
feedback learning schedule constitutes a positively reinforcing learning condition, while 
it is more threathening to failure-oriented subjects. Success- and failure-oriented 
subjects have different performance standards (Bossong, 1985). The standard of 
persons high in resultant achievement motivation is to solve the problem, while the 
standard of the persons low in resultant achievement motivation is to avoid the 
experience of anxiety. Under conditions of high self-awareness and salient success-
related incentives both success- and failure-oriented subjects perform equally well. 
Under conditions of self-awareness and failure-related incentives, failure-oriented 
subjects solve fewer problems than success-oriented subjects. When failure-related 
incentives are salient, failure-oriented subjects solve more problems in the condition of 
low seif-awareness than in the condition of high self-awareness. In the case of failure-
related incentives negative standards are avoided by success-oriented subjects by 
increasing performance, while in the case of failure-oriented subjects an avoidance 
conflict develops. According to Posse and Schneider (1978), both success- and failure-
oriented subjects use the information from success or failure at the previous task for 
their subsequent task choice and performance. This is contrary to the commonly held 
belief that success-oriented subjects are influenced more by success, while failure-
oriented subjects are influenced more by failure. 
3 .5 . Summary of the influence of rewards and feedback or information 
on task behavior 
Rewards. The results of the studies reported in this Chapter show clearly that 
extrinsic rewards influence motivational task behavior, especially task choice. Intrinsic 
motivation for a particular task is often deduced from task choice: if subjects choose a 
particular task without any outside pressure to do so, they are said to be intrinsically 
50 
motivated for that task. Material rewards that are expected, salient, contingent on 
participation only, and irrelevant to task content, appear to have a negative influence on 
intrinsic motivation, and thus on task choice. Activities that formerly were intrinsically 
satisfying, will not be chosen spontaneously any more when they have been associated 
with this kind of material reward at one time or another. On the other hand, extrinsic 
rewards in the form of verbal praise or verbal reinforcement appear to have a positive 
effect on intrinsic motivation and task choice: tasks which have at times been associated 
with verbal praise or reinforcement are subsequently chosen more often. Unexpected 
rewards and rewards inherent in task content appear to have no effect on intrinsic 
motivation or task choice. 
One very important finding regarding extrinsic rewards is that they are not additive 
with respect to intrinsic rewards. On the contrary, the extrinsic reward may even 
annihilate the intrinsic reward. Extrinsic rewards appear to shift the justification for 
working at a task to external causes, thereby destroying the intrinsic motivation. There 
is some evidence that this detrimental effect of extrinsic rewards is more apparent in 
failure-oriented children than in success-oriented children, 
Whether or not intrinsic and extrinsic rewards influence task behavior is determined 
by a number of factors, such as attainment value of the task, feelings of self-efficacy, 
ability, and goals and intentions. In the case of extrinsic rewards performance on tasks 
that are high or low in attainment value is similar, while in the case of intrinsic rewards 
performance is better for tasks with a high attainment value. If rewards are contingent 
on performance they can influence feelings of self-efficacy and in this way increase 
performance. The higher the ability of a subject, the less influence rewards have on task 
behavior. Low-ability subjects may be more susceptible to the influence of rewards. 
The influence of the reward is also dependent on the salience of its controlling or 
informational aspects. 
Feedback: The dynamics-of-action model does not consider feedback as a factor 
determining task choice. Implicitly, however, feedback does influence the motivational 
task process since the fact whether subjects experience success or failure at a task 
determines the value of the consummatory force. Other results suggest that success or 
failure on a prior trial determines the task choice of the following trial: after success 
subjects mainly choose tasks with a higher difficulty level, after failure they primarily 
choose tasks with a lower difficulty level. Both in deteimining causal attribution and in 
setting aspiration levels feedback seems to play an important part. Not only with regard 
to task choice, but also with regard to performance, feedback seems to play an 
important part. Since it allows ability assessment and self-evaluation and supplies 
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information about correctness of task solution, feedback influences persistence and, 
thereby, has a positive effect on performance. 
A lot of factors (such as salience of the feedback, goal setting, resultant achievement 
motivation of the subject) moderate the influence of feedback on task behavior. 
Performance is influenced more positively the more salient the feedback is. Subjects 
who try to achieve difficult goals are less influenced by feedback than subjects with 
goals which are easier to reach. Success-oriented subjects appear to be influenced more 
strongly by feedback than failure-oriented subjects. Success-oriented subjects show 
better performance in situations in which feedback is supplied than in situations without 
explicit feedback, while failure-oriented subjects show a similar performance in both 
kinds of situations. Success-oriented subjects appear to ask more information about 
their performance on tasks of an intermediate level of difficulty than on tasks of extreme 
levels of difficulty, while failure-oriented subjects behave in the opposite way. Tasks of 
an intermediate level of difficulty seem to be better candidates for a change in 
performance (for example, through effort regulation) than tasks of extreme difficulty 
levels. Success-oriented subjects appear to ask performance information in order to be 
able to regulate their effort expenditure and in this way increase their performance, 
while failure-oriented subjects ask for rather useless information. In addition, success-
oriented subjects increase their effort and performance speed after failure feedback, 
while failure-oriented subjects decrease effort and performance speed. It seems that 
success-oriented subjects regard failure as due to insufficient effort which can be 
overcome, while failure-oriented subjects see failure as due to stable causes and thus as 
unaffected by effort. 
S? 
4 . THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVE STRUCTURE ON DYNAMIC 
CHOICE BEHAVIOR 
4 . 1 . Introduction 
The main difference between traditional episodic theories of achievement motivation 
(Atkinson, 1957; Heckhausen, 1977) and the dynamic theory of achievement 
motivation (Atkinson and Birch, 1974) is the importance which the dynamic theory 
attaches to changes in behavior. Whereas the traditional theory mainly studies one 
person performing a single task, the dynamic theory investigates the stream of behavior 
which a person emits. In other words whereas the traditional theory tries to pinpoint the 
determinants of each individual action, the dynamic theory tries to identify the 
determinants of a change in behavior. 
All theories of achievement motivation imply that the activities performed by a 
subject are manisfestations of underlying motivational tendencies. At any particular 
moment every person is motivated by a number of different tendencies simultaneously. 
The behavior in which a subject engages is an expression of the dominant tendency. 
This does not imply, however, that the other tendencies suddenly disappear. On the 
contrary, they will persist until a psychological force modifies them. This is the 
assumption of the so-called inertial tendencies (Atkinson, 1964). 
Every tendency which is expressed in behavior is the sum of two components: The 
fira component is an action tendency or a tendency to actually perform the activity. The 
second component is the negaction tendency or a tendency not to perform the activity. 
Action and negaction tendencies wax and wane through the influence of a number of 
different forces. For the action tendency these are the instigating and consummatory 
forces, while for the negaction tendency these are the inhibitory force and the force of 
resistance. The instigating force represents environmental influences that cause an 
increase in the strength of an action tendency. This force develops when an activity has 
been intrinsically satisfying in the past or when the activity has been previously 
rewarded. Whenever an activity is expressed in behavior the consummatory force starts 
to increase. This force causes a decrease in the action tendency, in other words 
engaging in an activity causes a decrease in the action tendency to continue engaging in 
that activity. 
The negaction tendency is influenced by the inhibitory force and the force of 
resistance. The inhibitory force represents environmental influences that cause an 
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increase in the strength of a negaction tendency. This force develops when a certain 
activity has been frustrated or punished in the past. By definition a negaction tendency 
produces resistance to an activity, it dampens or blocks the performance of the activity. 
Analogous to the consummatory force which reduces the instigating force, there is a 
force of resistance which reduces the inhibitory force and, thereby, the resistance to an 
activity (Atkinson and Birch, 1970, 1974). 
Summarizing, there are two main differences between episodic and dynamic 
theories. First, the episodic theory only considers the strength of the instigating and 
inhibitory forces, whereas the dynamic theory complements these forces with the 
consummatory force and the force of resistance. Secondly, the episodic theory only 
considers the strength of the instigating and inhibitory forces at a particular time, 
whereas the dynamic theory investigates the changes of these forces over time, caused 
mainly by the influence of the consummatory force and the force of resistance. 
4 . 1 . 1 . Choice behavior in relation to motivation 
One of the behavioral correlates of motivation is the choice behavior of people 
confronted with a set of different tasks. A common finding of experiments in which 
people are confronted with tasks of different difficulty levels is that people show a 
gradual shift of preference to more difficult tasks (Atkinson and Feather, 1966; 
Atkinson, Bastian, Earl and Litwin, 1960). The explanation which the episodic theory 
gives for this phenomenon is that the perception of the difficulty of a task changes 
because of improvement due to practice with the task. Through this improvement the 
probability of success at a particular objective level of difficulty increases during the 
course of the experiment. A main assumption of the episodic theory is that subjects 
continue to choose tasks at their preferred subjective difficulty level. In order to choose 
tasks with the same subjective difficulty level during the entire experiment subjects have 
to choose tasks with an increasingly higher objective level of difficulty. If it would be 
possible to hold the subjective probability of success for each difficulty level constant 
during the course of the experiment the episodic theory predicts that subjects will 
choose the same difficulty level throughout the entire experiment (Atkinson and 
Feather, 1966; Atkinson, 1957; Raynor, 1969). 
The dynamic theory, however, can explain a shift of preference toward more 
difficult tasks even when the subjective probability of success at each difficulty level 
remains constant during the experiment. In addition to the instigating and inhibitory 
forces they also take the influence of the consummatory force and the force of 
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resistance into account. One of the main assumptions of the dynamic theory is that if 
one works at a task of a given difficulty level a consummatory force develops which 
reduces the tendency to keep choosing tasks of that level of difficulty. Another 
assumption is that this consummatory force is supposed to be greater with success than 
with failure at the task. Because subjects will experience more successes at easy than at 
difficult tasks, the consummatory force will be greater for tasks with a low level of 
difficulty than for tasks with a high level of difficulty. The result of the increase of the 
consummatory force is a decrease in the action tendency to choose tasks at that 
difficulty level and, consequently, a shift to more difficult tasks during the course of the 
experiment. 
For failure-oriented subjects there is still another force that has an influence on task 
choice, namely the force of resistance. Resistance toward working at a given task 
difficulty level is supposed to be the result of fear of failure, and it, consequently, 
varies with success and failure at a task. Resistance is reduced more after success than 
after failure, therefore, it should decrease fastest at the lowest difficulty levels. This 
again implies that the consummatory force can start to operate earlier on these easy 
tasks and this again leads to a preference for more difficult tasks over time (Atkinson 
and Birch, 1974). 
In line with the above-mentioned theoretical insights with regard to the dynamics-
of-action model Kuhl and Blankenship (1979a and b) formulated the following 
hypotheses about task choice in a situation in which subjects are confronted with a set 
of tasks that differ in difficulty (i.e., in probability of success), a particular number of 
which they have to solve. 
Hypothesis 1: 
For success-oriented subjects (Ms>Mf) there is an increasing tendency to choose 
more difficult tasks during the course of the experiment. 
This hypothesis is based on the influence of the consummatory force. Subjects 
experience more successes at easy than at difficult tasks and, consequently, the 
consummatory force will be greater for easy tasks. As a result subjects will gradually 
shift to more difficult tasks. 
Hypothesis 2: 
For success-oriented subjects the first task they will choose will be of an 
intermediate level of difficulty. 
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At the beginning of an experiment the consummatory force is not yet operative. The 
choice of the first task is, therefore, determined only by the strength of the instigating 
force. In line with the predictions following from the episodic theory this implies that 
for success-oriented individuals this choice will be a task of intermediate level of 
difficulty. 
Hypothesis 3: 
For failure-oriented subjects (Ms<Mf) there is also an increasing tendency to choose 
more difficult tasks during the course of the experiment. 
Again this hypothesis is based on the influence of the consummatory force. After the 
initial resistance, which for failure-oriented subjects is due to a fear of failure, has been 
overcome the consummatory force increases more for easy tasks than for difficult ones. 
This results in a shift to choose more difficult tasks during the course of the 
experiment. 
Hypothesis 4: 
For failure-oriented subjects the first task they will choose will be at a difficulty 
level lower than the intermediate one. 
According to the episodic theory, there should be an alternation of choices between the 
highest and the lowest difficulty level. The dynamic theory predicts that this alternation 
will very quickly be replaced by a choice for the lower difficulty levels due to the 
influence of the force of resistance and the consummatory force. 
Kuhl and Blankenship confirmed these hypotheses, both in a computer simulation 
(1979a) and in an experiment with male and female university students as subjects 
(1979b). In this paper a study will be reported in which the Kuhl and Blankenship 
experiment is replicated with elementary school children as subjects. The age difference 
between the subject groups of both experiments necessitated some changes in the 
design of the original experiment. For a better understanding the experiment of Kuhl 
and Blankenship will be briefly reviewed before the present study is described. 
4 .1 .2 . Kuhl and Blankenship's experiment 
A group of 48 university students was divided into a group of success-oriented and 
a group of failure-oriented subjects on the basis of their scores on the TAT (the 
Thematic Apperception Test by which the strength of the motive to achieve success was 
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determined; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell, 1953) and the TAQ (the Mandler 
and Sarason (1952) Test Anxiety Questionnaire by which the strength of the motive to 
avoid failure was determined). The scores on the TAQ appeared to be significantly 
higher for female than for male subjects. Therefore, the data of this experiment were 
analysed separately for both sexes. 
In the experiment proper subjects were presented with a perceptual reasoning task 
where they had to connect numbered dots in order with an imaginary line (see Figure 
4.1). Taking the arrow as a starting point they had to proceed to the highest numbered 
dot. The line connecting the dots should not cross, touch or retrace itself, while the 
borderline should not be traced or touched. The correct answer was the number of line 
segments in the shortest line connecting the dots. There were items on five levels of 
difficulty. 
During a practice period subjects solved items of each difficulty level until the 
solution time for each level had stabilized. Subsequently, each subject had to solve six 
items of each difficulty level. However, there was now a maximum time for each item 
so that subjects could solve five items of difficulty level 1, four of difficulty level 2, 
three of difficulty level 3, two of difficulty level 4 and one of difficulty level 5. In this 
way subjects became aware of their subjective probability of success at each difficulty 
level. 
In the main phase of the experiment the subjective probabilities were written on 
cards and placed in front of five stacks of 50 items, one for each difficulty level. 
Subjects were asked to solve 50 of these items, while they were free to choose any 
difficulty level they liked and to switch between difficulty levels as often as they liked. 
During this phase of the experiment the experimenter sat facing away from the subject. 
In this way the experimenter could not see which trial a subject would choose and 
hence social desirability factors were minimized. 
Subjects indicated the fact that they had chosen an item, so that the experimenter 
could start a timer. As soon as the maximum time for a particular subject (i.e., the 
maximum time of difficulty level 3 determined during the practice period) had expired, 
the experimenter stopped the trial. On an answer sheet subjects subsequently indicated 
that they had failed at that trial, after which they could choose the next trial. If subjects 
solved the item before the time limit had expired they had to check their answer, again 
indicating on the answer sheet whether they had been successful от not. 
After 50 trials subjects had to predict their number of successes given 10 additional 
trials at each difficulty level. All subjects who gave different probabilities here from the 
ones determined during the practice period were excluded from further analysis. For 
these subjects the assumptions on which the hypotheses were based, namely that the 
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subjective probability of success would remain constant during the course of the 
experiment, was violated. 
The four hypotheses were indeed confirmed: Both failure- and success-oriented 
subjects shift to a higher level of task difficulty during the course of the experiment; 
success-oriented subjects choose an item with an intermediate level of difficulty as their 
first trial, while failure-oriented subjects choose an item with a difficulty level lower 
than the intermediate one as their first item. 
4 . 1 . 3 . Changes made in the replication 
The are a number of differences between the replication and the original experiment, 
caused mainly by the age difference between the two subject groups. 
In the first place the task used by Kuhl and Blankenship seemed to be too difficult 
for children. Therefore, the children were allowed to actually draw the line connecting 
the dots and to correct themselves if necessary, in contrast to the adults who had to 
connect the dots with an imaginary line and subsequently give the number of line 
segments used in that line. In the second place the stimuli used by Kuhl and 
Blankenship had from four to nine dots. There seemed to be no objective criteria to 
détermine the difficulty level of each individual stimulus. Instead, difficulty level 
seemed to depend at least in part on the time needed to solve a puzzle, which in turn 
depended on the number of dots of the puzzle. In the present experiment all stimuli 
consisted of five dots. The difficulty level was determined by the location of the dots 
within the grid and not by their number. 
Instead of making subjects aware of subjective probabilities of success for different 
sets of stimuli in terms of proportions of trials solved during the practice period, the 
children were confronted with verbal labels indicating the difficulty level. Difficulty 
level 1 was labeled "very easy", difficulty level 2 was labeled "rather easy", difficulty 
level 3 was labeled "rather difficult", and difficulty level 4 was labeled "very 
difficult". The four levels can be characterized as follows. For difficulty level 1 the 
solution is more or less self-evident since the five dots are located in a circular pattern. 
The path from one dot to the next is obvious and, consequently, there are virtually no 
alternative routes. For the other difficulty levels the five dots are distributed more or 
less randomly in the matrix. To find the path from one dot to the next one has to take 
account of the other dots, in order to avoid a blockage of the path from one dot to the 
next. For difficulty level 2 only one dot is difficult to reach. For difficulty level 3 two 
dots are difficult to reach, while the solution is obvious if the path to these two dots is 
found. FOT difficulty level 4 at least three dots are difficult to reach if one does not take 
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account of the location of the other dots. An example of a stimulus for each difficulty 
level is shown in Figure 4,1. All attempts to translate the verbal descriptions of 
difficulty level into quantitative measures failed, resulting in a less than 100% objective 
division of the stimuli. In a preliminary study, therefore, it was investigated whether 
children would agree with this a priori division of stimuli. 
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Figure 4.1 An example of a stimulus for each difficulty level 
Another important difference between the two studies is the way in which motive 
strength was measured. While Kuhl and Blankenship used the TAT to determine the 
motive to achieve success and the TAQ to determine the motive to avoid failure, in the 
present experiment a Dutch version of the AMS (the Achievement Motivates Scale of 
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Nygârd and Gjesme (1973)) was used to determine both motives. The first 15 items of 
the AMS are used to compute the motive to achieve success, while the second 15 items 
are used to compute the motive to avoid failure. On the basis of these two scores 
subjects could be divided into four groups. Subjects who had a score above the median 
for Ms and a score below the median for Mf constituted the group of success-oriented 
subjects, whereas subjects who scored below the median on Ms and above the median 
on Mf constituted the group of failure-oriented subjects. 
In the following, first, the preliminary study is described, in which the a priori 
division of sdmuli in difficulty levels is compared with a division in difficulty levels of 
these same stimuli given by the children. After this preiiminary study the actual 
experiment is described in which the predictions for task choice derived from the 
dynamics-of-action model, in a situation in which a subject is confronted with a set of 
tasks differing in level of difficulty, are investigated with elementary school children as 
subjects. 
4 . 2 . The preliminary study 
4 . 2 . 1 . Subjects 
Twelve girls and eight boys of the fifth and sixth grade of an elementary school 
took part in this preliminaiy investigation. 
4 . 2 . 2 . Group session 
During a group session a Dutch translation of the AMS (developed by Nygârd and 
Gjesme, 1973) was administered in order to determine the scores for fear of failure and 
hope of success for each individual subject. 
4 . 2 . 3 . Individual sessions 
The children were randomly divided into two groups of 10 children each. Each 
group had to solve its own set of puzzles. The children were tested in individual 
sessions of about one hour. 
To acquaint the children with the task the individual session started with a practice 
period during which eight puzzles of each difficulty level were presented. The first 
puzzle of each difficulty level was demonstrated by the experimenter. The children had 
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to try to solve the second puzzle on their own. However, the experimenter would 
explain the solution if this still proved to be too difficult. The experimenter was allowed 
to help when children experienced difficulties with puzzles three and four. Starting with 
puzzle five children had to solve the puzzles on their own. The maximum time allowed 
for working on each puzzle was twominutes. If a puzzle was not solved within this 
time children had to put it away and try the next one. 
After the practice period the two groups of subjects had to solve their own set of 
24 puzzles, of which the difficulty level was unknown to them. In fact there were six 
puzzles of each difficulty level presented in a random order. Through this procedure 
there was a comparison between the a priori division and the children's judgment for 
48 puzzles. 
A maximum time of two minutes was allowed for the solution of each puzzle. It 
was our experience that puzzles which were not solved within two minutes would 
either take very long or could not be solved at all by the children. For each puzzle the 
experimenter recorded the solution time. After the children had either solved the puzzle 
or the maximum time had elapsed, they had to decide to which difficulty level the 
puzzle belonged according to them. 
For each puzzle, therefore, there were two measures indicating the degree of 
correspondence between the a priori division and the division the children produced. Of 
these two measures the difficulty level chosen by the children was more subjectively 
oriented, while the solution time for each puzzle provided a more objective measure for 
the difficulty of the puzzle. 
4 .2 .4 . Results 
To study the degree of correspondence between the a priori and the children's 
division in difficulty levels, both measures the children provided were taken into 
account. Whenever there was a serious discrepancy between the a priori and the 
children's judgment of difficulty level of a puzzle, this puzzle was excluded from 
further analyses and in addition would not be used in the main experiment. A 
discrepancy was defined as follows. For each child the mean solution time per 
difficulty level was determined, and all puzzles that had either much longer or much 
shorter solution times than the mean were marked. Subsequently the number of 
children for whom a particular puzzle had either longer or shorter solution times was 
counted. The puzzles for which the solution time deviated from the mean in the same 
direction for at least five children were excluded from the experiment 
This rather stringent criterium was used to avoid random factors such as the 
following firom influencing the results. Sometimes children did not see an easy solution 
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because they were trying to apply strategies that were only applicable to the higher 
difficulty levels. At other times children did not immediately find the right strategy to 
solve a difficult puzzle. On the other hand children sometimes solved a series of puzzles 
of the same difficulty level. Because they usually could apply the same strategy in this 
case they sometimes solved the later trials faster. 
On the basis of the above mentioned criterium six puzzles were excluded out of a 
total of 48. Two puzzles of difficulty level 2 were consistently judged to be of a higher 
difficulty level, three puzzles of difficulty level 3 were consistently judged to be of a 
lower difficulty level and one puzzle of difficulty level 4 was excluded because no 
child could solve it. 
In addition to the exclusion of a couple of puzzles the data of one child were also 
excluded. This child decided that nearly all puzzles (20 out of 24) were of difficulty 
level 1, while his solution times were, in general, very low and not consistent with the 
a priori difficulty levels. Obviously this child had either not understood the task or all 
puzzles were simply very easy for him. 
Table 4,1 Mean judgment of difficulty level and mean solution time for each a priori 
determined level of difficulty for the two groups of children 
a priori determined level of difficulty 
1 2 3 4 
group I judgment of difficulty 1.02 1.78 2.73 3.24 
( n = 1 0 ) s.d. 0.05 0.54 0.52 0.34 
solution time 8.36 17.76 38.02 49.79 
s.d. 2.70 6.82 19.98 11.94 
group II judgment of difficulty 1.06 1.40 2.62 3.20 
(n = 9) s.d. 0.17 0.42 0.56 0.46 
solution time 11.61 21.96 47.02 59.80 
s.d. 3.74 8.46 13.34 18.17 
A comparison of the results of the two groups of children who solved two different 
sets of puzzles is given in Table 4.1. A multivariate analysis showed that there were no 
significant differences between the two groups in assigning puzzles to difficulty levels 
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(F(4,14)=1.36; ρ > .10) nor in the time needed to solve the puzzles at different levels 
of difficulty (F(4,12)=1.39; ρ > .10). This result implies that the two sets of puzzles 
are similar. 
Individual tests for trend showed that both the choice of difficulty level and the 
solution times increase for eveiy child with increasing level of difficulty of the a priori 
division. 
In Table 4.2 subjects are assigned to four different motive groups of high and low 
fear of failure and high and low hope of success. These motive groups were formed on 
the basis of the scores subjects had on the AMS. Two multivariate analyses showed 
that neither the judgments about difficulty levels (F(4,12)=2.77; ρ > .10) nor the mean 
solution times for the four difficulty levels (F(4,10)<1) differed for the separate motive 
groups. 
4.2.5, Discussion 
This preliminary investigation was performed to study whether children would 
agree with an a priori division of tasks in levels of difficulty based on a number of 
qualitative criteria. 
For 19 of the 20 children there was a significant linear trend, i.e., a significant 
increase in judged difficulty from a priori difficulty level 1 to 4, indicating that the 
children followed the a priori division fairly well. They seemed to be reluctant to place 
puzzles in the highest level of difficulty, resulting in somewhat lower difficulty levels 
than the intended ones. This underestimation could be caused by a fear of appearing 
stupid if one admitted a puzzle to be "very difficult" (difficulty level 4). It seems 
reasonable to suggest that subjects with a dominant fear of failure would be most likely 
to show this behavior. However, Table 4.2 shows that the division of puzzles in 
difficulty levels is similar for the separate motive groups. Consequently, a dominant 
fear of failure cannot be responsible for the underestimation of difficulty level. 
Another explanation is that subjects will only judge a puzzle to be of difficulty 
level 4 if they are not able to solve it. During the extensive practice period, however, 
subjects were acquainted with all difficulty levels and they all solved one or more 
puzzles from difficulty level 4. This explanation also presupposes that subjects solved 
most puzzles of difficulty level 4 and subsequently gave them a lower level of 
difficulty. As can be seen in Table 4.3 this is not the case. In fact 56% of the puzzles of 
difficulty level 4 were not solved at all. 
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Table 4.2 Mean judgment of difficulty level and mean solution time for each a priori 
determined level of difficulty as a function of motive group 
a priori determined level of difficulty 
1 2 3 4 
judgment 
of 
difficulty 
solution 
time 
success-oriented 
(n = 5) 
failure-oriented 
(n = 5) 
high on both 
motives (n = 5) 
low on both 
motives (n = 5) 
success-oriented 
(n = 5) 
failure-oriented 
{n = 5) 
high on both 
motives (n = 5) 
low on both 
motives (n = 5) 
1.17 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
11.24 
10.50 
10.48 
8.57 
1.40 
1.33 
1.60 
1.67 
20.27 
17.07 
17.63 
20.84 
2.17 
2.83 
2.62 
2.68 
41.61 
39.78 
47.18 
35.15 
3.18 
2.92 
3.01 
3.43 
59.72 
60.75 
62.35 
45.42 
Table 4.3 Percentage of trials that ended in success or failure for each a priori 
determined level of difficulty 
a priori determined level of difficulty 
1 2 3 4 
success trials 99.2 93.0 67.8 43.6 
failure trials 0.8 7.0 32.2 56.4 
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According to Heckhausen (1980a), it is a common Finding that subjects report 
subjective probabilities of success that are higher than the corresponding objective 
probabilities of success. This finding appears to be characteristic of achievement-
oriented situations. It seems to reflect the wish to increase one's performance or the 
belief that future performance will be better due to effort and practice. Whatever the 
cause of this phenomenon may be, the fact remains that there is an increase in judged 
level of difficulty from the a priori easiest to the most difficult puzzles. 
From the results of this preliminary investigation it can be concluded that the a priori 
division of puzzles was to a large extent in agreement with the division the children 
made. In the main experiment 25 puzzles of each difficulty level were needed. In this 
preliminary investigation 12 puzzles of each difficulty level were actually sorted by the 
children. Because of the high degree of correspondence between the a priori and the 
children's division, the remaining 13 puzzles were sorted into difficulty levels, 
according to the a priori criteria. 
4 . 3 . The experiment 
The main purpose of this experiment was to study whether the preferred task 
difficulty of children would change if they had to choose and solve 25 tasks 
consecutively. Furthermore, the question was whether there would be a difference 
between success-oriented and failure-oriented children in task choice. 
4 .3 .1 . Subjects 
Eighteen boys and thirty-two girls of the fifth and sixth grade of two elementary 
schools took part in the experiment. 
4 .3 .2 . Group session 
In a group session a Dutch translation of the AMS (Nygârd and Gjesme, 1973) was 
administered to determine the strength of the motive to achieve success and the strength 
of the motive to avoid failure. 
4 .3 .3 . Individual sessions 
The actual experiment was performed in individual sessions of approximately one 
hour. During an extensive practice period (that was identical to the one in the 
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preliminary investigation) children solved eight puzzles of each difficulty level. For 
difficulty level 2 and 3 the mean solution time of the last four trials was determined. 
The mean of these two values was taken as the maximum time the child was allowed to 
work on a puzzle in the main part of the experiment. The idea behind taking this 
measure of the maximum time was that the children should be able to solve all puzzles 
of difficulty level 1, most puzzles of difficulty level 2, some puzzles of difficulty 
level 3 and few puzzles of difficulty level 4. 
During the main part of the experiment the children were confronted with four 
stacks of different levels of 25 puzzles each. The experimenter sat at the same table as 
did the children, but facing away from them in order to prevent any kind of control on 
their choice process. Children had to choose a puzzle and give a verbal signal at the 
moment at which they began solving it At that moment the experimenter started a 
timer. As soon as the maximum time had expired the children had to stop working at 
the puzzle and to put it away in a box in front of them. If the children solved the puzzle 
before the maximum time had elapsed they said 1'stop" and put the puzzle in the box. 
Then they had to register on a form whether they had solved the puzzle successfully or 
not After this the whole process was repeated until 25 puzzles were solved. 
4 .3 .4 . Results 
The AMS-scores showed that girls tended to have higher scores on the motive to 
avoid failure than boys, 2.08 versus 1.88 (F(l,44)=2.98; ρ < .10). while there was 
no difference in scores between the two sexes for the motive to achieve success (2.69 
versus 2.62). Because of this difference, in addition to an analysis on the data of all 
subjects combined, the data were also analysed for boys and girls separately. 
Table 4.4 Mean preferred difficulty level as a function of motive group and block of 
trials for all children 
blocks of four successive trials 
2 
2.5 
2.2 
2.4 
2.7 
3 
2.5 
2.1 
2.6 
2.5 
4 
2.6 
2.3 
2.5 
2.8 
5 
2.5 
2.2 
2.6 
2.8 
6 
2.6 
2.2 
2.5 
2.8 
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success-onented 
children (n = 13) 
failure-oriented 
children (n = 13) 
children high on 
both motives (n = 10) 
children low on 
both motives (n = 11) 
For each individual child the mean difficulty for each successive block of four 
puzzles was determined. Therefore, six data-points per child were entered into a 
number of trend analyses. The children were divided into four separate motive groups: 
success-oriented children, failure-oriented children, children high on both motives and 
children low on both motives. 
A trend analysis by means of a MANOVA (SPSS) performed on the data of all 
subjects with blocks of trials and motive groups as independent variables showed a 
significant linear trend (F(l,44)=4.83; ρ < .05), indicating a shift towards more 
difficult tasks during the course of the experiment as was expected by hypotheses 1 
and 3 (see Table 4.4). This significant linear trend could explain 11% of the total 
generalized variance. There was no significant main effect for motive group 
(F(1,44)<1), indicating that there was no difference in preferred difficulty level for the 
four motive groups. Neither a comparison of the linear trend between success- and 
failure-oriented subjects (F(1,44)<1), nor a comparison between subjects high and 
subjects low on both motives (F(1,44)<1) showed a significant difference. 
Table 4.5 Mean preferred difficulty level as a function of motive group and block of 
trials for the girls 
blocks of four successive trials 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
success-oriented 
girls (n = 7) 
failure-oriented 
girls (n = 7) 
girls high on 
both motives (n = 9) 
girls low on 
both motives (n = 7) 
2.3 
1.7 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.0 
2.3 
2.8 
2.7 
1.8 
2.5 
2.5 
2.6 
2.2 
2.5 
2.9 
2.5 
1.9 
2.6 
2.0 
2.7 
2.0 
2.4 
2.9 
A separate trend analysis for girls showed the same results as the analysis for all 
subjects. There was a significant linear trend that explained 15% of the total variance 
(F(l,27)=3.99; ρ <.05, see Table 4.5), no significant main effect for motive group 
(F(l ,27)<1) and no difference in linear trend for either success- versus failure-oriented 
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girls (F(1,27)<1) or girls high on both motives versus girls low on both motives 
(F(U7)<1). 
A trend analysis for the boys did not show any significant effect. There was no 
linear trend (F(1,14)<1), nor a difference between motive groups (F(1,14)<1, see 
Table 4.6), nor a difference in linear trend for either success- versus failure-oriented 
boys (F(1,14)<1) or boys high on both motives versus boys low on both motives 
(F(1,14)<1). 
Table 4.6 Mean preferred difficulty level as a function of motive group and block of 
trials for the boys 
blocks of four successive trials 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
success-oriented 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 
boys (n = 6) 
failure-oriented 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.4 
boys (n = 6) 
boys high on 2.7 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.5 3.0 
both motives (n = 1) 
boys low on 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 
both motives (n = 4) 
An analysis of variance comparing the mean preferred difficulty level of the first 
four trials for success- and failure-oriented subjects showed that failure-oriented 
subjects chose significantly lower difficulty levels than success-oriented subjects 
(F(l,43)=6.59; ρ < .05) as was expected by hypotheses 2 and 4 (see Table 4.4). 
When analysed separately it appeared that failure-oriented girls chose significantly 
lower difficulty levels than success-oriented girls (F(l,26)=4.67; ρ < .05, see Table 
4.5), but although failure-oriented boys also chose lower difficulty levels than success-
oriented boys this difference was not significant (F(l,13)=2.42-, ρ > .10, see Table 
4.6). 
To see whether there is a difference in task choice for success- and failure-oriented 
subjects, whether success or failure on a trial has a differential effect for success- and 
failure-oriented subjects on the choice of difficulty level of the following trial was 
studied. In this task, in which subjects can choose between four levels of difficulty, a 
transition matrix can be constructed with 16 possible combinations of two consecutive 
68 
difficulty levels. These 16 combinations can be combined into three main categories: 
subjects can choose a trial with a lower difficulty level than the previous one (i.e., the 
cells in the lower triangle of the transition matrix), they can choose a trial with the same 
difficulty level as the previous one (i.e., the cells on the diagonal), and they can choose 
a trial with a higher difficulty level than the previous one (i.e., the cells in the upper 
triangle of the transition matrix). The total number of entries for each subject is 24. 
Table 4.7 Mean percentage of trials with a difficulty level higher, the same or lower 
than the previous one as a function of success or failure on that previous 
trial and success or failure orientation in the subject 
subsequent subsequent subsequent 
difficulty difficulty difficulty 
level higher level the same level lower 
subjects 
previous failure-oriented 25.6 38.9 10.0 
trial 
successful success-oriented 27.4 31.0 4.8 
previous failure-oriented 1.9 7.7 15.9 
trial 
a failure success-oriented 1.8 8.9 19.0 
Table 4.7 shows the mean percentage of trials falling in these three categories as a 
function of success or failure on the previous trial for both success- and failure-oriented 
subjects. A multivariate test of variance with success or failure at the previous trial and 
motive group as independent variables and percentages of trials falling into each 
category as dependent variable showed that there was a significant main effect of 
success or failure at the previous trial (F(3,90)=171.2; ρ < .001). Subsequent 
univariate tests showed that a trial with a higher difficulty level was chosen significantly 
more often when the previous trial had been a success than when the previous trial had 
been a failure (F( 1,92)= 174.7; ρ < .001). A trial with the same difficulty level also 
was chosen significantly more often when the previous trial had been a success than 
when it had been a failure (F(l,92)=36.5; ρ < .001). Subjects chose a trial with a 
lower difficulty level significantly more often when the previous trial had been a failure 
than when it had been a success (F(l,92)=38.9; ρ < .001). There was no significant 
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main effect for motive group (F(3,90)<1) and no significant interaction between 
success and failure at the previous trial and motive group (F(3,90)<1) implying that the 
differences in mean percentages between success- and failure-oriented subjects all were 
not significant. 
4 . 4 . General discussion 
In essence the results of this experiment are in agreement with the results found by 
Kuhl and Blankenship (1979b). The predictions about task choice derived from the 
dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1970) are, thereby, confirmed in an 
experiment in which children took part as subjects. More specifically, children who 
were allowed to choose their preferred difficulty level, showed a predicted shift 
towards more difficult tasks during the course of the experiment. In addition the 
difficulty level preferred by failure-oriented children at the beginning of the experiment 
was lower than the difficulty level preferred by success-oriented children. 
The main difference between the Kuhl and Blankenship experiment and the present 
experiment is that in the former experiment the results are especially salient for male 
subjects, whereas here they are only significant for girls, not for boys. 
There are a number of factors that may have been responsible for the relative 
weakness of the findings of the present experiment. In the first place there were only 
four difficulty levels. Because of the nature of the verbal labels children may have been 
limited in their choice even more. They may, for example, have thought along the 
following lines: Everyone can solve a "very easy" puzzle, only the very clever can 
solve a "very difficult" puzzle. However, during the practice period all children had 
solved puzzles of difficulty level 4, so at least three difficulty levels (2 to 4) must have 
remained to choose from. 
In the second place the composition of the success- and failure-oriented motive 
groups was different because in the present experiment it was based on AMS-scores, 
while in the Kuhl and Blankenship experiment it was based on a comparison of TAT 
and TAQ scores. While scores on the AMS resulted in a differentiation into four groups 
in which children scoring high and children scoring low on both motives were placed in 
separate groups, the comparison of TAT and TAQ scores as used in the Kuhl and 
Blankenship experiment resulted in a division into two motive groups only, namely 
success- and failure-oriented individuals. In order to check whether this make-up of the 
motive groups was responsible for the difference in the results of the two experiments, 
the children were separated into a success-and a failure-oriented group based on the 
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difference between the Ms and Mf score. If the Ms score was higher than the Mf score 
the child belonged to the success-oriented motive group, if the Mf score was higher 
than the Mg score the child belonged to the failure-oriented motive group. Subsequently 
the data were reanalysed. Again there was a significant linear trend for the data of all 
subjects combined, and for the girls, but not for the boys. 
In the third place there was a difference in the instruction given to both groups of 
subjects. The adults were told that the experimenter wanted to get information about 
how people felt about a new series of tasks, that their opinion concerning the tasks was 
sought, and that the experimenter wanted to know whether they saw any problems 
regarding the tasks. This could have induced a strategy to start with easy puzzles and 
than gradually shift to puzzles of higher difficulty levels in order to be able to supply 
the information the experimenter wanted. The children, on the other hand, were only 
told that they could choose any difficulty level they wanted. In theory they could 
perform this task completely in their own way. However, because of their experience 
with the school system children might expect the experimenter to evaluate their 
performance afterwards. In this way social desirability factors may have influenced the 
choice process of the children. 
In the fourth place there was an age difference between the subject groups of the 
two experiments. The behavior of children in general is more variable than adults' 
behavior. This variability could be reflected in a number of different strategies for task 
choice and results in an irregular pattern of task choices. In short, the fact that the mean 
of a number of patterns of task choices of different children is taken could be the cause 
of the difference between both experiments. 
The finding of the present experiment, that there is a significant increase in preferred 
task difficulty level during the course of the experiment, is supported by the results of 
another experiment with a different group of children (Poulie, van den Bereken and 
Jansen, 1985). At the beginning of the school year about 200 elementary school 
children were asked (among other things) to solve a series of six anagram tasks which 
they could choose from six stacks of tasks of different difficulty levels. The same 
group of children performed a similar task at the end of the school year. Both for the 
success- and failure-oriented children a small but significant increase in preferred 
difficulty level was found at each occassiop. 
Finally the question whether success- and failure-oriented subjects differ in their 
pattern of task choice is addressed. In the experiment by Kuhl and Blankenship the 
increase in preferred level of difficulty was more pronounced for success- than for 
failure-oriented subjects. In the present experiment there was no significant difference 
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between success- and failure-oriented children. However, from Tables 4.4,4.5 and 4.6 
it appears that throughout the experiment the failure-oriented children consistendy chose 
somewhat lower difficulty levels than the success-oriented children. 
Differences between success- and failure-oriented subjects could also be caused by 
a differential influence of success or failure on a previous trial on the choice of task 
difficulty level of the next trial. From Table 4.7 it appears that after a success on the 
previous trial subjects will either choose a trial with the same or a trial with a higher 
difficulty level, whereas they will choose a trial with a lower difficulty level after a 
failure on the previous trial. This choice pattern corresponds with the pattern found by 
Schneider and Posse (1982). Although not significant, Table 4.7 shows a differential 
influence of success and failure on the previous trial on the choice of difficulty level of 
the next trial for success- and failure-oriented subjects. When the previous trial had 
been a success failure-oriented subjects as opposed to success-oriented subjects more 
often chose a trial with a lower or the same difficulty level, whereas success-oriented 
subjects as opposed to failure-oriented subjects more often chose a trial with a higher 
difficulty level. When the previous trial had been a failure success-oriented subjects as 
opposed to failure-oriented subjects more often chose a trial with a lower difficulty 
level. Together, these results suggest that success-oriented subjects used the 
information which a success or failure on the previous trial supplied more realistically 
in their decision about the difficulty level of the next trial than did failure-oriented 
subjects. 
4 .5 . Summary 
In a free choice situation with tasks of various difficulty levels the dynamics-of-
action model predicts a shift to more difficult tasks, while episodic theories of 
achievement motivation predict that subjects continue to choose tasks from the same 
difficulty level. According to the dynamics-of-action model, there is a consummatory 
force which reduces an action tendency when this action tendency is expressed in 
behavior. The consummatory force is supposed to be larger for success at a task than 
for failure. Because subjects experience more successes at easy tasks than at difficult 
ones, the decrease in the action tendency to choose easy tasks is, therefore, bigger than 
the decrease in the action tendency to choose difficult tasks. Accordingly, subjects will 
choose higher levels of task difficulty during the course of the experiment. This 
assumption was confirmed in an experiment by Kuhl and Blankenship with university 
students as subjects. This finding was replicated in an experiment with elementary 
school children as subjects. 
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5 . DO CHILDREN AND ADULTS REACT DIFFERENTLY IN A 
DYNAMIC TASK SITUATION? 
5 . 1 . Introduction 
Until now principles of motivation as described by the dynamics-of-action model 
(Atkinson and Birch, 1970,1974) have mainly been studied with adults (mostly college 
students) as subjects. In order to study whether these principles would also apply to 
children, Houtmans (1986, see Chapter 4) attempted to replicate an experiment by Kuhl 
and Blankenship with college students as subjects (1979b) in which predictions derived 
from the dynamics-of-action model were tested. However, to use the Kuhl and 
Blankenship design with children some changes in the experimental set-up were 
necessary. Although the basic results of both experiments were similar, the results were 
less convincing in the experiment with children as subjects. To investigate whether this 
discrepancy was caused by the age difference between both subject groups or by 
changes in the experimental design, a new experiment was planned in which college 
students would perform the same task as the children had done. In order to clarify the 
differences between the experiment of Kuhl and Blankenship and the experiment of 
Houtmans both experiments will now be described in some detail. 
5.2 . The experimental set-up according to Kuhl and Blankenship 
In order to test predictions ensuing from the dynamics-of-action model Kuhl and 
Blankenship (1979b) performed an experiment in which subjects had to solve a number 
of similar perceptual reasoning tasks. In a grid of nine by nine lines from four to nine 
numbered dots were distributed. Subjects were told that they had to connect the dots in 
(»der with an imaginary line, starting at a fixed starting point and proceeding to the 
highest numbered dot. To demonstrate that they had solved the task subjects had to 
supply the number of line segments in the shortest line connecting the dots. There were 
a number of rules for solving these puzzles: a) the line connecting the dots should not 
touch, cross or retrace itself, b) the borderline of the grid should not be traced or 
touched and c) only the lines within the grid should be traced. There were puzzles at 
five levels of difficulty. 
During an extensive practice period subjects were acquainted with the task. For each 
difficulty level there was a predetermined objective probability of success, i.e., subjects 
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were 'allowed' to solve a predetermined number of tasks at each difficulty level. To 
counteract individual differences, the experimenter manipulated the time subjects were 
allowed to work on a puzzle. In other words the objective probability of success was 
identical for all subjects. However, die subjects were led to believe that probabilities of 
success were computed for everyone individually, i.e., that a subjective probability of 
success was determined for each subject. 
In the next phase of the experiment subjects were confronted with five stacks of 
50 puzzles each, one for each difficulty level, each with a card indicating the 'personal' 
probability of success. The subjects' task was to choose and try to solve 50 of these 
puzzles consecutively. To check whether the probability of success had remained 
constant during the experiment, subjects were asked at the end of the experiment to 
indicate the probability of success for each level of difficulty. The results from the 
subjects who indicated probabilities at variance with the initial ones were excluded from 
further analyses. The results of this experiment by Kuhl and Blankenship indicated 
that, for both success- and failure-oriented subjects, there was indeed a shift in 
preference to tasks of higher levels of difficulty during the course of the experiment, as 
predicted by the dynamics-of-action model. According to other predictions from the 
dynamics-of-action model, failure-oriented subjects should show a less pronounced 
shift toward choosing more difficult tasks than success-oriented subjects. Although the 
results pointed in this direction the difference in trend between success- and failure-
oriented subjects was not significant. 
5 . 3 . A modified experimental set-up 
To see whether the principles of motivation as described by the dynamics-of-action 
model would also apply to children the Kuhl and Blankenship experiment was 
replicated with children who were from 10 to 12 years old in Chapter 4. The task had 
to be adjusted somewhat to be usable with children. In particular, drawing an imaginary 
line, while also counting line segments in this invisible line, and, in addition, checking 
whether this is the shortest possible connection between the dots, seems to tax 
children's powers quite a bit. Therefore, in the replication children were allowed to 
draw the line connecting the dots with a pencil, while they could erase and correct the 
line when necessary. Counting line segments could lead to a number of unnecessary 
errors (for example, counting some parts of the line twice or forgetting some parts) 
and, in addition, it would cost a lot of time. Therefore, it was decided to omit the 
counting procedure. However, this implied that the answer could not be checked 
through counting anymore. As an alternative checking procedure, transparancies 
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corresponding with the shortest line connecting the dots could be prepared. For most 
puzzles, though, there is more than one right alternative. It would have been very 
confusing to put all these alternatives in one transparancy or to supply the child with 
more than one tranparancy per puzzle. In the end it was decided to ask the children to 
draw any line whatsoever that would connect the dots in order. Through this procedure 
children had the opportunity to see immediately whether their answer was right or 
wrong. Failure was defined either by not being able to finish the puzzle in time or by 
not obeying the rules (although for the child this constituted only a failure when the 
mistake was actually detected). 
Based on some examples of tasks used in the experiment by Kuhl and Blankenship 
an attempt was made to construct a scale of task difficulty levels. However, in the end 
only four difficulty levels were really separable. Instead of a variable number of dots, 
every puzzle consisted of five numbered dots to be connected. Instead of supplying 
values which indicated the probability of success at each difficulty level, there was a 
label indicating whether a pile of puzzles was 'very easy', 'rather easy', 'rather 
difficult' or 'very difficult'. 
In a preliminary experiment children gave subjective ratings about the difficulty 
levels of the puzzles which were in agreement with the experimenter's ratings of the 
puzzles. Despite the fact that there were only four difficulty levels to choose from, a 
shift in preference to more and more difficult tasks during the course of the experiment 
was found for both success- and failure-oriented children. However, although the shift 
in preference towards more difficult tasks during the course of the experiment was 
significant, it was not very convincing. Because of the adjustments in the original 
experimental design, another experiment was planned in which the influence of the 
changes, introduced in the latter experiment, would be investigated. 
5 .4 . Differences between the experiment of Kuhl and Blankenship and 
the modified experiment 
If the above mentioned two experiments are compared there appear to be two main 
differences. In the first place, children were allowed to actually draw the line 
connecting the dots, while the adults had to imagine drawing the line. In the second 
place, adults had to count the number of line segments in addition to imagining the line, 
while the children only had to draw the line. Counting line segments after actually 
drawing the line could be a boring extra task. After all, the line has already been 
discovered when one starts to draw it. The influence of boredom on the resultant action 
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tendency would be a decrease in the instigadng force. In addition, the consummatory 
force would increase faster through boredom, i.e., the trend towards choosing higher 
levels of difficulty would be more pronounced. Following this line of reasoning the 
task of the children is less boring than the task of the adults. Therefore, the trend 
toward choosing more difficult tasks should be less pronounced when subjects had to 
count line segments in addition to drawing the line than when they only had to draw the 
line. 
To test this hypothesis an experiment was planned in which four different groups of 
subjects would solve 25 puzzles in four different conditions. One group of subjects 
had to draw the line connecting the dots, a second group of subjects had to count line 
segments in addition to drawing the line, a third group of subjects had to draw an 
imaginary line and a fourth group of subjects had to count line segments in addition to 
imagining the line. The first few subjects who had to solve the puzzles by drawing an 
imaginary line needed much more time (sometimes twice as much) as the subjects who 
were allowed to actually draw the line. Furthermore, they complained about getting 
very tíred. During the practice phase it became clear that these subjects frequently were 
uncertain about whether they had found the solution. Sometimes they thought they had 
found the solution, but when the experimenter asked them to draw it, they discovered 
that the line would touch or even cross itself. One subject in the condition of drawing 
an imaginary line and counting line segments in it, told us afterward that she frequently 
had to restart looking for the solution whenever she started counting line segments. 
Besides getting complaints about the complexity of the task, subjects thought it strange 
that there was no way to check whether they really had discovered the solution in the 
two conditions with the imaginary lines. 
After four subjects were put through this ordeal and in addition hearing from a 
number of other subjects that they were unable to solve puzzles from difficulty level 3 
and 4 by drawing an imaginary line, it was decided that the puzzles at difficulty 
levels 3 and 4 were too complex to solve in this way. Because we were interested in 
the influence which actual success or failure at solving tasks has on subsequent task 
choice and not in the influence of uncertainty induction, it was decided to drop the 
conditions with the imaginary lines and to continue with only two conditions, one in 
which subjects had to draw the line and one in which subjects, in addition to drawing 
the line, had to count line segments. 
If the consummatory force is partly determined by boredom it should increase more 
rapidly in the condition in which subjects had to count line segments in addition to 
drawing the line. The trend towards choosing increasingly more difficult tasks should, 
therefore, be more pronounced in this condition. In other words, in this latter condition 
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subjects would choose more difficult puzzles at an earlier point in the experiment than 
subjects who only had to draw the line connecting the dots. If, on the other hand, the 
consummatory force only depends on the number of tasks solved at each difficulty level 
(i.e., the amount of boredom is similar in both conditions) then there should be no 
difference between both conditions in the trend towards choosing more difficult tasks 
during the course of the experiment. 
An alternative explanation for the difference in choice pattern between Houtmans' 
experiment with children as subjects and Kuhl and Blankenship's experiment with 
college students as subjects would be the age difference between both subject groups. 
To test this hypothesis, the results from the experiment with children will be compared 
with the results from the comparable condition in the experiment to be presented here. 
5.5 . Method 
5 .5 .1 . Subjects 
Twelve male and twelve female students from the departments of psychology and 
special education from the University of Nijmegen participated in the experiment Their 
mean age was 24 years and four months. 
Eighteen boys and thirty two girls of the fifth and sixth grade of two elementary 
schools took part in a similar experiment (see Chapter 4). Their mean age was 11 years 
and three months. 
5.5 .2 . Experimental session 
Subjects were tested in individual sessions of about one and a half hour. First the 
experimenter administered a Dutch translation of the AMS (Achievement Motives Scale, 
Nygârd and Gjesme, 1973) questionnaire to determine the strength of the motive to 
achieve success (Ms) and the strength of the motive to avoid failure (Mf). Then the 
subjects were instructed in the experimental task: a maze like puzzle (see Figure 4.1). 
In a grid of nine by nine lines five numbered dots were more or less randomly 
distributed. The task of the subjects was to connect these dots in order starting at a 
fixed starting point and proceeding to the highest numbered dot. There were three rules 
which should not be violated in solving the task: a) the line connecting the dots may not 
touch, cross or retrace itself, b) the borderline of the grid may not be touched or traced, 
and c) only the lines within the grid may be traced. Half of the subjects had to count the 
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number of line segments after they had drawn the line connecting the dots, the other 
half only had to draw the line. There were puzzles at four levels of difficulty. 
During a practice period the experimenter demonstrated the solution of two puzzles 
of each difficulty level, after which the subjects solved six puzzles of each difficulty 
level by themselves. For difficulty level 2 and 3 the mean solution time of the last four 
puzzles was determined. The mean of these two values was taken as the maximum time 
the subjects were allowed to work on a puzzle in the main phase of the experiment. The 
idea behind taking this measure of the maximum time was that the subjects should be 
able to solve all puzzles of difficulty level 1, most puzzles of difficulty level 2, some 
puzzles of difficulty level 3 and a few puzzles of difficulty level 4. 
During the main phase of the experiment the subjects were confronted with four 
stacks of 25 puzzles each, one for each difficulty level. The experimenter sat at the 
same table as the subjects but facing away from them in order to prevent any kind of 
control on the choice process. Subjects had to choose a puzzle and indicate the moment 
at which they would begin solving it At that moment the experimenter started a timer. 
As soon as the maximum time was up subjects had to stop working at the puzzle and 
put it away in a box in front of them. If they solved the puzzle before the maximum 
time had elapsed they said stop and put the puzzle in the box. Then they had to register 
on a form whether they had been successful in solving the puzzle or not. After this the 
whole process repeated itself until 25 puzzles were solved. 
5.6. Results 
First the scores of the adults and the children on the motive to achieve success (М^ 
and on the motive to avoid failure (Mf) were compared. There was a significant 
difference between college students and children for M
s
 (F(l,72)=12.13; ρ < 0.005). 
College students tended to have higher scores on M
s
 than children (2.82 versus 2.34), 
i.e., their motive to achieve success appears to be higher than the motive to achieve 
success is for children. There were no significant differences between college students 
and children with regard to the motive to avoid failure (1.84 versus 2.01). 
Based on the M
s
 and Mf scores subjects were divided into three motive categories in 
the following way. The score for the motive to achieve success and the score for the 
motive to avoid failure were transformed into z-scores. Subsequently, the z-score for 
the motive to avoid failure was subtracted from the z-score for the motive to achieve 
success. Subjects with a difference score around zero plus or minus two times the 
standard error of the mean (i.e., the average of the standard error of the mean of the 
M
s
-score and Mf score computed for each subject individually) were as high (or low) 
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on the motive to achieve success as on the motive to avoid failure; they constituted the 
group of 'balanced subjects'. Subjects with a positive score constituted the group of 
success-oriented subjects and subjects with a negative score constituted the group of 
failure-oriented subjects. 
For each subject the mean level of difficulty for each successive block of four 
puzzles was determined. This implies that six data-points per subject were entered into 
a number of trend analyses. 
The first trend analysis was performed on the data of the college students to 
investigate whether the condition in which line segments had to be counted in addition 
to drawing the line would result in a different choice pattern compared to the condition 
in which subjects only had to draw the line. The independent variables were motive 
category and task condition and the dependent variable was blocks of trials, a repeated 
measures factor. There was a significant main effect for trend towards choosing puzzles 
of higher levels of difficulty during the course of the experiment (F(l,18)=36.6; 
ρ < 0.001). This trend was neither significandy different for success- and failure-
oriented college students, nor for the two task conditions. There was no main effect for 
condition пот an interaction between motive category and condition. There was a main 
effect of motive category (F(l,18)=6.42; ρ < 0.05): success-oriented college students 
chose puzzles of higher difficulty levels than failure-oriented college students (see 
Figure 5.1). 
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oriented college students in both conditions 
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The second trend analysis was performed on the data of both college students and 
children to investigate whether the difference in age between both subject groups was 
reflected in a different choice pattern. The independent variables were motive category 
and subject group and the dependent variable was blocks of trials, a repeated measures 
factor. There was a significant main effect for trend towards choosing puzzles of higher 
levels of difficulty during the course of the experiment (F(l,53)=31.62; ρ < 0.001). 
This trend was not different for success- and failure-oriented subjects. There was a 
marginally significant main effect for motive category (F(l,53)=3.35; ρ < 0.08): 
success-oriented subjects choose higher difficulty levels than failure-oriented subjects. 
There was a significant main effect for subject category (F(l,53)=5.78; ρ <0.05): 
college students chose puzzles of higher difficulty levels then children did. The trend 
towards choosing puzzles of higher difficulty levels during the experiment was 
significantly different for the two subject groups (F( 1,53)=10.0; ρ < 0.005): college 
students showed a sharper increase in difficulty level during the course of the 
experiment than children did (see Figure 5.2). 
4 n 
S 
э ¿г 
-в 
с 
δ 
E 
3 -
2 -
1 -
•о- child Mt 
+- child Ms 
-β- adult Mf 
- · - adult Ms 
τ 
-•—Γ 
2 3 4 5 
block of trial· 
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5 .7 . Discussion 
As predicted by the dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1974), 
experiments by Kuhl and Blankenship with college students (1979b) and by Houtmans 
with children (1986) as subjects showed a significant trend towards choosing tasks 
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with a higher level of difficulty during the course of die experiment. However, the 
trend appeared to be weaker for children than for adults. The objective of this study 
was to see whether the difference in results between both experiments was caused by 
procedural differences. One of the main differences between the two experiments was 
that college students had to count the number of line segments in an imaginary line 
connecting a number of dots, while the children only had to draw the line connecring 
the dots. In the experiment reported in this study it was found that drawing an 
imaginary line connecting all dots was too difficult for stimuli of difficulty levels 3 
and 4. This finding indicates that the stimuli Kuhl and Blankenship used were all rather 
easy when compared to our stimuli, which could explain why the consummatory force 
in their experiment increased more rapidly, thereby causing a more pronounced trend 
toward the more challenging stimuli. 
In the case of the Kuhl and Blankenship experiment counting line segments was 
necessary in order to see whether subjects were successful or not. In the condition of 
the present experiment in which subjects also counted line segments it was found that a 
non-matching number of line segments was blamed on errors in counting and not on 
drawing an incorrect line. This reduces the whole counting procedure to a non-
informative extra task, which could influence task motivation in the sense that the 
consummatory force could increase more rapidly. This should be visible in the 
difficulty levels that subjects choose during the course of the experiment. 
In the present experiment, however, no difference in choice pattern, between the 
condition in which college students only had to draw the line connecting the dots and 
the condition in which they had to count line segments in addition to drawing the line 
between the dots, was found. The non-informative extra task, whether it was boring or 
not, seemed to have no influence on the pattern of difficulty levels chosen during the 
course of the experiment. Therefore, it can be concluded that procedural differences 
between the two experiments did not cause a difference in results for children and 
college students. 
An alternative explanation for the relatively weak trend towards tasks of higher 
difficulty levels in the experiment with children, was the fact that the subjects in the 
Kuhl and Blankenship experiment were college students and thus older. To check this 
hypothesis in the present experiment the choice pattern of the children was compared 
with the choice pattern of the college students. The trend towards choosing more 
difficult tasks during the course of the experiment was more pronounced for college 
students than for children. Because the task was the same for both subject groups the 
difference in task performance must be caused by the age difference. 
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The conclusion of this experiment is that children, just like college students, show a 
trend, albeit less pronounced, towards choosing increasingly more difficult tasks 
during the course of an experiment. The question now is why the trend differs for the 
two subject groups. According to Kuhl and Blankenship (1979b), the consummatory 
value of success and failure is different for failure- and success-oriented subjects. Both 
success- and failure-oriented children seem to have a trend similar to the failure-oriented 
college students. It seems that the consummatory value of success and failure for 
children in general is lower than it is for adults. Rephrasing this in cognitive terms it 
appears that children need more experience with or information about tasks of a certain 
level of difficulty before they decide to try more difficult tasks. 
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б. MOTIVATION, REWARD AND TASK PERFORMANCE 
6 . 1 . Introduction 
When we observe a person in his everyday life, the first thing we notice is that this 
person is constantly doing (or thinking) something or is constantly active. From the 
viewpoint of the motivation theorist we want to answer the question why the person is 
doing one thing and not the other. According to the theories of achievement motivation 
(Atkinson and Birch, 1970, 1974, 1978; Heckhausen, 1977), all activities performed 
by a person are manifestations of underlying motivational tendencies. At any particular 
moment in time every person is motivated by a number of different tendencies 
simultaneously. The behavior which the person actually performs is an expression of 
the dominant tendency. At the same time the other, non-expressed, tendencies will 
persist until a psychological force modifies them. 
Each tendency is the result of an interplay of a number of forces. In this process of 
waxing and waning forces two factors are important in determining the strength of each 
force. The first factor is the difficulty level of the task at hand or the probability that one 
will execute the task successfully. The second factor is the incentive value connected 
with success or failure on that task. According to the dynamics-of-action model 
(Atkinson and Birch, 1974), difficulty level of a task and incentive value of success or 
failure are inversely related, in other words the difficulty level of a task determines the 
incentive value of success or failure at that task. Consequently, the incentive value of 
success at a difficult task is higher than the incentive value of success at an easy one. 
The incentive value of success must be understood as feelings of pride when solving 
the task successfully, the incentive value of failure is equal to feelings of shame 
accompanying failure. As such these incentives are intrinsic and QQÌ defined by the 
situation a person finds himself in. 
In this sense incentives as defined in the dynamics-of-action model are comparable 
to incentives as defined in theories of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1975; de Charms, 
1968). In both cases subjects perform a particular task because they want to reach a 
specific goal. The question now remains whether the feelings of pride and shame are 
the only incentives when performing a task. According to Heckhausen (1968), there are 
other types of incentives independent of success probability such as personal 
importance of a task, which are neglected in research in the area of achievement 
motivation. Another incentive, that is scarcely studied in relation to the dynamic theory 
of motivation, is the extrinsic reward. In contrast, there is an extensive body of 
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research in the realm of intrinsic motivation about the influence of extrinsic rewards on 
intrinsic motivation. 
Intrinsic motivation is defined as performing a task for no reason other than the 
satisfaction inherent in task participation and completion (Bates, 1979). What happens 
to this intrinsic motivation if children receive an extrinsic reward (money, course credit, 
a Good Players Award) for performing a task they formerly performed without 
receiving any rewards for it? The consequences of giving a reward depend on the 
nature of the reward and the salience of the reward. Rewards that are contingent only 
on participation in an activity lead to a decreased interest in that activity, especially if it 
is in itself an entertaining or stimulating enteiprise (Deci, 1971). Receiving unexpected 
rewards does not decrease intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, 1973; 
Lepper and Greene, 1975). Rewards that are inherent in the task content should 
increase intrinsic motivation (Kroglanski, Riter, Amitai, Margolin, Shabtai and Zaksh, 
1975). 
The theoretical basis for the two experiments reported in this study lies in the 
dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1970). However, this leaves us with a 
couple of problems. The dynamics-of-action model implies that task behavior, in 
particular intensity and persistence of behavior, should be influenced by different 
motivational conditions. But there are no clear instructions about the way in which 
these components of task behavior should be measured, in particular in the context of 
cognitive tasks. This implies that we have to explicate which dependent variables we 
will choose to represent intensity and persistence. For intensity we substituted solution 
time and for persistence the time subjects were willing to work on a puzzle on which 
they eventually would give up. Another problematic point in the dynamics-of-action 
model is the representation of the probability of success. In fact this factor is always 
represented by the subjective difficulty level of tasks. Since we worked with 10 to 
12 year old children we did not expect them to be acquainted with probabilities of 
success. Instead we confronted them with five piles of objectively differing puzzles 
numbered from 1 to 5 to indicate the difficulty of each pile. 
In the following two experiments the effect of an extrinsic reward on task 
performance of elementary school children is studied in the framework of the 
dynamics-of-action model. Therefore, in both experiments children were confronted 
with a series of similar tasks. Both experiments used a repeated measures design, i.e., 
children first solved the tasks in a baseline condition in which a correct solution was not 
rewarded and subsequently they solved the tasks again, but now correct solutions were 
rewarded. In the first experiment there was one baseline and one experimental 
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condition, in the second experiment there was one baseline and two experimental 
conditions. 
The experiments differed in two regards. The first difference concerns a procedural 
difference in task presentation. In one experiment children were confronted with a fixed 
sequence of tasks of differing levels of difficulty which they had to solve (i.e., a forced 
choice situation). In the other experiment children could choose the difficulty level of 
the tasks they wanted to solve (i.e., a free choice situation). As a result of this 
procedural difference we can investigate different components of task behavior in the 
two experiments. In the forced choice situation we can study the solution time for each 
puzzle and the persistence with which a child tries to solve each trial. In the free choice 
situation we can again study solution time and persistence and in addition task choice 
and the choice pattern. 
The second difference between the two experiments lies in the nature of the reward 
for a correctly solved task. Rewards can differ on a number of dimensions. One 
dimension is the intrinsic-extrinsic dimension. A person who is intrinsically motivated 
will perform a task with no other reason than the satisfaction inherent in task 
participation. Therefore, we can call the feelings attached to task performance (feelings 
of joy and shame accompanying respectively successful and unsuccessful task 
completion) intrinsic rewards or incentives. Subjects who are extrinsically motivated 
will have another reason for performing a task in addition to satisfaction inherent in task 
completion. They might, for example, try to earn good grades or prizes attached to task 
completion. In this case an extrinsic reward must be attached to task completion. 
Another dimension on which rewards could be categorized is the locus of the reward 
(cf., Rotter's locus of control, 1966). This locus of the reward is internal if the person 
supplies the reward and if it is only meaningful to this person. The locus of the reward 
is external if someone else supplies the reward and if the reward is also meaningful to 
others. 
In the first experiment the reward is extrinsic (subjects earn a number of points 
dependent on the difficulty level of the task for a correct solution) and internal (there are 
no consequences attached to the number of points given for each correct solution and 
the number of points earned are not communicated to others). The extrinsic reward is 
related to the intrinsic feelings of pride or shame accompanying task solution. The 
following hypotheses are tested. Failure-oriented children will show better task 
performance in the condition in which they have to write down the number of points 
owned than in the condition in which they just solve the puzzle. Success-oriented 
children will show a similar task performance in both conditions. 
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In the second experiment there are two reward conditions. In the first condition the 
reward is extrinsic (subjects earn a fixed number of points for correct task solution 
independent of difficulty level of the task) and external (there is a consequence attached 
to earning as many points as possible and this consequence is communicated to others). 
In the second condition the reward is extrinsic (subjects earn a number of points 
dependent on the difficulty level of the task far conect task solution) and external (there 
is a consequence attached to earning as many points as possible and this consequence is 
communicated to others). However, in this second condition the number of points 
earned for correct task solution is, in fact, a mirror of the intrinsic incentive associated 
with correct task solution. In both reward conditions there is also an intrinsic 
component attached to solving the puzzles, namely the pride or shame accompanying 
success or failure at a puzzle. In the first reward condition the intrinsic reward is not 
related to the extrinsic reward. The question now is which reward component is 
dominant, the intrinsic or the extrinsic component. In the second reward condition the 
extrinsic reward is related to the intrinsic reward. In this experiment the following 
hypotheses are tested. In the condition without any rewards failure- and success-
oriented children will show a different pattern of task choice. In the condition with a 
constant reward failure- and success-oriented children will show a similar pattern of 
task choice. In the condition with a reward consistent with the difficulty level of the 
task failure- and success-oriented children will show a different pattern of task choice. 
For success-oriented children task choice will be similar in the condition without any 
kind of reward and the condition with a consistent reward, while it will be different in 
the two reward conditions. For failure-oriented children task choice will be similar in 
the condition without any kind of reward and the condition with a constant reward, 
while it will be different in the two reward conditions. 
6 .2 . Experiment 1 
6 . 2 . 1 . Method 
Subjects : 15 girls and 15 boys of the fifth and sixth grade of an elementary 
school took part in the experiment Their mean age was 11 years and six months. 
Group session: During a group session which lasted ^proximately 45 minutes the 
SPM (Standard Progressive Matrices; Raven, 1960) and a Dutch translation of the 
AMS (Achievement Motives Scale; Nygärd and Gjesme, 1973) was administered. 
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The S PM provides a measure of the person's present capacity for intellectual 
activity. Although this test provides a measure of the general level of intelligence, it 
leans heavily on a figurative-perceptual reasoning factor (Büros, 1975). This same 
factor is supposed to be very important in solving the tasks used in the experiments 
described here. The SPM are, therefore, administered to control for ability effects in 
task performance. 
The AMS was administered to determine the score for the motive to achieve success 
(Ms) and for the motive to avoid failure (Mf). The Fürst 15 items of the AMS are used to 
compute Ms, while the remaining 15 items are used to compute Mf. On the basis of 
these two scores children were divided into 3 groups in the following way. The score 
for the motive to achieve success and the score for the motive to avoid failure were 
transformed into z-scores. Subsequently, the z-score for the motive to avoid failure was 
subtracted from the z-score for the motive to achieve success. Children with a 
difference score around zero plus or minus two times the standard error of the mean 
(i.e., the average of the standard error of the mean of the Ms-score and the Mf-score 
computed for each child individually) were regarded to score just as high (or low) on 
the motive to achieve success as on the motive to avoid failure; they constituted the 
group of 'balanced children'. Children with a positive score constituted the group of 
success-oriented children and children with a negative score constituted the group of 
failure-oriented children. 
Experimental conditions: During the experimental conditions, in which five 
children were tested simultaneously, children were confronted with a set of tasks that 
ranged from very easy to very difficult. The task was an adaptation from a task used by 
Kuhl and Blankenship (1979b). It consisted of a maze-like puzzle. In a grid of nine by 
nine lines children had to connect five numbered dots in their numerical order. From a 
Fixed starting point they had to proceed to the highest numbered dot. The line 
connecting the dots should not cross, touch or retrace itself, while the borderline of the 
grid should not be traced or touched either. If a child had connected the dots without 
violating one of these rules within two minutes, the puzzle was solved successfully. 
There were puzzles on four levels of difficulty (see Figure 4.1). To acquaint the 
children with the tasks there was a practice session in which they tried to solve six 
puzzles of each difficulty level. The experimenter would help the child with the first 
two puzzles of each difficulty level if there were any problems. 
Each child took part in two experimental conditions separated by seven days of 
time. During the first experimental condition children would work on 24 puzzles (six 
of each difficulty level) presented in a booklet in a predetermined random order. There 
were no consequences attached to either solving or not solving the puzzles, i.e., there 
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was no reward for correctly solving puzzles. One week later the children would solve 
the same puzzles presented in another predetermined random order. In this second 
condition children were told that if they solved a puzzle of difficulty level 1 correctly 
they would earn 1 point, if they solved one of difficulty level 2 correctly they would 
earn 2 points and so on, i.e., the points they could earn were consistent with the 
difficulty level of the puzzle. They were told that they had to write down the number of 
points they had earned next to the puzzle if they had solved it correctly within the time 
limit. Furthermore, in both conditions children used a stopwatch to record the time they 
needed to solve each puzzle. This solution time was also written next to the puzzle. 
The reward in the second condition was both expected (children knew that they 
could earn points for correct solution of the puzzle) and contingent on level of 
performance (children would only be rewarded if they solved the puzzle correctly and 
the higher the difficulty level of the puzzle, the more points they could earn). The 
reward was also salient: if children solved a puzzle correctly, they had to write the 
number of points they had earned on the puzzle. However, the reward had no 
consequences for the children: there were no prizes attached to the highest total number 
of points. The children know that the experimenter will later check how they performed 
on the various puzzles. All in all this kind of reward should have a positive effect on the 
intrinsic motivation to work on this task and, thereby, on the task performance. 
With regard to this experiment task performance can be divided into two 
components. The first one is the intensity of working on a puzzle, represented by the 
solution time for each puzzle and the number of tasks solved correctly. The second one 
is the persistence with which a child tries to solve a puzzle, represented by the time 
spent on a puzzle before deciding to give up and the number of puzzles on which 
children decided to give up. Since the reward given in this experiment enhances the 
intrinsic motivation, a decrease in solution time and an increase in persistence is 
expected for both success-oriented and failure-oriented children if we compare the 
reward with the no-reward condition. 
6 .2 .2 . Results 
There was no significant corrélation between scores on the SPM and scores on the 
AMS. Neither was there a significant effect of SPM (i.e., ability) on solution times: an 
analysis of variance with difficulty level of the puzzle and score on the SPM as 
independent variables and solution time of the puzzle as dependent variable showed 
only a significant main effect of difficulty level, both for the first (F(3,95)=29.93; 
ρ < 0.001) and for die second (F(3,96)=46.79; ρ < 0.001) condition. There was no 
effect of ability on solution behavior. 
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To investigate the effect of the reward in the second condition on task performance, 
four dependent variables were studied: solution time, number of puzzles solved 
correctly, number of puzzles on which children gave up and persistence. For each 
dependent variable multi-variate analyses of variance were performed over difficulty 
levels with condition (reward, no-reward) and motive group as independent variables. 
With solution times as dependent variable there was a significant main effect for 
condition (F(4,23)=3.34; ρ < 0.05). Univariate F-tests showed that this main effect 
was significant for difficulty level 1 (F(l,26)=7.37; ρ <0.05, explained variance 
22%) and for difficulty level 2 (F(l,26)=9.35; ρ < 0.01, explained variance 27%). 
For these two difficulty levels all children had shorter solution times in the reward than 
in the no-reward condition. There was a significant interaction between motive group 
and condition (F(4,34)=3.01; ρ < 0.05). Univariate F-test showed that this interaction 
was significant for difficulty level 3 (F(l,26)=8.11; ρ < 0.01, explained variance 
24%): success-oriented children had shorter solution times in the reward than in the no-
reward condition (21.8 versus 35.9 sec) while failure-oriented children had similar 
solution times in both conditions (30.8 versus 28.6 sec., see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Solution times for each group of subjects in both the reward and the no-
rewaid condidon for each difficulty level 
No-Reward Condidon Reward Condition 
success- balanced failure-
oriented children oriented 
children children 
success balanced failure-
oriented children oriented 
children children 
difficulty 
level 1 
difficulty 
level 2 
difficulty 
level 3 
difficulty 
level 4 
8.2 
23.2 
35.9 
35.1 
7.8 
21.2 
30.5 
25.6 
9.3 
19.8 
28.6 
38.6 
7.5 6.8 
17.2 13.4 
32.8 36.4 
8.5 
16.9 
21.8 22.0 30.8 
37.7 
With number of puzzles solved correctly as dependent variable, there was a 
significant main effect for condition (F(4,24)=3.92; ρ < 0.05). Univariate F-tests 
showed that this main effect was significant for difficulty level 3 (F(l,27)=4.13; 
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ρ < 0.06, explained variance 13%), and for difficulty level 4 (F(l,27)=11.81; 
ρ < 0.005. explained variance 30%): in the no-reward condition fewer puzzles were 
solved correctly than in the reward condition. There was a marginally significant 
interaction between motive group and reward (F(4,24)=2.18; ρ < 0.11). Univariate F-
tests showed that this interaction was significant for difficulty level 2 (F(l,27)=6.24; 
ρ < 0.05, explained variance 19%): success-oriented children solved fewer puzzles 
correctly in the no-reward than in the reward condition, while failure-oriented children 
had solved a similar number of puzzles correctly in both conditions (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2 Number of puzzles solved correctly for each group of subjects in both the 
reward and the no-reward condition for each difficulty level 
No-Reward Condition Reward Condition 
success- balanced failure-
oriented children oriented 
children children 
success balanced failure-
oriented children oriented 
children children 
difficulty 
level 1 
difficulty 
level 2 
difficulty 
level 3 
difficulty 
level 4 
5.9 
5.4 
4.2 
3.5 
6.0 
5.8 
4.0 
3.8 
5.9 
5.9 
4.5 
3.4 
6.0 
6.0 
4.6 
4.5 
6.0 
6.0 
4.8 
5.0 
5.9 
5.8 
4.8 
4.2 
Because children hardly ever gave up on puzzles of difficulty level 1 and 2, only 
the puzzles of difficulty level 3 and 4 were used in the analyses on persistence time 
and number of puzzles on which children gave up. With persistence time as dependent 
variable neither condition, nor motive group nor the interaction between condition and 
motive group were significant (see Table 6.3). 
Persistence can be studied by looking at the time children are willing to spend on a 
puzzle before deciding that they are not able to solve it. But it can also be studied by 
looking at the number of puzzles on which children decided to give up before the 
maximum time allowed to solve a puzzle had expired (see Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.3 Persistence for each group of subjects in both the reward and the no-
reward condition for each difficulty level 
No-Reward Condition Reward Condition 
difficulty difficulty difficulty difficulty 
level 3 level 4 level 3 level 4 
success-
oriented 62.5 77.0 67.0 84.9 
children 
balanced 
children 15.0 73.0 22.5 54.5 
failure-
oriented 68.8 53.9 73.1 64.8 
children 
Table 6.4 Number of puzzles given up for each group of subjects in both the reward 
and the no-reward condition for difficulty level 3 and 4 
No-Reward Condition Reward Condition 
difficulty difficulty difficulty difficulty 
level 3 level 4 level 3 level 4 
success-
oriented 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.7 
children 
balanced 
children 0.5 2.0 1.0 0.5 
failure-
oriented 0.8 1.5 0.7 0.7 
children 
With number of puzzles on which children gave up as dependent variable, there was 
a nearly significant main effect for condition (F(2,26)=3.12; ρ < 0.07). Univariate F-
tests showed that this main effect was significant for difficulty level 4 (F(l ,27)=5.73; 
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ρ < 0.05, explained variance 18%): both success- and failure-oriented children gave 
up less often in the reward than in the no-rewaid condition. 
6 . 3 . Experiment 2 
6 . 3 . 1 . Method 
Subjects : 11 girls and 15 boys of the fifth grade of an elementary school took part 
in the experiment Their mean age was 10 years and six months. 
Group session: During a group session which lasted approximately 45 minutes the 
SPM and a Dutch translation of the AMS were administered. 
Experimental conditions: In the experimental conditions all children were tested 
simultaneously. During the experimental conditions children were confronted with four 
sets of maze-like puzzles differing in level of difficulty (for more information see 
Experiment 1). To acquaint the children with the tasks there was a practice session in 
which they tried to solve six puzzles of each difficulty level. The experimenter would 
help the child with the first two puzzles of each difficulty level if there were any 
problems. 
Each child took part in three experimental conditions separated by seven days of 
time. During the experimental conditions the children had to choose and try to solve 
puzzles for about 30 minutes. Each child was completely free with regard to the 
number of puzzles solved during these 30 minutes and with regard to the difficulty 
level or levels chosen. In the first experimental condition there was no extrinsic reward 
for solving or choosing particular puzzles, i.e., there were no consequences attached to 
choosing or solving a particular kind of puzzle. In the second experimental condition 
each puzzle solved correctly would be rewarded with 2 points, independent of the 
difficulty level of the puzzle. The children were told that the number of points earned 
would be summed at the end of the experimental condition and the child with the 
highest total would receive a prize at the end of the experiment. In the third 
experimental condition children would also eam points when they solved a puzzle 
correctly. However, in this case the number of points would be consistent with the 
difficulty level of the puzzle, i.e., solving a difficult puzzle would be rewarded with 
more points than solving an easy one. Again the children were told that the number of 
points earned would be summed at the end of the experimental condition and the child 
with the highest total would receive a prize at the end of the experiment. In fact all 
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children received a small prize at the end of the experiment, the children with the 
highest number of points were allowed to choose their prize first from a set of small 
prizes. The sequence in which the experimental conditions were presented was the 
same for all subjects. This sequence was chosen based on the literature review from 
which it was clear that extrinsic rewards could have a negative influence on the intrinsic 
motivation to work at a task. For this reason the condition in which there was no 
extrinsic reward was presented first. The condition with the constant extrinsic reward 
was presented secondly, to make children aware of the influence of the reward. 
In this experiment task performance can be studied in the form of task choice. Task 
choice can be divided into two components. The first one is the percentage of puzzles 
chosen of each difficulty level and the second component is the sequence of difficulty 
levels chosen during the course of the experiment 
In the first condition no reward is given for solving a puzzle correctly. Therefore, 
the intrinsic value of success is the only incentive in this condition. According to the 
dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1970) and the empirical evidence for 
this theory in studies by Kuhl and Blankenship (1979a and 1979b) and Houtmans 
(1986), both success-oriented and failure-oriented children will display a shift in 
preference towards increasingly more difficult puzzles during the course of the 
experiment due to the effect of the consummatoty force. 
In the two reward conditions of this experiment, children were both rewarded for 
each individual puzzle and there was a consequence (in the form of a small prize for the 
child with the highest number of points) attached to earning as many points as possible. 
In this experiment the reward was again expected, contingent on performance and 
salient. 
In the second condition, in which two points were given for each correctly solved 
puzzle, children are expected to choose puzzles from the lowest difficulty levels. They 
can be fairly certain that they will be able to solve these puzzles while the reward will be 
the same as it would have been had they solved a difficult puzzle. Extrinsic motivation 
to cam as many points as possible will dominate intrinsic motivation (feelings of pride) 
to solve more difficult puzzles. 
In the third condition the extrinsic reward for correctly solving a puzzle is consistent 
with the difficulty level of the puzzle. Hence the predictions for task performance are 
identical to the predictions for the no-reward condition. Both success- and failure-
oriented children will choose increasingly more difficult puzzles during the course of 
the experiment. 
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6.3.2. Results 
There was no significant correlation between scores on the SPM and scores on the 
AMS. Neither was there a significant effect of ability on percentage of puzzles solved 
correctly in each of the three reward conditions пот on percentage of puzzles chosen in 
each of the three reward conditions. 
To see whether there was a relation between motive group and the percentage of 
puzzles of each difficulty level that were chosen in the three reward conditions, 
multivariate analyses of variance with motive group and condition as independent 
variables and percentage of puzzles chosen as dependent variable were carried out for 
each difficulty level separately (see Table 6.5). 
For difficulty level 1 there was a significant main effect for condition 
(F(2,22)=2.64; ρ < 0.10, univariate repeated measures F-test: F(2,46)=3.50; 
ρ < 0.05), caused by a significant difference between the no-reward and the consistent 
reward condition (F(l,23)=5.07; ρ < 0.05): children from all motive groups chose 
significantly fewer puzzles of difficulty level 1 in the consistent reward than in the no-
reward condition. For difficulty level 2 there was a difference between success- and 
failure-oriented children (F(3,21)=1.89; ρ < 0.17), which was significant in the no-
reward condition (F(l,23)=4.31; ρ < 0.05): success-oriented children chose fewer 
puzzles of difficulty level 2 in the no-reward condition than failure-oriented children. 
There was also a significant difference between the no-reward and the constant reward 
condition (F(l,23)=4.44; ρ < 0.05): more puzzles of difficulty level 2 were chosen in 
the constant than in the no-reward condition. For difficulty level 3 there were no 
significant differences either between motive groups or between reward conditions. For 
difficulty level 4 there was a marginally significant difference between the no-reward 
and the constant reward condition (F(l,23)=3.30; ρ < 0.10): all children chose fewer 
puzzles of difficulty level 4 in the constant reward than in the no-reward condition. 
To investigate whether the sequence of the difficulty levels chosen would differ for 
the motive groups and for the three reward conditions, for each child separately the total 
number of puzzles chosen was split into three equal parts and for each part the mean 
difficulty level chosen was calculated (see Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). 
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Table 6.5 Percentage of puzzles chosen of each difficulty level for each motive group 
in each condition 
success- balanced failure-
oriented subjects oriented 
subjects subjects 
No-Reward 
condition 
Constant 
Reward 
condition 
Consistent 
Reward 
condition 
difficulty 
level 1 
difficulty 
level 2 
difficulty 
level 3 
difficulty 
level 4 
difficulty 
level 1 
difficulty 
level 2 
difficulty 
level 3 
difficulty 
level 4 
difficulty 
level 1 
difficulty 
level 2 
difficulty 
level 3 
difficulty 
level 4 
50.4 
31.6 
7.4 
10.5 
42.5 
41.0 
14.3 
2.2 
37.5 
40.1 
11.7 
10.7 
55.0 
41.0 
1.3 
2.7 
54.2 
41.4 
3.9 
0.6 
52.7 
40.0 
4.9 
2.4 
51.4 
40.7 
6.7 
1.2 
47.3 
42.8 
9.6 
0.2 
39.0 
32.5 
20.0 
8.5 
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Figure 6.1 Mean difficulty level chosen by success- and failure-oriented children 
during the first, second and third part of the experiment in the no-
reward condition 
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Figure 6.2Mean difficulty level chosen by success- and failure-oriented 
children during the first, second and third part of the experiment in 
the constant reward condition 
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Figure 6.3 Mean difficulty level chosen by success- and failure-oriented 
children during the first, second and third part of the experiment in 
the consistent reward condition 
Subsequently these data were used in trend analyses to study whether the difficulty 
level chosen changed during the course of the experiment. In the no-reward condition 
there is a trend towards the choice of more difficult puzzles during the course of the 
experiment (F(l,23)=8.76; ρ <0.01), while this trend differed for success-oriented 
and failure-oriented children (F(l,23)=3.40; ρ < 0.08), i.e., the trend is significant for 
failure-oriented children (F(l)ll)=27.89; ρ < 0.001) and not significant for success-
oriented children (F(l,8) < 1). Failure-oriented children start with puzzles of lower 
difficulty levels than success-oriented children. In the reward condition with the same 
reward for each correctly solved puzzle there is also a trend toward the choice of more 
difficult puzzles during the course of the experiment (F(l,23)=l 17.13; ρ < 0.001), 
this trend was significant both for success-oriented (F(l,8)=32.63; ρ < 0.001) and 
failure-oriented children (F(l,ll)=80.94; ρ < 0.001). In the reward condition where 
the reward is consistent with the difficulty level of the puzzle, there was no trend 
towards the choice of more difficult puzzles. In other words the mean difficulty level of 
the puzzles chosen during the course of the experiment did not change. 
In addition whether the percentage of children showing a variable choice pattern (as 
compared to the percentage of children who solved all puzzles of difficulty level 1 
before continuing with puzzles of difficulty level 2 and so forth) differed between the 
four motive groups was studied. Table 6.6 shows the percentage of children with a 
variable choice partem in each motive group and in each condition. 
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Table 6.6 Percentage of children with a variable choice pattern for each motive 
group in die three conditions 
no-reward constant reward consistent reward 
condition condition condition 
success-
oriented 67 44 67 
children 
balanced 
children 20 20 40 
failure-
oriented 25 17 75 
children 
In the no-reward condition more success- than failure-oriented children showed a 
variable choice pattern (c 2 = 3.84, df = 1; ρ < 0.10). In the condition in which each 
correctly solved puzzle was rewarded with 2 points again rather more success- than 
failure-oriented children showed a variable choice pattern (C2 = 1.94, df= 1; 
ρ < 0.20). In the condition in which the reward for a correctly solved puzzle was 
consistent with the difficulty level of the puzzle, there was no significant difference 
between success- and failure-oriented children in the percentage of children who 
showed a variable choice pattern. 
6.4. Discussion 
The main question of this study was, how do different kinds of reward influence 
the task behavior of children? In the first experiment children had to solve a 
predetennined sequence of puzzles of different difficulty levels in two conditions. In 
the first condition there was no consequence nor any reward attached to correct solution 
of the puzzles. In the second condition correct solution of a puzzle would be rewarded 
with a number of points that increased with increasing difficulty level of the puzzle. In 
this condition children wrote the number of points earned next to the puzzle if it was 
solved correctly. They also wrote down the time they needed to solve the puzzle, or the 
time at which they decided to give up on the puzzle. In this condition, therefore, correct 
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solution of the puzzle was rewarded. However, there were no consequences attached to 
these rewards. The reward was merely a reflection of the difficulty level of the puzzle 
and as such an external sign of the feelings of pride and shame children felt upon 
solving the task correctly or incorrectly. 
In this first experiment four components of task behavior were studied. The first 
component was the solution time for the puzzles. Rewarding correct solution of a 
puzzle could induce the child to work harder and, thereby, decrease the solution time of 
the puzzle. However, only for difficulty levels 1 and 2 did both success- and failure-
oriented children have shorter solution times in the reward than in the no-reward 
condition. Intensity can be influenced, but only if the task is rather easy. For difficulty 
level 3 only the success-oriented children had shorter solution times in the reward than 
in the no-reward condition. The kind of reward given in this experiment (which would 
not have any consequences once the experiment was over) appeared to have no 
influence on the intensity with which the children worked on the harder tasks. 
The second component of task behavior studied in this experiment is the number of 
puzzles solved correctly. Both success- and failure-oriented children solved more 
puzzles of difficulty level 3 and 4 correctly in the reward than in the no-reward 
condition. For puzzles of difficulty level 2, success-oriented children also solved more 
puzzles correcüy in the reward than in the no-reward condition. Making explicit the 
incentive value attached to correct task solution appears to influence the effort with 
which children work at the task and in this way increases the number of tasks solved 
correctly. The effect of making explicit the reward is more general fot success-oriented 
children: for these children there is an increase in solution time on harder tasks (of 
difficulty level 3) in addition to the easier tasks of difficulty level 1 and 2 and there is 
an increase in the number of tasks solved correctly for easier tasks (of difficulty 
level 2) in addition to the harder tasks of difficulty level 3 and 4. Failure-oriented 
children appear to spend effort in decreasing solution times for easier tasks and 
increasing the number of tasks solved correctly for difficult tasks. 
The third component of task behavior studied in this experiment was the persistence 
with which children tried to find the correct solution of a puzzle. The children solved 
almost all puzzles of difficulty level 1 and 2. Therefore, persistence is only studied for 
difficulty level 3 and 4. There were no significant differences in persistence time 
between success- and failure-oriented children nor between the reward and the no-
reward condition. 
The fourth component of task behavior studied was the number of puzzles on which 
children gave up. For puzzles of difficulty level 4 both success- and failure-oriented 
children gave up less often in the reward than in the no-reward condition. 
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It seems that both success- and failure-oriented children are influenced by the kind 
of reward used in the first experiment. Making explicit the incentive value of correct 
task solution induces all children to increase the intensity or effort of their task 
pertormance. As a result solution times are decreased, number of tasks solved correctly 
increased and number of tasks given up on decreased. 
In the second experiment children had to choose and solve a number of puzzles for 
about 30 minutes in three different conditions. In the first condition there was no 
reward nor any consequence attached to correct solution of the puzzle. In the second 
condition any puzzle that was solved correctly was rewarded with 2 points independent 
of the difficulty level of the puzzle. In addition the child with the highest number of 
points in this experimental condition was to receive a prize at the end of the experiment. 
In the third condition children would receive a number of points for each correctly 
solved puzzle that was consistent with the difficulty level of the puzzle. Again the child 
with the highest total number of points in this experimental condition would receive a 
prize at the end of the experiment. 
In this experiment another component of task behavior was studied, namely choice 
of difficulty level. The main objective of this experiment was to see whether the 
sequence of difficulty levels of the puzzles children chose would be influenced by the 
kind of reward following correct solution of the puzzle. This implies that in theory 
children had to be able to choose puzzles of the same difficulty level throughout the 
experiment. In prior experiments it was found that children could solve approximately 
20 puzzles in 30 minutes. Therefore, children were confronted with four piles of 
20 puzzles, one for each difficulty level. However, in contrast to these earlier 
experiments, children now seemed to be able to solve considerably more than 
20 puzzles in half an hour. As a consequence they could not choose puzzles of the 
same difficulty level throughout the experiment, but instead had to move to another 
level of difficulty after their preferred one was finished. In theory, of course, they 
could have stopped after they had solved all puzzles of their primary choice. But all 
children understood our instruction as implying that they had to keep on working until 
the 30 minutes were over and, therefore, to continue with other puzzles. An 
explanation for the discrepancy in number of puzzles solved in earlier experiments and 
in the present experiment could be the fact that in the present experiment children were 
not tested individually but in a group session. The presence of the other children seems 
to have induced a tendency to solve as many puzzles as quickly as possible. 
Both failure- and success-oriented children chose fewer puzzles of difficulty level 1 
in the reward conditions than in the no-reward condition. Especially, if the extrinsic 
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reward was consistent with the incentive value related to correct task solution fewer 
puzzles of difficulty level 1 were chosen In other words, very easy puzzles loose their 
attraction if rewards are associated with task performance In the no-reward condition 
success-onented children chose fewer puzzles of difficulty level 2 and more of 
difficulty level 4 than failure-onented children. This difference between success- and 
failure-onented children disappears in the constant and consistent reward conditions In 
the constant reward condition success-onented children began to choose more puzzles 
of difficulty level 2 The incentive value connected with choosing difficult puzzles was 
dominated by the rewards connected with correct task solution even for success-
onented children In the consistent reward condition failure-onented children began to 
choose fewer puzzles of difficulty level 2 and more puzzles of difficulty level 3 and 4 
In this condition incentive value connected to task choice and reward connected to 
correct task solution were consistent In this case even failure-onented children began 
to choose difficult tasks 
In the condition in which there was no reward for the correct solution of a puzzle 
failure-onented children chose progressively more difficult puzzles dunng the course of 
the expenment, while success-onented children chose similar difficulty levels 
throughout the expenment Furthermore more failure-onented than success-onented 
children showed a vanable choice pattern (i e , they first solved all puzzles of difficulty 
level 1 before continuing with puzzles of difficulty level 2) 
In the condition in which correct solution of a puzzle was rewarded with two 
points, independent of the difficulty level of the puzzle, both success- and failure-
onented children chose progressively more difficult puzzles dunng the course of the 
expenment In this condition nearly all children of the failure-onented group and nearly 
half of the children of the success-onented group first solved all puzzles of difficulty 
level 1 before continuing with puzzles of difficulty level 2 In this condition the 
extnnsic rewards associated with correct solution of a puzzle and the consequence 
attached to earning these rewards seems to dominate over the intnnsic value of solving 
difficult puzzles Earning as many points as possible, and in this way winning a pnze at 
the end of the expenment, seems to be more important to the children than feelings of 
pnde at solving a difficult puzzle This conclusion applies especially to the success-
onented children who now start choosing puzzles of lower difficulty levels than they 
did in the condmon without any external rewards 
In the condition m which the reward for correct solution of a puzzle was consistent 
with the difficulty level of the puzzle, the choice of difficulty level did not change 
dunng the course of the expenment, neither for success- nor for failure-onented 
children There was also no difference in the number of children who showed a 
vanable choice pattern In this condition the extnnsic reward attached to correct solution 
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of a puzzle was a validation of intrinsic feelings of pride accompanying correct solution 
of a puzzle. Especially the failure-oriented children now start with puzzles of higher 
difficulty levels than they did in the other two conditions. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these experiments is that attaching rewards to 
correct solution of tasks can have a positive effect on task behavior, especially on the 
task behavior of failure-oriented children. More specifically, if one takes care to let the 
value of the reward coincide with the intrinsic feelings accompanying successful task 
completion, which in their turn are associated with the difficulty of a task, then this 
reward has a positive effect on task performance. This effect is reflected both in the 
sense that children now dare to choose more difficult tasks, despite the fact that they 
know that their chance of solving such a task is less than one, and in the sense of trying 
longer to find a solution for the task. 
6 . 5 . Summary 
The main question of this study was, in which way do different kinds of rewards 
influence the task behavior of children? In the first experiment coirect task solutions 
would or would not be rewarded with a number of points that increased with increasing 
difficulty level of the puzzle. Making explicit the incentive value of correct task solution 
induced both success- and failure oriented children to increase the intensity or effort of 
their task performance. As a result solution times decreased, number of tasks solved 
correctly increased and number of tasks given up on decreased. In the second 
experiment correct task solutions were not rewarded, rewarded with two points 
independent of the difficulty level of the task, or rewarded with a number of points 
consistent with the difficulty level of the task. In this experiment the sequence of 
difficulty levels chosen appeared to be influenced by the kind of reward following 
correct task solution. When the extrinsic reward associated with correct task solution 
was independent of the difficulty level of the task, it appeared to dominate the intrinsic 
value of solving difficult puzzles. Consequently, both success- and failure-oriented 
children started with choosing easy tasks. When the extrinsic reward associated with 
correct task solution was consistent with the difficulty level of the task, it appeared to 
be a validation of the intrinsic feelings of pride accompanying correct task solution. 
Both success- and failure-oriented children in this case started with choosing tasks of 
higher difficulty levels. 
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7. DYNAMIC MOTIVATION IN MENTAL TASKS: THE 
INFLUENCE OF PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK ON TASK 
CHOICE 
7 . 1 . Introduction 
When we observe a person in his everyday life, the first thing we notice is that this 
person is constantly active. From the viewpoint of the motivation theorist we want to 
answer the question why that person is doing one thing and not the other. Therefore, 
task choice is one of the main factors studied in the domain of motivation theory. Since 
the emergence of the dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1974) studies 
have appeared focusing on the behavior of a person working at a sequence of similar 
tasks (see, for example, Kuhl and Blankenship, 1979a, 1979b; or Schneider and 
Posse, 1982). According to Atkinson's risk-taking model for achievement behavior 
(1964), task choice is primarily influenced by two factors (Houtmans, 1986). The first 
factor is the probability that one will execute the task successfully, which is related to 
the difficulty level of the task at hand; the second factor is the incentive value connected 
with success or failure on that task. These incentive values represent the affects 
connected with success (pride) or failure (shame). Aside from these affects connected 
with task outcome, the dynamics-of-action model does not concern itself explicitly with 
task outcome. Consequently, in most studies on the dynamics-of-action model 
feedback about task performance is not considered as a factor that can influence, for 
example, task choice. However, it is known that feedback or knowledge of results does 
have an effect on task behavior (Locke, 1968; Locke, Shaw, Saari and Latham, 1981). 
It is an unresolved question in the area of motivation research whether feedback about 
task performance shows an interaction with the motive structure of an individual (i.e., 
the predominance of either the motive to achieve success or the motive to avoid failure) 
in determining task behavior (in particular task choice). 
In motivation research the general finding with regard to task choice is that success-
oriented subjects choose tasks of an intermediate level of difficulty, while failure-
oriented subjects are more inclined to choose tasks of either a very low or a very high 
level of difficulty. In addition, in studies about the level of aspiration failure-oriented 
subjects show more atypical shifts in level of aspiration (and, thereby, in task choice) 
than success-oriented subjects, i.e., failure-oriented subjects more often choose a more 
difficult task after failure and an easier task after success than success-oriented subjects 
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(Moulton, 1965). These atypical shifts in task choice of failure-oriented subjects may 
be explained by Atkinson's risk-taking model of achievement motivation (1964). 
Failure-oriented subjects choose tasks of either very high or very low difficulty levels 
because the fear of failure far tasks of these difficulty levels is considerably lower than 
for tasks of intermediate difficulty levels. When subjects are confronted with a small 
number of tasks they will revise the probability of success of the remaining tasks after 
each success or failure at a task. The atypical shifts in task choice of failure-oriented 
subjects can then be explained in terms of trying to keep choosing the task connected 
with the least fear of failure. 
In this study the influence of information about task performance on task choice 
was investigated. Therefore, an experiment was designed in which children had to 
choose and (try to) solve a number of tasks consecutively. One group of children 
would choose and solve tasks without any explicit information about their performance. 
Another group of children received explicit and cumulative information about their task 
performance after each trial. Task choice was operationalized in two different ways: a) 
the number of tasks of varying difficulty levels chosen by the children and b) the 
difficulty level a child chooses after either success or failure on the previous trial. In 
addition, it was studied whether success- and failure-oriented children are differentially 
influenced by information about their performance. 
According to Lewin, Dembo, Festinger and Sears (1944), the last success or failure 
carries a great psychological weight and is, therefore, the main factor responsible for 
raising or lowering the expectation of future achievement. Since the expectation of 
future achievement is one of the factors determining task choice, we assume that the 
outcome on a trial has an effect on the subsequent task choice. This effect is not 
identical for success- and failure-oriented children. Instead, success-oriented children 
seem to focus on the incentive value of success and behave as if the value of failure is 
zero, while failure-oriented children focus on incentive value of failure and behave as if 
the incentive value of success is zero (Atkinson, 1957). The influence of the last 
'performance on subsequent task choice should be attenuated when explicit and 
cumulative information about task performance is supplied. This line of reasoning led 
to the following hypotheses: Failure-oriented children dare to choose more tasks of a 
higher difficulty level (in a relative sense, i.e., not necessarily the highest difficulty 
level in an absolute sense) in the condition in which they receive more explicit 
information about their performance than in the condition without any explicit 
information, because the explicit information shows them that they can solve some of 
the difficult tasks correctly, and in this way attenuates the inhibiting effect of failure. 
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Success-oriented children are expected to choose the same tasks in both conditions, 
because failure has a less inhibitory effect on these children. In the condition in which 
the children receive the explicit and cumulative information about their performance 
they are expected to get a more objective look on their performance. It is, therefore, 
expected that both success- and failure-oriented children in the condition with explicit 
information about performance will choose trials of a higher difficulty level after 
success and trials with the same difficulty level after failure more often than in the 
condition without this information. 
7 .2 . Method 
Subjects : Twenty-nine children (ten boys and nineteen girls) of the fith and sixth 
grade of two elementary schools took part in the experiment. Their mean age was 11 
years and eight months. 
Procedure: Each child was tested individually in an experimental session which 
lasted approximately one hour. During this session the children were confronted with 
five sets of 12 tasks each, ranging in difficulty from very easy to very difficult. To 
construct these tasks, a set of 60 five-letter nouns was selected from the total Dutch 
population of five-letter words. Excluded were foreign words, proper nouns or 
diminutives. These nouns were subsequently divided into 5 classes which were 
matched on a number of factors such as frequency range (Uit den Bogaart, 1975) and 
positional letterfrequencies for words (i.e., the frequency of occurrence of each letter at 
a particular position in a five letter word, summated over the five letters in the word. 
Rolf and van Rijnsoever, 1984). Subsequently, each word was scrambled into a 
random sequence of five letters in order to obtain a so-called anagram of the word. 
Children had to rearrange the letter sequence of the anagram to find the original word. 
The letter sequences of difficulty level 1 and 2 were easiest because two letters were 
already presented in their correct position. Letter sequences of difficulty level 3 had one 
letter in the correct position, while letter sequences of difficulty level 4 and 5 had no 
letters in the correct position. The difference between difficulty level 1 and 2 and 
between difficulty level 4 and 5 was achieved by varying the number of letters which 
has to be moved to recreate the original word. According to Dominowski (1966), the 
relationship between the letter order of the anagram and the letter order of the 
corresponding solution word affects the difficulty of anagram solution. In particular, 
the difficulty is affected by the number of letters which have to be moved to produce the 
word letter order from the anagram, disregarding the distance over which the letter or 
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letters have to be moved. The difficulty increases as the number of required moves 
increabes from one to three. In letter sequences of difficulty level 1 only one letter has 
to be moved to recreate the solution word, while for difficulty level 2 two letters have to 
be moved. Similarly, in letter sequences of difficulty level 4 two letters have to be 
moved to recreate the solution word, while for difficulty level 5 three letters have to be 
moved. 
The experimental task was presented on a personal computer. The computer 
registered the answers of the children and also the time children needed far each phase 
of the task performance. At the start of each trial children indicated of which difficulty 
level the letter sequence they were going to solve should be. When a difficulty level had 
been chosen two letter sequences (one below die other) were presented on the screen. 
The topmost letter sequence was the anagram, in the lower sequence the letters of the 
anagram that were already in the correct position were given, while the other letters 
were indicated by an underscore (for an example of a stimulus of each difficulty level 
see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 An example of a stimulus, the construction principle, the correct response 
and the English transladon of the solution for each difficulty level. The 
letters in the anagram with an underscore are already in their correct 
position, the fat letters have to be moved to obtain the solution word. 
stimulus construction response English 
principle translation 
Difficulty level 1: 
Ufsiht 
w 1 
ULSini u i i n s t p r o f i t 
Difficulty level 2: 
rakmt 
-a—t 
гдЦті markt market 
Difficulty level 3: 
ipumr 
— u — 
ipyjnr pruim plum 
Difficulty level 4: 
nvhae 
nv/hae haven h a r b o r 
Difficulty level 5: 
falsa 
falsa slaaf slave 
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As soon as a letter sequence was presented a timer started. Children then had three 
options: 1) not responding at all; in this case the trial ended after 3 minutes; 2) 
indicating that they did not want to think about the word any longer by pushing a 'give 
up' button; 3) indicating that they knew the word; in this case the letter sequence would 
disappear and the child was asked to type in the correct word. Independent of the 
option chosen the correct solution of the anagram was shown after each trial, because in 
prior experiments children appeared to keep thinking about what the correct solution 
should have been and in this way the solution process of the next trial was disturbed. 
The solution time for a correct answer was defined as the time between presentation of 
the anagram and the moment at which the children indicated that they knew the 
solution. In this way the time needed to produce the answer (i.e., typing speed) could 
not influence the solution time of each individual trial and, in addition, children could 
not find the word by trial and error by way of trying out different letter sequences. 
Design: The children were divided into two groups. One group of nineteen children 
(six boys and thirteen girls) only saw the correct solution of each individual anagram. 
These children could only try to keep count of the number of words of each difficulty 
level they had chosen and solved correctly. The other group of ten children (four boys 
and six girls) saw the correct solution of each individual anagram and in addition they 
received cumulative information about the number of words of each difficulty level they 
had chosen and solved correctly up to that trial. This cumulative information was 
presented in a table in which the number of words chosen and solved correctly and the 
percentage of words solved correctly of each difficulty level were summarized. This 
second group of children received more accurate information about their task 
performance than the first group. The question which had to be answered in this 
experiment was whether more accurate information about task performance had a 
differential effect on task behavior (i. е., task choice) for children with different motive 
structures. 
After the experimental task, a Dutch translation of the AMS (Achievement Motives 
Scale, Nygârd and Gjesme, 1973) was administered to determine the score for the 
motive to achieve success (Ms) and for the motive to avoid failure (Mf). The first 15 
items of the AMS are used to compute Ms, while the remaining 15 items are used to 
compute Mf. On the basis of these two scores children were divided into 3 groups in 
the following way. The score for the motive to achieve success and the score for the 
motive to avoid failure were transformed into z-scores. Subsequently the z-score for the 
motive to avoid failure was subtracted from the z-score for the motive to achieve 
success. This procedure is admissable because our research group generally finds only 
a small, insignificant, correlation between Ms and Mf when measured with the help of 
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the AMS Children with a score around zero plus or minus two times the standard error 
of the mean (computed for each child individually) were as high (οτ low) on the motive 
to achieve success as on the motive to avoid failure, they constituted the group of 
'balanced subjects' Children with a positive score constituted the group of success-
onented children and children with a negative score constituted the group of failure-
onented children 
7 . 3 . Data analyses 
Data were analysed using multivariate analyses of vanance The independent 
variables were motive group (success-onented children, fddure-onented children and 
balanced children) and information condition (explicit and cumulative information 
versus no explicit and cumulative information about task performance) The dependent 
\ arables were the percentage of trials chosen of each difficulty level and the percentage 
of tnaJs on which children chose the same, a higher or a lower level of difficulty after 
success or failure on a trial 
7 .4 . Results 
With regard to the first hypothesis the percentage of tnals chosen of each difficulty 
level was investigated A multivariate analysis of vanance showed a significant 
interaction between motive group and information condition (F(10,38)=l 18, 
p < 0 10) Univariate F-tests showed that this interaction was significant for the 
percentage of tnals chosen of difficulty level 4 (F(2,23)=2 78, ρ < 009) and difficulty 
le\el 5 (F(2,23)=3 17, ρ < 0 07) In the condition with cumulative information about 
task performance failure-oriented children chose more tnals of difficulty level 4 
(Γ(1,4)=5 14, p < 0 0 9 ) and fewer trials of difficulty level 5 (F(l,4)=11.86; 
ρ < 0 05) than success-onented children In the condition without cumulative 
information about task performance the result (although not significant) was just the 
opposite failure-onented children chose fewer tnals of difficulty level 4 and more tnals 
of difficulty level 5 than success-onented children (see Table 7 2) 
A subsequent analysis investigated whether Success- and failure-onented children 
would choose differently in the condition with than in the condition without cumulative 
information about task performance Failure-onented children chose significantly more 
trials of difficulty level 4 in the condition with than in the condmon without the 
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cumulative information (F( 1,7)= 16.04; ρ <0.01). Success-oriented children chose 
more trials of difficulty level 5 in the condition with than in the condition without the 
cumulative feedback (F(l ,6)=4.26; ρ < 0.09). 
Table 7.2 Mean percentage of tasks chosen on each difficulty level for both the 
condition with and the condition without explicit and cumulative 
information about task performance 
no 
cumulative 
information 
about 
task 
performance 
cumulative 
information 
about 
task 
performance 
difficulty 
level 1 
difficulty 
level 2 
difficulty 
level 3 
difficulty 
level 4 
difficulty 
levels 
difficulty 
level 1 
difficulty 
level 2 
difficulty 
level 3 
difficulty 
level 4 
difficulty 
level 5 
success-
oriented 
subjects 
13.8 
32.5 
21.3 
22.5 
10.0 
17.7 
18.8 
18.8 
22.9 
21.9 
balanced 
subjects 
24.4 
20.6 
20.0 
19.4 
15.6 
9.4 
15.6 
29.2 
31.3 
14.6 
failure-
oriented 
subjects 
28.6 
21.4 
16.4 
13.6 
20.0 
10.4 
18.8 
20.8 
41.7 
8.3 
With regard to the second hypothesis the percentage of trials on which children 
chose the same, a higher or a lower level of difficulty after success or failure on the 
previous trial was investigated. A multivariate analysis of variance showed a marginally 
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significant interaction between motive group and information condition 
(F( 12,36)= 1.68; ρ < 0.12). Univariate F-tests showed that this interaction was 
significant for choosing a higher difficulty level after failure (F(2,23)=3.77; ρ < 0.05) 
and choosing a lower difficulty level after failure (F(2,23)=4.19; ρ <0.05). There 
were no significant differences between success- and failure-oriented children in the 
choice of difficulty level after success on the previous trial. In the condition with 
cumulative information about task performance failure-oriented children less often 
chose a trial with a higher difficulty level after failure (F(l,4)=6.15; ρ < 0.07) and 
more often chose a trial with a lower difficulty level after failure (F(l)4)=7.75; 
ρ < 0.05) than success-oriented children. 
Table 7.3 Percentage of choices on the same, a higher or lower level of difficulty after 
failure on the previous trial for both the condition with and the condition 
without explicit and cumulative information about task performance 
success- balanced failure-
oriented subjects oriented 
subjects subjects 
same 
difficulty 24.3 14.1 21.9 
level 
higher 
difficulty 5.0 28.3 28.4 
level 
lower 
difficulty 70.8 57.5 50.9 
level 
same 
difficulty 26.5 17.0 12.5 
level 
higher 
difficulty 36.3 49.0 0.0 
level 
lower 
difficulty 36.8 34.0 87.5 
level 
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no 
cumulative 
information 
about 
task 
performance 
cumulative 
information 
about 
task 
performance 
Again the results were just the opposite for the condition without the cumulative 
information about task performance: failure-oriented children more often chose a trial 
with a higher difficulty level after failure (F(l,9)=7.11; ρ <0.05) and less often 
(although not significantly) chose a trial with a lower difficulty level after failure 
(F(l,9)=1.67; ρ < 0.20) than did success-oriented children (see Table 7.3). 
7 .5 . Discussion 
The general finding that success-oriented subjects choose more trials of intermediate 
levels of diffficulty, while failure-oriented subjects tend to favor either very high or 
very low levels of difficulty, is again corroborated in this experiment. In the condition 
without cumulative feedback success-oriented subjects chose a higher percentage of 
trials from difficulty levels 2, 3 and 4 than from the extreme difficulty levels 1 and 5 
(76.3% versus 23.8%). Failure-oriented subjects, on the other hand, showed a 
preference for the extreme difficulty levels 1 and 5 in favor of the intermediate difficulty 
levels 2, 3 and 4 (48.6% versus 51.4%). In the condition in which children received 
cumulative feedback about their task performance, however, the choice pattern of 
preferred difficulty levels diverted from this generally found pattern. While success-
oriented children in this case distributed their choices more evenly between the five 
possible difficulty levels, failure-oriented children now tended to prefer difficulty levels 
3 and 4 in favor of the more extreme difficulty levels. Summarizing the comparison of 
choices of both subject groups in the condition with and without cumulative feedback. 
it appears that failure-oriented subjects chose more trials of difficulty level 4 at the cost 
of difficulty levels 1 and 5, while success-oriented subjects chose more trials of 
difficulty level 5 at the cost of difficulty level 2 in the condition with feedback. 
It was hypothesized that failure-oriented children dare to choose more difficult tasks 
when they receive performance feedback than when there is no feedback about task 
performance, while success-oriented children should have a similar choice pattern in 
both conditions. However, feedback about task performance appeared to have an effect 
on task choice for both success- and failure-oriented children. When they received 
feedback success-oriented children chose a similar number of trials of difficulty level 4 
and more trials of difficulty level 5, while failure-oriented children chose more trials of 
difficulty level 4 and a similar number of trials of difficulty level 5 (although there 
appears to be a difference in the percentage of trials chosen in the two conditions [20.0 
and 8.3], statistically it is not significant). Explicitly confronting children with the fact 
that they can solve difficult trials (albeit not so very often) induced them to choose a 
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larger number of these trials. While failure-oriented children in this case appear to set 
more realistic levels of aspiration (they attempt more of the difficult tasks instead of the 
extremely difficult or easy tasks), success-oriented children seem to be encouraged by 
the reminder that they have solved some of the extremely difficult tasks to try more of 
these tasks. 
It was also hypothesized that feedback would give children a more objective idea 
about their task performance and, thereby, would reduce the effect of the outcome of 
the immediately preceding trial. In other words, performance feedback should have an 
effect on Ле choice of the task following success or failure on the previous trial. When 
they receive performance feedback both success- and failure-oriented children are 
expected to more often choose trials of a higher difficulty level after success, and trials 
of the same (or even a higher) difficulty level after failure. The cumulative feedback 
should show both to the success- and the failure-oriented children that they can solve 
tasks from higher difficulty levels, even if they just failed such a task. This hypothesis 
was only confirmed for success-oriented children. In the condition without cumulative 
feedback these children overwhelmingly chose tasks with a lower level of difficulty 
after failure. They showed almost no atypical shifts in task choice. However, in the 
condition with the cumulative feedback they showed a considerable percentage of 
atypical shifts, i.e., they chose a considerable percentage of trials with a higher level of 
difficulty after failure. In other words, the cumulative feedback attenuated the influence 
of the last task outcome. The children knew that they could solve these difficult tasks 
and they were confident enough to choose them, even after a failure. 
The hypothesis was not confirmed for failure-oriented children. In the condition 
without cumulative feedback these children showed a considerable percentage of 
atypical shifts in task choice (as predicted by Moulton, 1965). In the condition with the 
cumulative feedback the children showed no atypical shifts, but overwhelmingly chose 
tasks with a lower level of difficulty after failure. In contrast to success-oriented 
children, the failure-oriented children seem to be influenced heavily by their last 
performance when they receive cumulative information. Failure-oriented children 
seemed to react more strongly to their failures when confronted with performance 
feedback about their task outcome compared to success-oriented children. While 
displaying a history of past successes and failures induced success-oriented children to 
be more daring and more often to choose more difficult trials and less often to choose 
easier trials after failure, failure-oriented children became more cautious and, 
consequently, more often chose easier trials and less often chose more difficult trials 
after failure. 
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7.6. Summary 
To study motivation in relation to mental tasks an anagram solution task has been 
developed. Anagrams on five levels of difficulty were presented to children who had to 
choose and solve 24 of these tasks consecutively. As a motivational factor information 
about task performance was manipulated. Feedback about task performance appeared to 
have a positive effect on task behavior of failure-oriented children in the sense that they 
chose a larger percentage of difficult trials than in the case in which this information 
was not available to them. However, performance feedback also seemed to have the 
immediate consequence that these failure-oriented children got more cautious and, 
therefore, more often chose an easier trial after a failure than in the condition without 
this information. Success-oriented children chose similar percentages of trials of each 
difficulty level in both conditions. However, in their case the performance feedback 
induced them to more often choose a trial with a higher level of difficulty after failure. 
113 
U4 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, 
EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS 
In this final Chapter an attempt is made to deduce some implications for theory, 
educational practice, and treatment programs based on the conclusions that can be 
drawn from this thesis. In the first four sections the conclusions are summarized. They 
are clustered with respect to four themes, i.e., task motivation and the dynamics-of-
action model, children and the dynamics-of-action model, the influence of rewards on 
task motivation and the influence of performance feedback on task motivation. In the 
remaining sections some implications for theory, educational practice, and treatment 
programs are given. 
8.1 . Task motivation and the dynamics-of-action model 
The aim of this thesis was to study whether task motivation, as conceived by the 
dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1974), could be influenced by varying 
the conditions under which subjects had to solve a number of tasks. To achieve this, 
subjects were brought into a task situation allowing the investigation of dynamic 
aspects of task behavior. In practice, this meant that subjects were confronted with a 
large number of similar tasks, differing only in difficulty level; they had to solve a fixed 
or varying number while for every single task they were either allowed freely to choose 
the difficulty level or they were forced to work at a particular level of difficulty. 
The dynamics-of-action model considers task motivation as a process which is 
determined by three factors. These three factors are: 1) the motive structure of the 
subject, 2) the difficulty level of the task, and 3) the incentive value associated with 
success or failure at the task. Task motivation is one of the factors that, besides 
intelligence, can determine the task performance by influencing a number of aspects of 
task behavior, in particular: task choice, persistence and intensity of performance. In an 
actual task situation these aspects are represented by choice of difficulty level of the 
task, sequence of task difficulty levels chosen, number of tasks on which subjects give 
up, time until they decide to give up, solution time and number of tasks solved 
correcdy. The dynamics-of-action model examines task behavior in a dynamic task 
situation in which subjects have to work consecutively at a series of tasks, i.e., it looks 
at motivation from a dynamic perspective. This implies that experiences with earlier 
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trials influence the way in which subjects perform on the following trials. In other 
words, the dynamics-of-action model examines how subjects change their task 
behavior in relation to what happened on earlier trials. This approach is more in line 
with task behavior as manifested in real life than the approach taken by episodic 
theories of achievement motivation which pay no attention to any prior experiences of 
the subjects. In summary, the main theoretical implication of the dynamics-of-action 
model is that variations in one or more of the three motivational factors determining task 
motivation (i.e., the motive structure of the subject, the difficulty level of the task and 
the incentive value associated with success or failure at the task) should have a 
differential influence on the various aspects of task behavior (i.e., choice of difficulty 
level, sequence of task difficulty levels chosen, number of tasks on which subjects give 
up, time until they decide to give up, solution time and number of tasks solved 
correctly). 
The theoretical overviews given in Chapters 2 and 3 allow the following 
conclusions. Although the three motivational factors mentioned by the dynamics-of-
action model certainly do influence task behavior, they are not the only factors involved 
in task motivation. Other external factors are at least as important in determining the 
motivational processes in effect at task performance. For example, in actual task 
performance the incentive value of success at a task is not exclusively represented by 
self-evaluation (resulting in affective feelings of pride or shame). Most of the time 
additional consequences associated with task performance (such as evaluation by 
others, or grades earned) also determine the way in which the children will handle the 
task (Heckhausen, 1977). Two of the most important external factors influencing task 
motivation, investigated primarily in theories of intrinsic motivation, are extrinsic 
rewards and feedback about task performance. In this thesis the influence of these two 
factors on task motivation was investigated within the context of a dynamic task 
situation. Summing up the conclusions drawn from the literature review, the dynamics-
of-action model appears to have a number of valuable elements, in particular the 
dynamic viewpoint of the theory seems to be of great importance for studying task 
motivation. However, the theory is rather restrictive since the influence of external 
factors (such as extrinsic rewards or the number of successes and failures at a task) on 
task motivation is only described in the context of the development of the motivational 
system. Once the motivational system is established, the model is only concerned with 
personal and task dependent variables and does not consider external factors as 
influencing task motivation. To get a broader perspective on processes related to task 
motivation, it seems worth while incorporating these factors into a model about task 
motivation. 
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8.2 . Children and the dynamics-of-action model 
According to the dynamics-of-action model, the behavior subjects demonstrate (in 
particular task choice, persistence and intensity of behavior) is determined by the 
interplay of a number of forces. One of the main predictions of the theory is that, based 
on the influence of the consummatory force, subjects who are confronted with a great 
number of similar tasks, a number of which they have to solve, will show a trend 
towards choosing increasingly more difficult tasks. When subjects are engaged in a 
task, a consummatory force stans to develop decreasing the tendency to keep working 
at that (or a similar) task. Consequently, the tendency to keep choosing tasks of the 
same difficulty level will decrease with an increase in the number of tasks of that 
difficulty level already chosen. Therefore, during the course of an experiment subjects 
should switch to more difficult tasks for which the consummatory force would still be 
rather small (Kuhl and Blankenship, 1979b). 
One of the questions addressed in this thesis was whether the predictions, as 
derived firom the dynamics-of-action model, were valid for children. According to 
Heckhausen (1980a), children at the age of 10 to 12 already possess the cognitive 
prerequisites necessary for regulating one's behavior as predicted by the risk-taking 
model (Atkinson, 1964), i.e., they have an idea about their subjective probability of 
success at tasks of differing levels of difficulty, they are aware of the fact that there is a 
relation between success probability and incentive and they even realize that this relation 
between success probability and incentive is a multiplicative one. 
In this thesis it was shown that children do behave as predicted by the dynamics-of-
action model, i.e., they show an increase in the difficulty level chosen in a dynamic 
task situation. Compared to the choice pattern of adults, however, the increase in 
difficulty level is less steep. This can be explained by a differential increase in the 
consummatory force for children and adults, i.e., the consummatory force appears to 
increase less quickly for children than for adults. Children appear to need more 
experience with or information about tasks of a certain level of difficulty before they 
decide to try more difficult tasks. 
8.3. The influence of rewards on task motivation 
Another question addressed in this thesis is whether various kinds of rewards have 
a differential effect on task motivation in a dynamic task situation. Specifically, the 
effect of various methods of rewarding a correct task solution on task choice, sequence 
117 
of task choices, persistence, solution times, and number of tasks solved correctly has 
been reviewed. 
Independent of any external rewards (such as money, grades or verbal praise) there 
is always an intrinsic reward or incentive associated with task performance. This 
intrinsic reward is generally described as being of an affective quality. It consists of 
feelings of pride or accomplishment for correct task solutions and feelings of guilt and 
shame for incorrect task solutions. In the dynamics-of-action model intrinsic reward (or 
incentive value) is one of the three factors which influence various aspects of task 
motivation. In actual task situations in addition to intrinsic rewards (self-evaluations), 
task performance is usually also in one way or another associated with an external 
reward (be it money, grades, or verbal praise). These external rewards presumably also 
influence task motivation. 
The experiments reported in this thesis show that extrinsic rewards for correct task 
solutions can have positive as well as negative effects on task behavior, depending on 
the nature of the reward. Basically an extrinsic reward can be related to an intrinsic 
reward in two different ways. On the one hand intrinsic and extrinsic rewards can be 
congruent (tasks with a higher difficulty level generate more feelings of pride and 
accomplishment when they are solved correctly, while they are also rewarded with a 
higher number of points). On the other hand intrinsic and extrinsic rewards could be 
incongruent (independent of the difficulty level and the related affective reactions, all 
correct task solutions are rewarded with an equal number of points). 
In general, positive effects of rewards are reported when the extrinsic reward is 
congruent with the intrinsic reward, i.e., the extrinsic reward for a correct task solution 
is bigger if the difficulty level of the task is higher. The positive effect of congruent 
extrinsic rewards is manifested in intensity of task performance, persistence, task 
choice and sequence of task difficulty levels chosen. With respect to the intensity of 
task performance, solution times for the easier puzzles decrease, while the number of 
puzzles solved correctly increases for the harder puzzles. With respect to persistence, 
children give up less often on harder puzzles. With respect to task choice, children in 
general choose more difficult puzzles. With respect to the sequence of task difficulty 
levels chosen, it appears that a congruent reward destroys the normal pattern, which is 
an increase in difficulty level chosen during the course of an experiment. Both success-
and failure-oriented children start with tasks of a higher difficulty level, after which 
they can only show a marginal increase in difficulty level, due to the limited number of 
difficulty levels presented. Since success-oriented children in a situation without 
external rewards start with tasks of a higher difficulty level than failure-oriented 
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children, the positive effect of the congruent extrinsic reward is especially prominent 
for these failure-oriented children. 
Negative effects of rewards are reported when the extrinsic reward is incongruent 
with the intrinsic reward, i.e., when the extrinsic reward is identical for puzzles of 
different levels of difficulty. The negative effect is manifested in the sequence of task 
difficulty levels chosen. Compared with the sequence of task choices in a situation 
without external rewards, both success- and failure-oriented children now start with the 
easiest puzzles and show a small increase towards somewhat more difficult puzzles 
during the course of the experiment. Since success-oriented children in a situation 
without external rewards start with tasks of a higher difficulty level than failure-oriented 
children, the negative effect of the incongruent extrinsic reward is especially prominent 
for these success-oriented children (yet, all failure-oriented children started with the 
easiest puzzles, while only half of the success-oriented children did this). The incentive 
value associated with choosing difficult puzzles was dominated by the rewards 
associated with correct task solution even for success-oriented children. 
The conclusion of these experiments is that the long ascertained positive effect that 
attaching rewards to correct task solutions has on task performance, is especially 
apparent in the task behavior of failure-oriented children. More specifically, if one takes 
care to let the value of the reward coincide with the intrinsic feelings accompanying 
successful task completion, which on their tum are associated with the difficulty of a 
task, then this reward has a positive effect on task performance. Both in the sense that 
children now dare to choose more difficult tasks, despite the fact that they know that 
their chance of solving such a task is less than one, and in the sense of trying longer to 
find a solution for the task. 
8 .4 . The influence of performance feedback on task motivation 
A third question addressed in this thesis is whether performance feedback has a 
differential effect on task motivation in a dynamic task situation. Specifically, the effect 
of performance feedback on task choice and sequence of task choices has been studied. 
Feedback about task performance had a positive effect on task choice: both success-
and failure-oriented children started to choose trials with higher difficulty levels. 
However, while success-oriented children started to choose more trials of the highest 
difficulty level, failure-oriented children appeared to be more cautious and chose more 
trials of the second highest difficulty level. Explicitly confronting children with the fact 
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that they can solve difficult trials (albeit not so very often) induced them to choose a 
larger number of these more difficult trials. 
Performance feedback also had an effect on the choice of the difficulty level after 
success or failure on the previous trial. Failure-oriented children seemed to react more 
strongly to their failures when they were confronted with feedback about their task 
outcome compared to success-oriented children. While displaying a history of past 
successes and failures induced success-oriented children to be more daring and to more 
often choose more difficult trials and less often choose easier trials after failure, failure-
oriented children got more cautious and, consequently, more often chose easier trials 
and less often chose more difficult trials after failure. 
8.5 . Implications for the theory 
As already concluded the dynamics-of-action model supplies a valuable framework 
for studying achievement behavior in a dynamic context, i.e., a situation in which a 
number of tasks (or items) have to be solved consecutively. In its elementary form the 
theory considers achievement behavior as influenced by two factors that can vary 
independently from each other: motive structure and difficulty level of the task 
(incentive value is directly derived from this latter factor). The explanatory value of the 
theory appears to be, therefore, rather restrictive. In fact it is only applicable in a 
situation in which there is no information about prior task performance, be it in the 
form of extrinsic rewards or in the form of elaborate feedback about prior successes 
and failures. If the dynamics-of-action model is intended to explain task behavior in a 
variety of situations as they exist in real life, it has to allow these factors to be integrated 
in the theoretical model predicting task behavior. 
The results of the experiments described in this thesis suggest that both extrinsic 
rewards and feedback about prior successes and failures influence task behavior and 
thus should be incorporated in the theory. Variations in these two factors seem to 
influence the relation between the factors which, according to the theory, determine task 
behavior. The incentive value, for example, appears not to be direcüy derived from the 
difficulty level of the task, but is instead also influenced by variations in the extrinsic 
rewards associated with task outcome. Extrinsic rewards could be incorporated in the 
theory as a weighting factor for the incentive value. Information about prior task 
performance, on the other hand, seems to influence the consummatory force reducing 
the action tendency to keep working on the same or a similar task. The consummatory 
force appears to be heavily influenced by the outcome of the task immediately prior to 
choosing the following task. Supplying elaborate feedback about prior task 
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performance results in a more steady increase of the consummatory force (i.e., a more 
realistic evaluation of the task behavior). This factor could be integrated as a weighting 
factor for the consummatory value associated with a task. 
8.6. Implications for educational practice 
The results of the experiments reported in this thesis show that variations in task 
conditions influence achievement motivation and, thereby, cause changes in actual task 
behavior. From the results reported in this thesis three conclusions can be drawn which 
are relevant for actual classroom situations. In the first place, it was shown that, in a 
situation in which no consequences were associated with task outcome, children chose 
and worked at tasks of an increasingly higher level of difficulty, without being coerced 
to do so, and knowing that they would fail most of the difficult tasks. Only very few 
children opted for the easy way out and chose tasks of the lowest difficulty level 
throughout the experiment. This result shows that children have an "intrinsic" 
motivation to work at difficult tasks. However, situations in which there are no 
consequences associated with task performance are very rare in actual classroom 
situations (as they are, in fact, in real life). The "intrinsic" motivation might be 
decreased by external factors and this implies that teachers should not rely on it too 
much. 
In the second place, it was shown that extrinsic rewards can have both positive and 
negative effects on task behavior, depending on the nature of the reward. When the 
amount and nature of the extrinsic reward is clearly associated with task difficulty, there 
is a positive effect on task behavior: children will spend more effort at the tasks (i.e., 
for easy puzzles solution times are shorter and for more difficult puzzles more puzzles 
are solved correctly) and they will choose difficult tasks more readily. This effect is 
more prominent for failure-oriented children. In actual classroom situations it seems 
important to clarify the relation between extrinsic rewards associated with task outcome 
and task performance in order to improve task motivation. In this way children's 
awareness of the intrinsic rewards (affective consequences) of working at or even 
solving difficult tasks is heightened, which induces a more positive attitude with regard 
to task performance. In general, this awareness seems to be already more apparent in 
success- than in failure-oriented children. For failure-oriented children, therefore, it 
might even be beneficial to associate rewards more explicitly with task performance. 
However, teachers should be warned against indiscriminately rewarding children for 
correct task solutions. In this case the attention of the children is distracted away from 
the experiences associated with task involvement towards the reward. Attaining 
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rewards becomes more imponant than feelings associated with being involved in a 
difficult task solution process and thus "intrinsic" task motivation may be destroyed. 
Heavily rewarding tasks that are easy to attain may, therefore, be bad advice for 
teachers. 
In the third place, it is shown that feedback about prior task performance has a 
positive effect on task motivation. Confronting children with their previous successes 
and failures induces them to choose more difficult tasks. Without this information 
children have to rely on their memory to deduce whether they can solve a particular task 
or not. The result from the previous task will have a big influence on this memory 
process. If the previous task has been a success the expectation for a success on the 
next task will be more positive than in the case of a previous failure. A summary of 
previous successes and failures is a more objective basis for the expectation of success 
or failure at the next task. In addition this summary may show children that they were 
successful (albeit not so often) at difficult tasks. Information about previous task 
performance can give children a more realistic outlook on their own task performance 
and, thereby, increase task motivation. 
There are two points that still deserve some comments. First, the results of this 
thesis show that task conditions as well as differences in motive structure can cause 
differences in task behavior. Therefore, diagnostic activities both in the area of different 
task conditions and in the area of differences in motive structure are important for 
explaining differences in task behavior. 
Second, the tasks used in this thesis were cognitive tasks and, as such, comparable 
to tasks children have to perform at school. The question is, however, to what extent 
these results can be generalized to real school tasks. This question represents the main 
aim of a research proposal in which tasks in the field of reading and arithmetic will be 
presented to school children in a large number of different task conditions. 
8.7 . Implications for treatment programs 
Besides ability, motivation is one of the factors that influence performance and, 
therefore, the outcome at a particular task. Motivational problems can, and often do, 
have a negative influence on task performance. These problems usually become 
apparent in school situations, where task performance is greatly emphasized. 
Achievement at school is determined by a number of factors, both personality factors 
(such as ability and motivation) and situational factors (such as family background and 
educational environment which includes teaching content, teaching methods and 
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teaching climate). Nonetheless, a positive change in achievement-related motives in 
pupils is supposed to bring school results more in agreement with the capabilities of the 
pupils and thereby improve performance. Many researchers point out that teachers can 
be of influence on the motivational processes that partly determine the achievement of a 
student. However, most of these researchers describe this influence in terms of the 
affective climate in which teaching takes place. For example, Hermans, Bergen and 
Eijssen (1975) describe the relation between teacher and pupil in a task situation as a 
helping relation, only in a positive affective climate is optimal task achievement 
possible. The importance of the social relation between teacher and pupil for improving 
the motivation of these pupils is also stressed by de Charms (1980). Research on the 
manner in which teachers can structure learning so as to optimize motivational 
processes is, as yet, scarce. Veenman and Bergen (1979) give a description of teaching 
as creating conditions in which pupils will be motivated to work on tasks. In their view 
teachers have to present task situations which are in accordance with the achievement 
level of the pupil, which will lead to a result that can be evaluated in a qualitative or 
quantitative way, and in which success or failure is possible when the pupil applies a 
certain level of task-related effort within a certain time period. Changing the motive 
structure of pupils should be possible by influencing certain components of the 
motivational process such as setting realistic aspiration levels, giving nonspecific help 
and giving direct and correct feedback about task results. 
This state of affairs led to the development of a number of training programs that 
tried to influence motivational processes by different kinds of treatment, and that were 
either aimed at the teacher or at the pupils involved. Four of these training programs 
will be reviewed at this place to investigate whether variations in performance feedback 
or rewards are used in order to change the motivational processes. The programs 
developed by McClelland (1973), de Charms (1976), Krug and Hanel (1976), and 
Bergen (1981) and Alberts (1986) will be discussed briefly (for more extensive reviews 
and comparisons of these programs see Bergen, 1979, 1981; Alberts, 1986; and Van 
Overwalle, 1987). 
The main emphasis of McClelland's program (1973) was placed on teaching failure-
oriented children to think, talk and act like a person with high achievement motivation. 
The goal of the program was to increase the willingness to work more intensively and 
more in accordance with the pupil's own competence. The program was originally 
developed to increase achievement motivation in businessmen, but was later adapted to 
be used with high school children. Children preferably entered the training program on 
a voluntary basis. The program took place outside regular school hours, either in 
weekends or in vacation periods. Children were first confronted with a model who 
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possessed high achievement motivation. They were taught to recognize the pattern of 
achievement-related thinking, talking and acting of this model and the actual behavior 
connected with it (such as setting moderate goals, taking personal responsibility, using 
feedback to modify goals and taking initiative to find new ways of achieving goals). 
Next they compared their own conduct with the conduct of this model. Then subjects 
had to set their own goals and invent strategies to reach these goals. Through all these 
steps subjects were supported by the other participants and the training staff. The 
aspects of the training were not translated into teacher behavior, probably because the 
program took place outside regular school activities. The training appeared to have no 
systematic effects on school performance, although there was a positive effect on 
achievement activities outside the school. There were some effects on science and math 
courses, that were explained by the fact that these fields allow specific goal setting and 
getting very specific feedback about the fact whether the goals were reached or not 
The most important feature in the training program of de Charms (1976) is personal 
causation or the origin-pawn distinction. Personal causation or being an origin is 
conceived as a general orientation and feeling of responsibility in the attainment of 
goals. Origins are persons who sets their own goals, take responsibility and prepare 
and plan their work carefully according to their own capacities. In contrast, pawns act 
as persons who are pushed around and who fail to control their own life. In the training 
program of de Charms teachers had to convince their pupils that they were origins, i.e., 
that they were personally responsible for their own actions and performance. In 
practice, pupils were taught to set realistic goals for themselves, to know their own 
strengths and weaknesses, to use strategies to accomplish their goals, to gather 
information about whether their goals were accomplished or not, to determine whether 
their actions had the desired effect. The program was integrated in the normal school 
routine. The training took two years and showed positive effects on academic 
achievement. However, which variables were responsible for the increase in school 
performance could not be traced. 
The training program of Krug and Hanel (1976) is based on the fact that 
achievement motivation is seen as a system of self-evaluation. The program stresses the 
informational aspects and cognitive processes connected with motivation, such as goal-
setting, attributional processes and self-evaluative strategies. The goal of the program is 
to change the thoughts and behaviors which are responsible for the negative self-
reinforcing circular process of failure-oriented children. These children are more likely 
to have unrealistic performance standards and to derive less satisfaction from their task 
results because they attribute failure to lack of ability and success to external 
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circumstances such as luck or easiness of the test. They, therefore, try to circumvent 
performance-oriented activities or choose task levels which are far below or above their 
capacities. These avoidance strategies prevent them from learning about their actual 
abilities and from increasing their self-concept. This results in a circular process of new 
self-reinforcing failures. Failure-oriented children are taught to set more realistic goals 
and to attribute their performance to favorable causes, just like success-oriented 
children do, in order to produce higher concepts of ability and to experience more 
positive emotions after performance. To achieve the desired changes in cognitive 
processes the training uses modeling through observation of the behavior of the trainer 
or others and self-controlled verbalization of motive relevant cognitions and actions. 
The training was integrated in normal school life and was meant for failure-oriented 
children of about 10 years of age. In contrast to the other programs, this program used 
school tasks in order to facilitate the transfer of effects of the training to normal school 
tasks. The training led to a change in the motive structure of the failure-oriented pupils. 
There were, however, no positive effects cm performance of school tasks. 
Based on these existing training programs a number of programs have been 
developed in Nijmegen (Bergen, 1981; Alberts, 1986). These programs were aimed at 
changing the motive structure of the pupils by being applied to the pupils directly or 
indirectly (through their teachers). The teachers had to become acquainted with 
concepts from achievement motivation theory to apply these concepts, consequendy, in 
their behavior towards their students. The concepts that were illuminated were goal-
setting, attribution of success and failure, affective value of success and failure, and 
subjective own competence. These theoretical concepts were, consequently, translated 
into teaching skills and used in the classroom. Just like most of their predecessors these 
intervention strategies did not result in clear positive effects on the task behavior of 
children in a classroom. 
These brief descriptions of the training programs show that they all focus on rather 
broad concepts of several achievement motivation theories. The training programs are 
based on a clarification of these concepts. Pupils and teachers are confronted with 
descriptions of the concepts and the way in which these concepts are transformed into 
actual behavior. The aim of these programs is to change the motivationally related 
behavior of children as a result of this clarification of concepts. In fact, children leam to 
behave like the ideal prototype of an achievement-oriented individual should behave 
according to the theory. None of the programs makes use of the positive effects that 
changes in task conditions, such as supplying performance feedback or giving external 
rewards for correct task performance, can have on motivationally related task behavior. 
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If treatment of motivational problems is to be effective, a comprehensive overview 
of behavior related to these problems is a prerequisite. In other words, there has to be a 
clear diagnosis of the aspects of task behavior that have to be changed in order to 
improve task performance. In this thesis it was found that success- and failure-oriented 
children often react differently in response to a change in stimulus situation. Depending 
on the relative strength of the motive to achieve success and the motive to avoid failure 
children will react in different ways towards interventions in motivational processes. 
Before treatments for motivational problems can be effective, two prerequisites have to 
be fulfilled. First, the motive structure of the child has to be diagnosed. Second, the 
influence of various motivational factors on task performance has to be known. This 
leads to the conclusion that both research on motivational attitudes and research into 
differences in task behavior caused by variations in task conditions are significant 
activities. This conclusion may sound trivial, but considering the way in which 
motivational problems are often met in practice, it seems worth while to stress the 
necessity of research once more. 
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SUMMARY 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to study whether task motivation, as conceived by the 
dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1974), can be influenced by varying 
the conditions in which subjects have to solve a number of tasks. In other words, this 
thesis deals with changes in task behavior resulting from changes in motivational 
factors. It intends to clarify the influence of motìvationally relevant situational factors 
on task behavior. 
The theoretical basis for the experiments reported in this thesis is supplied by the 
achievement motivation theory as described in 'The Dynamics of Action' by Atkinson 
and Birch (1970). It presents a model about the motivational factors related to task 
performance which is used to predict changes in task behavior as a result of changes in 
motivational factors. According to this model, motivation is influenced by three factors: 
motive structure of the individual (a personality factor), difficulty level of the task and 
incentive value of success or failure on the task (two situational factors). The influence 
of external factors (such as extrinsic rewards or information about task performance) on 
task behavior is not explicitly dealt with by the model. This thesis tries to shed some 
light on the influence of extrinsic rewards and performance feedback on task behavior 
as described by the dynamics-of-action model. 
Historical background of achievement motivation theory 
Chapters 2 and 3 supply the theoretical basis for the experiments described in 
Chapters 4 to 7. Chapter 2 gives an account of the evolution of achievement motivation 
theories. First, the origin of some important concepts is traced. The idea that drive 
reduction is accompanied by feelings of pleasure and thus constitutes one of the most 
important motivators for human behavior, is due to Freud (Heckhausen, 1980a). 
Another important contribution of Freud is the fact that unconscious processes are even 
more important determinants of human behavior than conscious processes. The need 
for achievement (nAch) first makes its appearance in the motivation theory of Murray 
(1938). According to Murray's definition, a need should explain similarities in behavior 
which occur despite the fact that a subject is observed in different situations and at 
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different times. The concept of valence and the description of behavior as a function of 
personal and situational factors originated from Lewin's motivation theory (1935). 
In the next part of this Chapter the work of three people contributing to the 
development of the achievement motivation theory is described: McClelland, Atkinson 
and Heckhausen. McClelland provides a first definition of the achievement motive and 
starts to use the TAT (the Thematic Apperception Test) for measuring motive strength. 
In addition, he is the first researcher who set up experiments in which motive scores are 
used to predict behavior (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell, 1953). Atkinson 
(1964) redefines the achievement motive by splitting it up into two independent parts. 
He proposes that, in an achievement-oriented situation, both a motive 'hope of success' 
and a motive 'fear of failure' will be active. The result of the conflict between both 
motives determines whether a task will be performed or not. Atkinson maintains that 
resultant motivation is deteimined by a combination of situational and personal factors, 
and proposes a mathematical model for predicting the behavior of success- and failure-
oriented subjects. He also introduces a new procedure for measuring both motives: the 
TAT is used to measure hope of success, while the TAQ (Test Anxiety Questionnaire; 
Mandler and Sarason, 1952) is used to measure fear of failure. Heckhausen (1980a) 
adheres to Atkinson's conception of the achievement motive, but he proclaims that the 
TAT is the ideal instrument to measure both components of the achievement motive 
(i.e., hope of success and fear of failure). The construction of Scoring procedures is 
one of the main themes of his work. Another major theme is the way in which 
achievement motivation develops in children. A third major contribution is the 
development of a cognitive process model for motivation. This model includes a 
number of cognitive factors (such as attributional factors, action consequences and their 
valences) formerly disregarded by the theory. 
The next step in the development of the achievement motivation theory is the 
introduction of dynamic concepts. Actions performed in the past and expectations for 
future actions influence the way subjects behave in the present and thus should be 
included in the theoretical model. At first this is accomplished by the introduction of 
inertial tendencies (Atkinson and Cartwright, 1964), representing all the influences 
previous tasks have on the current task and all other (task independent) influences on 
the person. Eventually, these insights are used to formulate a general theory of 
motivation, the so-called dynamics-of-action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1974). The 
main emphasis of the theory shifts from explaining a single activity to explaining the 
switch from one activity to another. 
The Chapter ends with the description of a number of problems inherent in the 
dynamics-of-action model, in particular: how to measure the factors in the mathematical 
motivation model, and how to substitute the variables in the mathematical formula by 
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numerical values. The operationalisation and measurement of the hypothetical 
parameters has been largely neglected until now. As a result empirical evidence for the 
dynamic model is still scarce. On the other hand, the dynamic model seems to serve 
very well as a heuristic device for the integration of a number of different theoretical 
ideas. 
The influence of reward and information on task motivation 
In Chapter 3 the influence of two external factors (i.e., extrinsic rewards and 
performance feedback) on task motivation and, thereby, on task performance is 
described. The dynamics-of-action model does not explicitly consider these two 
components of the motivational process. However, from various other motivation 
theories (for example theories of intrinsic motivation) it is apparent that they do 
influence task behavior. 
In the first part of the Chapter the relation between external rewards and task 
behavior is traced. The dynamics-of-action model conceives of the incentive (or 
reward) value of success as feelings of pride accompanying success at the task, and of 
the incentive value of failure as feelings of shame accompanying failure at the task. The 
model does not deal with the fact that success at a task can also be externally rewarded 
or failure at a task can be punished, while these external rewards and punishments can, 
Subsequently, influence task behavior. 
The studies reported in this Chapter show clearly that extrinsic rewards do influence 
motivational aspects of task behavior, especially task choice. Material rewards that are 
expected, salient, contingent on participation only, and irrelevant to task content appear 
to have a negative influence on intrinsic motivation as revealed in task choice. Activities 
that formerly have been intrinsically satisfying, are not spontaneously chosen again 
after they have been linked with these kinds of material reward. On the other hand, 
extrinsic rewards in the form of verbal praise or verbal reinforcement appear to have a 
positive effect on intrinsic motivation and task choice: tasks, formerly linked with 
verbal praise or reinforcement, are, subsequently, chosen more often. Unexpected 
rewards and rewards inherent to task content appear to have no effect on intrinsic 
motivation or task choice. One very important finding regarding extrinsic rewards is 
that they can not be simply added to intrinsic rewards. On the contrary, the extrinsic 
reward sometimes even annihilates the intrinsic reward. Extrinsic rewards appear to 
shift the justification for working at a task to external causes and, thereby, destroy the 
intrinsic motivation. 
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In the second pan of the Chapter the relation between feedback and task behavior is 
described. The dynamics-of-action model only pays attention to the incentive value 
connected with success or failure at a task. It does not explicitly consider the 
information subjects can deduce from success or failure at a task that could have an 
effect on subsequent task choice and task perfoimance. Implicitly, however, feedback 
does influence the motivational task process since the fact whether subjects experience 
success or failure at a task determines the value of the consummatory force. Some 
experiments suggest that success or failure on a prior trial determines the choice of the 
following trial: after success subjects primarily choose tasks with a higher difficulty 
level, after failure they primarily choose tasks with a lower difficulty level. Feedback 
appears to play an important role in determining causal attribution and in setting 
aspiration levels. Since it allows ability assessment and self-evaluation and supplies 
information about correctness of task solution, feedback also influences persistence 
and, thereby, has a positive effect on performance. 
From Chapters 2 and 3 the following conclusions are drawn. The dynamics-of-
action model appears to have a number of valuable elements, in particular the dynamic 
viewpoint of the theory seems to be of great importance for studying task motivation. 
However, the theory is rather restrictive since it does not consider the influence of 
external factors on task motivation. For example, in actual task performance the 
incentive value of success at a task is not exclusively represented by self-evaluation 
(resulting in affective feelings of pride or shame). Most of the time additional 
consequences associated with task performance (such as evaluation by others, or 
grades earned) also determine the way in which the child will handle the task 
(Heckhausen, 1977). Two of the most important external factors influencing task 
motivation, investigated primarily in theories of intrinsic motivation, are extrinsic 
rewards and feedback about task performance. To get a broader perspective on 
processes related to task motivation, it seems worth while to incorporate these factors 
into a model about task motivation. In this thesis, therefore, the influence of these two 
factors on task motivation is investigated within the context of a dynamic task situation. 
Children and the dynamics-of-action model 
Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the experimental part of this thesis. In Chapter 4 an 
experiment is reported which studies whether hypotheses about task choice, as deduced 
from the dynamics-of-action model, do apply to children. The few experimental 
attempts to validate the dynamics-of-action model all have been performed with adults 
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as subjects (mostly college students). According to Heckhausen (1980b), children at 
the age of 10 to 12 should already possess the cognitive requirements necessary to react 
to motivational factors in accordance with the way motivation is conceived of by the 
dynamics-of-action model. However, to the author's knowledge this theoretical 
statement has not yet been tested. 
One of the main predictions of the dynamics-of-action model is that subjects who 
are confronted with tasks differing in difficulty level but otherwise similar, will choose 
increasingly more difficult tasks. Working at a task leads to an increase of the 
consummatory force, decreasing the tendency to keep working at a task of that 
difficulty level. Consequently, the tendency to keep choosing tasks of the same 
difficulty level will decrease with an increase in the number of tasks of that difficulty 
level already chosen and subjects will switch to more difficult tasks for which the 
consummatory force is still rather small (Kuhl and Blankenship, 1979b). 
The experiment reported in Chapter 4 is a replication of an experiment by Kuhl and 
Blankenship (1979b) with a task adapted for children. It is shown that children indeed 
behave as predicted by the dynamics-of-action model, i.e., they show an increase in 
difficulty level chosen. Compared to adults, however, the increase in difficulty level is 
less steep. To determine whether the age difference between both subject groups or 
changes in the task structure are the cause of this discrepancy, the reactions of children 
and adults in a dynamic task situation are explicitly compared in Chapter 5. The age 
difference proves to be the cause of the differential increase in difficulty level chosen. 
There appears to be a differential increase in the consummatory force for children and 
adults, i.e., the consummatory force increases less quickly for children than for adults. 
Children seem to need more experience with or information about tasks before they 
decide to try more difficult tasks. 
The influence of extrinsic rewards on aspects of task behavior 
In Chapter 6 the influence of extrinsic rewards on task behavior in a dynamic task 
situation is studied. In two experiments correct task performance is linked with 
different kinds of extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards can either be congruent with 
intrinsic rewards or incentive values (i.e., tasks with a higher difficulty level, 
presumably generating more feelings of pride and accomplishment when they are 
solved correctly, are hence rewarded with a higher number of points) or incongruent 
with intrinsic rewards (all correct task solutions are rewarded with an equal number of 
points, independent of the difficulty level and the related affective reactions). 
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Depending on their nature, extrinsic rewards for correct task solutions appear to 
have positive as well as negative effects on task behavior. In general, positive effects of 
rewards are reported when the extrinsic reward is congruent with the intrinsic reward. 
They are manifested in intensity of task performance (solution times for the easier 
puzzles decrease, number of puzzles solved correctly increases for the more difficult 
puzzles), persistence (children give up less often on more difficult puzzles), task choice 
(children generally choose more difficult puzzles) and sequence of task difficulty levels 
chosen. With respect to the sequence of task difficulty levels chosen a congruent 
reward appears to destroy the normal pattern, which is an increase in difficulty level 
chosen during the course of an experiment. Both success- and failure-oriented children 
start with tasks of a higher difficulty level, after which they can only show a marginal 
increase in difficulty level. Since success-oriented children in a situation without 
external rewards start with tasks of a higher difficulty level than failure-oriented 
children, the positive effect of the congruent extrinsic reward is especially prominent 
for these failure-oriented children. 
Negative effects of rewards are reported when the extrinsic reward is incongruent 
with the intrinsic reward. They are manifested primarily in the sequence of difficulty 
levels chosen. The incentive value associated with choosing difficult puzzles appears to 
be dominated by the external reward associated with a correct solution. Both success-
and failure-oriented children start with the easiest puzzles and show a small increase 
towards somewhat more difficult puzzles during the course of the experiment. Since 
success-oriented children in a situation without external rewards start with tasks of a 
higher difficulty level than failure-oriented children, the negative effect of the 
incongruent extrinsic reward is especially prominent for these success-oriented 
children. 
The influence of performance feedback on aspects of task behavior 
In Chapter 7 an experiment is reported in which the influence of performance 
feedback on task behavior is studied. In this experiment after successive trials children 
either do or do not receive feedback about their task perfonnance on previous trials. 
Feedback about task performance has a positive effect on task choice: both success- and 
failure-oriented children start to choose trials with higher difficulty levels. Explicitly 
confronting children with the fact that they can solve difficult trials (albeit not so very 
often) induces them to choose a larger number of these trials. However, while success-
oriented children start to choose more trials of the highest difficulty level, failure-
134 
oriented children appear to be more cautious and choose more trials of the second 
highest difficulty level. 
Performance feedback also influences the choice of difficulty level after success or 
failure on the previous trial. Failure-oriented children seem to react more strongly to 
their failures when confronted with feedback about task outcome compared to success-
oriented children. While success-oriented children are more daring in more often 
choosing difficult trials and less often choosing easier trials after failure, failure-
oriented children get more cautious and, consequently, more often choose easier trials 
and less often choose more difficult trials after failure. 
Implications of the results for the theory 
Chapter 8 supplies an overview of the conclusions and implications for theory, for 
educational practice and for diagnosis and treatment. The dynamics-of-action model is a 
valuable framework for studying achievement behavior in a dynamic context, i.e., a 
situation in which a number of tasks (or items) has to be solved consecutively. The 
explanatory value of the model, at least in its elementary form, appears to be rather 
restrictive though, because it considers achievement behavior as influenced by only two 
independent factors: motive structure and difficulty level of the task (incentive value is 
directly derived from the latter). In fact, it can only be applied in a situation in which 
there is no information about prior task performance, be it in the form of extrinsic 
rewards or in the form of elaborate feedback about prior successes and failures. If the 
dynamics-of-action model intends to explain task behavior in a variety of situations as 
they exist in real life, it has to integrate these factors. 
Implications of the results for educational practice 
Variations in task conditions influence achievement motivation, thereby causing 
changes in actual task behavior. Three conclusions, drawn in this thesis, are relevant 
for actual classroom situations. First, in a situation where no consequences are 
associated with task outcome, children chose to work on tasks of an increasingly higher 
level of difficulty, without being coerced to do so, and knowing that they would fail 
most of these tasks. Children appear to have an "intrinsic" motivation to work at 
difficult tasks. However, the "intrinsic" motivation can be decreased by external factors 
and thus teachers should not rely too much on this intrinsic motivation. 
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Second, extrinsic rewards can have both positive and negative effects on task 
behavior, depending on the nature of the reward. When the amount and nature of the 
extrinsic reward is clearly associated with task difficulty children will spend more effort 
at the task and they will choose difficult tasks more readily. In actual classroom 
situations, therefore, it seems important to clarify the relation between extrinsic rewards 
associated with task outcome and task performance in order to improve task motivation. 
In this way children's awareness of the intrinsic rewards (affective consequences) of 
working at or even solving difficult tasks is heightened, which induces a more positive 
attitude towards these tasks. However, teachers should be warned against 
indiscriminately rewarding children for correct task solutions which distracts the 
attention away from the experiences associated with task involvement towards the 
reward. Thus, attaining rewards becomes more important than feelings associated with 
being involved in a difficult task solution process and "intrinsic" task motivation may 
be destroyed. 
Third, feedback about prior task performance has a positive effect on task 
motivation. A summary of previous successes and failures induces children to choose 
more difficult tasks. Without this information the result from the previous task 
primarily determines task choice. In actual classroom situations, therefore, it seems 
important to give children elaborate feedback about their previous task performance. 
Implications of the results for diagnosis and treatment 
Motivational problems can, and often do, have a negative influence on task 
performance and thus on school results. Therefore, a number of training programs, 
trying to influence motivational processes, have been developed. These programs 
propose that a positive change in achievement-related motives in pupils brings school 
results more in agreement with the capabilities of the pupils and, thereby, improves 
performance. Most programs focus on the clarification of a number of rather broad 
concepts from several achievement motivation theories. Their aim is changing 
motivationally related behavior of children as a result of this clarification of concepts. In 
fact, children learn to behave like the ideal prototype of an achievement-oriented 
individual. As yet none of the programs uses the positive effects that changes in task 
conditions, such as supplying elaborate performance feedback or giving external 
rewards for correct task performance, can have on motivationally related task behavior. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Inleiding 
In dit proefschrift wordt nagegaan of taakmotivatie, zoals beschreven in het 
dynamische motivatie model van Atkinson en Birch (1974), beïnvloed kan worden 
door de condities te variëren, waarin proefpersonen een aantal taken moeten oplossen. 
Met andere woorden het doel van dit proefschrift is het opsporen van veranderingen in 
taakgedrag die voortkomen uit veianderingen in motivationeel relevante situationele 
factoren. 
De prestatiemotivatie theorie, zoals beschreven in het boek "The Dynamics of 
Action" door Atkinson en Birch (1970), vormt het theoretische uitgangspunt voor de 
experimenten uit dit proefschrift. Dit boek presenteert een model waarin motivationcle 
factoren gerelateerd worden aan taakuitvoering. Het model kan gebruikt worden om 
veranderingen in taakgedrag ten gevolge van veranderingen in motivationcle factoren te 
voorspellen. Volgens dit model wordt de motivatie om een handeling uit te voeren 
bepaald door drie factoren: de motiefstructuur van het individu (een 
persoonlijkheidsfactor), de moeilijkheidsgraad van de taak en de incentieve waarde van 
succes of falen bij die taak (twee situationele factoren). Het model gaat niet expliciet in 
op de invloed van eventuele exteme factoren (zoals extrinsieke beloning of informatie 
over taakuitvoering) op taakgedrag. In dit proefschrift is geprobeerd om de invloed van 
extrinsieke beloning en informatie over taakuitvoering op taakgedrag in het kader van 
het dynamische modvatie model te verduidelijken. 
Historische achtergronden van de prestatiemotivatie theorie 
In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 wordt de theoretische basis gelegd voor de experimenten 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 4 tot en met 7. Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt het ontstaan van de 
prestatiemotivatie theorie. Eerst wordt de herkomst van een aantal belangrijke concepten 
uit de theorie nagegaan. Het idee dat drift-reductie vergezeld gaat van gevoelens van 
lust en daardoor een van de meest belangrijke motivatie bronnen voor menselijk 
handelen vormt, is afkomstig van Freud (Heckhausen, 1980a). Een ander belangrijk 
inzicht van Freud, dat in de theorie wordt ingelijfd, is het feit dat onbewuste processen 
belangrijkere determinanten voor het menselijk handelen vormen dan bewuste 
processen. De behoefte om te presteren (need for achievement, nAch) duikt voor het 
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eerst op in de motivatie theorie van Murray (1938). Volgens Murray's definitie moet 
een behoefte overeenkomsten in gedrag verklaren die optreden ondanks het feit dat 
personen in verschillende situaties en op verschillende tijdstippen worden 
geobserveerd. Het concept valentie en de beschrijving van gedrag als een functie van 
persoonlijkheids- en situationele factoren is eveneens afkomstig uit Lewin's motivatie 
theorie (1935). 
Verder wordt in dit hoofdstuk het werk van drie personen beschreven die een 
belangrijke bijdrage hebben geleverd aan het ontstaan van de prestatiemotivatie theorie: 
McClelland, Atkinson en Heckhausen. McClelland stelt een definitie van het 
prestatiemotief vast en gebruikt voor het eerst de TAT (Thematic Apperception Test) om 
motiefsterkte te meten. Bovendien is hij de eerste onderzoeker die experimenten uitvoert 
waarin motiefscores gebruikt worden om gedrag te voorspellen (McClelland, A±inson, 
Clark en Lowell, 1953). Atkinson (1964) herdefinieert het prestatiemotief door het in 
twee onafhankelijke gedeelten te splitsen. Hij beweert dat in een op prestaties gerichte 
situatie, naast het motief om succes te behalen ook het motief om falen te vermijden 
actiefis. Het resultaat van het conflict tussen beide motieven bepaalt of een taak al dan 
niet wordt uitgevoerd. Bovendien stelt Atkinson dat de uiteindelijke taakmotivatie 
bepaald wordt door een combinatie van persoonlijkheids- en situationele factoren en 
formuleert hij een mathematisch model om het gedrag van succes-gemotiveerde en 
faalangstige personen te voorspellen. Atkinson introduceert ook een nieuwe procedure 
om de twee motieven te meten: de TAT wordt gebruikt om het motief om succes te 
behalen te meten, terwijl de TAQ (Test Anxiety Questionnaire; Mandier en Sarason, 
1952) gebruikt wordt om het motief om falen te vermijden te meten. Heckhausen 
(1980a) blijft trouw aan Atkinson's definitie van het prestatiemotief, maar stelt dat de 
TAT het ideale instrument is om beide componenten van het prestatiemotief (zowel 
hoop op succes als angst om te falen) te meten. Het construeren van 
scoringsprocedures vormt een van de belangrijkste thema's van Heckhausen's werk. 
Een ander belangrijk thema is het ontwikkelingsverloop van prestatiemotivatie bij 
kinderen. Een derde thema vormt de constructie van een cognitief procesmodel voor 
motivatie. Dit model voegt een aantal cognitieve factoren (zoals attributionele factoren, 
gevolgen van handelingen en hun valentie) aan de theorie toe. 
De volgende stap in de ontwikkeling van de prestatiemotivatie theorie is de 
introductie van dynamische concepten. Handelingen uitgevoerd in het verleden en 
verwachtingen ten aanzien van toekomstige handelingen beïnvloeden de manier waarop 
personen zich in het heden gedragen en zouden daarom in het theoretisch model moeten 
worden ingepast. In het begin gebeurt dit via de introductie van de zogenaamde 
traagheids-tendenties (Atkinson en Cartwright, 1964), die alle invloeden van eerder 
uitgevoerde taken op de huidige taak en alle andere (taak onafhankelijke) invloeden op 
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de persoon representeren. Uiteindelijk worden deze inzichten gebruikt om een algemene 
motivatie theorie te formuleren: het zogenaamde dynamische motivatie model (Atkinson 
en Birch, 1974). De belangrijkste doelstelling van de theorie verschuift van het 
verklaren van het uitvoeren van één enkele activiteit naar het verklaren van 
veranderingen in activiteit. 
Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een beschrijving van een aantal problemen inherent aan 
het dynamische model: hoe worden de factoren, genoemd in het mathematische model, 
gemeten en op welke wijze worden de variabelen in de mathematische formule door 
getallen vervangen. De operationalisatie en meting van de hypothetische parameters van 
het model is tot nu toe voor een belangrijk deel verwaarloosd, resulterend in een 
schaarste aan empirische evidentie voor het model. Daartegenover staat dat het 
dynamische model erg goed functioneert als een heuristisch raamwerk voor de 
integratie van een aantal verschillende theoretische ideeën. 
De invloed van beloning en informatie op taakmotivatie 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de invloed van twee exteme factoren (extrinsieke beloning en 
informatie over taakuitvoering) op taakmotivatie en taakgedrag nagegaan. Het 
dynamische model schenkt geen expliciete aandacht aan deze factoren als onderdelen in 
het motivationele proces. Uit een aantal andere motivatie theorieën (zoals bijvoorbeeld 
theorieën over intrinsieke motivatie) blijkt echter dat zij taakgedrag wel degelijk 
beïnvloeden. 
In het eerste gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk wordt de relatie tussen exteme beloningen 
en taakgedrag nagegaan. Het dynamische motivatie model veronderstelt dat de 
incentieve (of belonings-) waarde van succes gerepresenteerd wordt door gevoelens 
van trots, en de incentieve waarde van falen door gevoelens van schaamte. Het model 
houdt er geen rekening mee dat succes ook extern beloond of dat falen ook bestraft zou 
kunnen worden, terwijl deze exteme beloning en straf vervolgens weer invloed kan 
hebben op het taakgedrag. 
De studies, die in dit hoofdstuk worden beschreven, tonen duidelijk aan dat 
extrinsieke beloningen motivationele aspecten van taakgedrag (met name taakkeuze) 
beïnvloeden. Enerzijds blijken materiële beloningen die verwacht, duidelijk zichtbaar, 
alleen van deelname afhankelijk, en irrelevant voor de taakinhoud zijn, een negatieve 
invloed op de intrinsieke motivatie te hebben, voornamelijk zichtbaar in de keuze van 
taken. Activiteiten die eerder intrinsiek motiverend bleken te zijn, worden niet meer 
spontaan gekozen nadat ze met deze soorten van materiële beloning in verband gebracht 
zijn. Anderzijds blijken extrinsieke beloningen in de vorm van loftuitingen of verbale 
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stimulansen een positief effect te hebben op de intrinsieke motivatie en de keuze van 
taken: taken die ooit gekoppeld zijn aan loftuitingen of verbale stimulansen worden 
vervolgens vaker gekozen. Onverwachte beloningen en beloningen inherent aan de 
taakinhoud blijken geen effect op intrinsieke motivatie of keuze van taken te hebben. 
Een belangrijk gegeven met betrekking tot extrinsieke beloningen is dat ze niet zonder 
meer opgeteld kunnen worden bij intrinsieke beloningen. Integendeel, extrinsieke 
beloningen blijken soms zelfs de intrinsieke beloningen op te heffen. Ze blijken de 
oorzaak voor het uitvoeren van de handeling te verschuiven naar externe factoren en op 
deze wijze de intrinsieke motivatie te vernietigen. 
In het tweede gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk wordt de relatie tussen informatie over 
taakuitvoering en taakgedrag beschreven. Het dynamische motivatie model schenkt 
alleen aandacht aan de incentieve waarde verbonden met succes of falen op een taak. Er 
wordt geen expliciete aandacht besteed aan de informatie die personen kunnen afleiden 
uit het taakresultaat (goede of foute uitkomst), die op zijn beurt weer van invloed zou 
kunnen zijn op taakkeuze en taakprestatie. Impliciet heeft informatie overigens wel 
invloed op het motivationele proces, omdat het feit of een persoon succes heeft of faalt 
op een taak de waarde van de consummatorische kracht bepaalt. Enkele experimenten 
tonen aan dat succes of falen op een vroegere taak bepalend is voor de keuze van de 
volgende taak: na succes kiezen personen hoofdzakelijk taken met hogere 
moeilijkheidsgraden, na falen kiezen ze voornamelijk taken met een lagere 
moeilijkheidsgraad. Informatie speelt een belangrijke rol in het bepalen van causale 
attributies en in het opstellen van het aspiratie niveau. Informatie laat inschatting van 
vaardigheid, zelf-evaluatie en bepaling van de correctheid van de taakoplossing toe en 
beïnvloedt de persistentie waardoor de prestatie op zijn beurt positief wordt beïnvloed. 
Uit hoofdstuk 2 en 3 kunnen de volgende conclusies getrokken worden. Het 
dynamische motivatie model lijkt een aantal waardevolle elementen te bevatten, vooral 
het dynamische gezichtspunt van de theorie is van groot belang bij de studie van 
taakmotivatie. De theorie is echter vrij beperkt omdat ze de invloed van exteme factoren 
niet in het model betrekt. Bijvoorbeeld, bij het uitvoeren van een taak wordt de 
incentieve waarde van succes niet alleen door zelf-evaluatie (resulterend in affectieve 
gevoelens van trots of schaamte) gerepresenteerd, maar bepalen additionele gevolgen 
geassocieerd met taakuitvoering (zoals evaluatie door anderen, of rapportcijfers) mede 
de manier waarop een kind met een taak zal omgaan (Heckhausen, 1977). Twee van de 
belangrijkste factoren die taakmotivatie beïnvloeden zijn extrinsieke beloningen en 
informatie over taakprestaties. Om processen gerelateerd aan taakmotivatie in een breder 
perspectief te zien, lijkt het zinvol om deze factoren in het model over taakmotivatie te 
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integreren. In dit proefschrift zal daarom de invloed van beide factoren op taakmodvatie 
in het kader van een dynamische taaksituatie worden bestudeerd. 
Kinderen en het dynamische motivatie model 
Hoofdstuk 4 tot en met 7 bevat het experimentele gedeelte van dit proefschrift. In 
hoofdstuk 4 is een experiment beschreven waarin bestudeerd wordt of hypothesen over 
taakkeuze afgeleid uit het dynamische motivatie model ook bij kinderen van toepassing 
zijn. Bij de schaarse pogingen om het dynamische model experimenteel te valideren 
waren steeds volwassenen (voornamelijk studenten) betrokken als proefpersonen. 
Volgens Heckhausen (1980b) zouden kinderen tussen tien en twaalf jaar al beschikken 
over de cognitieve vaardigheden die nodig zijn om op moövationele factoren te reageren 
zoals het dynamische motivatie model voorspelt. Deze uitspraak is echter, voor zover 
bekend, nooit getoetst 
Een van de belangrijkste voorspellingen van het dynamische model is dat personen 
die met een aantal gelijksoortige taken, die enkel in moeilijkheidsgraad verschillen, 
worden geconfronteerd steeds moeilijkere taken zullen gaan kiezen. Taakuitvoering 
leidt tot een toename van de consummatorische kracht waardoor de tendentie om taken 
van die moeilijkheidsgraad te blijven kiezen afneemt. De tendentie om taken van 
dezelfde moeilijkheidsgraad te blijven kiezen zal afnemen met een toename van het 
aantal reeds gekozen taken van die moeilijkheidsgraad. Er zullen geleidelijk aan 
moeilijkere taken worden gekozen waarvoor de consummatorische kracht nog vrij klein 
is (Kuhl en Blankenship, 1979b). 
Het experiment uit hoofdstuk 4 is een replicatie van een experiment van Kuhl en 
Blankenship (1979b), waarvan de taak is aangepast voor kinderen. Kinderen blijken 
zich inderdaad te gedragen zoals voorspeld door het dynamische motivatie model: in de 
loop van het experiment kiezen ze taken van steeds hogere moeilijkheidsgraden. 
Vergeleken met volwassenen is de toename in moeilijkheidsgraad bij de kinderen echter 
minder overtuigend. Om te bepalen of het leeftijdsverschil van beide groepen 
proefpersonen dan wel taakverschillen de oorzaak vormen van deze discrepantie 
worden de reacties van kinderen en volwassenen in een dynamische taaksituatie 
expliciet vergeleken in hoofdstuk 5. Het leeftijdsverschil blijkt de oorzaak van de 
discrepantie te zijn. Er lijkt een verschil in toename van de consummatorische kracht bij 
kinderen en volwassenen te zijn: de consummatorische kracht lijkt minder snel toe te 
nemen voor kinderen. Kinderen lijken meer ervaring of informatie over taken nodig te 
hebben voor ze besluiten om moeilijkere taken te gaan proberen. 
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De invloed van extrinsieke beloningen op aspecten van taakgedrag 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt de invloed van extrinsieke beloningen op taakgedrag in een 
dynamische taaksituatie bestudeerd. In twee experimenten worden verschillende 
vormen van extrinsieke beloningen gekoppeld aan correcte taakoplossingen. De 
extrinsieke beloning is ofwel congruent met de intrinsieke beloning of incentieve 
waarde van succes (taken met een hogere moeilijkheidsgraad, die meer gevoelens van 
trots en vaardigheid zullen genereren wanneer ze correct worden opgelost, worden ook 
met een hoger aantal punten beloond) ofwel incongruent met de intrinsieke beloning 
(onafhankelijk van de moeilijkheidsgraad en de gerelateerde affectieve reacties, worden 
alle correcte taakoplossingen beloond met eenzelfde aantal punten). 
Afhankelijk van hun aard blijken de extrinsieke beloningen voor correcte 
taakoplossingen zowel positieve als negatieve effecten op taakgedrag te kunnen hebben. 
Wanneer de extrinsieke beloning congruent is met de intrinsieke beloning worden er in 
het algemeen positieve effecten gevonden. Deze manifesteren zich in intensiteit van 
taakuitvoering (oplostijden voor de moeilijkere taken nemen af, aantal goed opgeloste 
taken van hogere moeilijkheidsgraden neemt toe), persistentie (kinderen geven minder 
snel op bij taken van hogere moeilijkheidsgraden), taakkeuze (in het algemeen kiezen 
kinderen moeilijkere taken) en volgorde van gekozen moeilijkheidsgraden. Met 
betrekking tot de volgorde van gekozen moeilijkheidsgraden blijkt een congruente 
beloning het normale patroon (een toename in gekozeti moeilijkheidsgraad gedurende 
het experiment) te verstoren. Zowel succes-gemotiveerde als faalangstige kinderen 
beginnen met taken van hogere moeilijkheidsgraden waama ze enkel nog een marginale 
toename in moeilijkheidsgraad kunnen vertonen. Omdat succes-gemotiveerde kinderen 
in een situatie zonder externe beloning beginnen met takin van een hogere 
moeilijkheidsgraad dan faalangstige kinderen, is het positieve effect van de congruente 
beloning vooral zichtbaar bij deze faalangstige kinderen. 
Wanneer de extrinsieke beloning incongruent is met de intrinsieke beloning worden 
vooral negatieve effecten gerapporteerd. Zij manifesteren zich voornamelijk in de 
volgorde van gekozen moeilijkheidsgraden. De incentieve waarde geassocieerd met het 
kiezen van moeilijke taken blijkt gedomineerd te worden door de exteme beloning voor 
de correcte taakoplossing. Zowel succes-gemotiveerde als faalangstige kinderen 
beginnen met de makkelijkste taken en vertonen een kleine toename naar iets moeilijkere 
taken gedurende het experiment. Omdat succes-gemotiveerde kinderen in een situatie 
zonder exteme beloning beginnen met taken van een hogere moeilijkheidsgraad dan de 
faalangstige kinderen is het negatieve effect van de incongruente beloning vooral 
zichtbaar bij deze succes-gemotiveerde kinderen. 
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De invloed van informatie over taakuitvoering op aspecten van 
taakgedrag 
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een experiment beschreven over de invloed van informatie 
over taakuitvoering op taakgedrag. In dit experiment krijgen kinderen na elke taak al 
dan niet informatie over hun taakprestaties op alle voorafgaande taken. Informatie over 
taakuitvoering heeft een positief effect op taakkeuze: zowel succes-gemotiveerde als 
faalangstige kinderen kiezen taken van hogere moeilijkheidsgraden. Wanneer kinderen 
expliciet geconfronteerd worden met het feit dat ze moeilijke taken kunnen oplossen (zij 
het niet altijd) leidt dit tot het kiezen van een groter aantal van dit soort taken. Echter, 
terwijl succes-gemotiveerde kinderen meer taken van de hoogste moeilijkheidsgraad 
kiezen, blijken de faalangstige kinderen meer op hun hoede te blijven en meer taken van 
de op één na hoogste moeilijkheidsgraad te kiezen. 
Informatie over taakprestaties blijkt ook de keuze van de volgende 
moeilijkheidsgraad na succes of falen op de direct voorafgaande taak te beïnvloeden. 
Faalangstige kinderen blijken sterker op hun falen te reageren wanneer ze 
geconfronteerd worden met informatie over de taakoplossing vergeleken met succes-
gemotiveerde kinderen. Terwijl succes-gemotiveerde kinderen meer durf tonen en dus 
vaker moeilijkere taken en minder vaak makkelijkere taken kiezen na falen, blijken 
faalangstige kinderen meer op hun hoede te zijn en minder vaak moeilijkere taken na 
falen te kiezen. 
Implicaties van de resultaten voor de theorie 
Hoofdstuk 8 geeft een overzicht van de conclusies en implicaties van de 
experimenten voor de theorie, de onderwijskundige praktijk en diagnose en 
behandeling. Het dynamische motivatie model is een waardevol kader om taakgedrag in 
een dynamische context (in een situatie waarin een aantal taken of items 
achtereenvolgens moeten worden opgelost) te bestuderen. De verklarende waarde van 
het model, althans in zijn elementaire vorm, blijkt tamelijk klein, daar de theorie 
taakgedrag ziet als enkel afhankelijk van twee onafhankelijk van elkaar te variëren 
factoren: namelijk de motiefstructuur van het individu en de moeilijkheidsgraad van de 
taak (de incentieve waarde is direct uit deze laatste factor afleidbaar). In feite is het 
model alleen toepasbaar in een situatie waarin geen informatie over voorgaande 
taakprestaties beschikbaar is, noch in de vorm van extrinsieke beloningen noch in de 
vorm van uitgebreide informatie over succes en falen op de voorafgaande taken. 
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Wanneer het dynamische motivatie model taakgedrag in een variëteit van 
omstandigheden wil verklaren dan moet het model deze factoren opnemen. 
Implicaties van de resultaten voor de onderwijskundige praktijk 
Variaties in taakcondities beïnvloeden de prestatiemotivatie, en veroorzaken 
daardoor veranderingen in taakgedrag. Drie conclusies uit dit proefschrift zijn relevant 
voor schoolsituatiesTen eerste, in een situatie waarin de uitkomst van een taak geen 
verdere gevolgen heeft* kiezen kinderen voor taken van een toenemend hogere 
moeilijkheidsgraad, zonder dat ze hiertoe worden gedwongen en hoewel ze weten dat 
ze bij de meeste taken zullen falen. Kinderen lijken een 'intrinsieke' motivatie te hebben 
om aan moeilijke taken te werken. Exteme factoren kunnen deze intrinsieke motivatie 
echter verminderen en dus moeten leerkrachten niet al te veel op deze intrinsieke 
motivatie vertrouwen. 
Op de tweede plaats blijken extrinsieke beloningen, afhankelijk van hun aard, zowel 
positieve als negatieve effecten op taakgedrag te kunnen hebben. Wanneer de 
hoeveelheid en de aard van de externe beloning een duidelijke relatie met de 
taakmoeilijkheid heeft dan zullen kinderen meer inspanning vertonen en zullen ze deze 
taken eerder kiezen. Het lijkt daarom belangrijk om in schoolsituaties de relatie tussen 
extrinsieke beloningen voor correcte taakuitvoering en de prestatie op de taak te 
verduidelijken om zodoende de taakmotivatie te verhogen. Op deze wijze worden 
kinderen zich meer bewust van de intrinsieke beloningen (de affectieve gevoelens) die 
gepaard gaan met het werken aan of oplossen van moeilijke taken, waardoor er een 
positievere attitude ten opzichte van deze taken ontstaat. Leerkrachten moeten echter niet 
elke goede taakoplossing belonen omdat dit de aandacht afleidt van de ervaringen 
gerelateerd aan het werken aan de taak. Het verkrijgen van de beloning zou dan 
belangrijker worden dan het werken aan een moeilijk taak-oplosproces waardoor de 
intrinsieke motivatie wordt vernietigd. 
Op de derde plaats blijkt informatie over voorgaande taakprestaties een positief 
effect te hebben op taakmotivatie. Een samenvatting van het aantal keren dat een taak 
van een bepaalde moeilijkheidsgraad wel of niet goed is opgelost leidt tot de keuze van 
moeilijkere taken. Zonder deze informatie wordt de keuze van de volgende taak 
voornamelijk bepaald door het resultaat van de direct voorafgaande taak. 
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Implicaties van de resultaten voor diagnose en behandeling 
Motivationele problemen hebben vaak een negatieve invloed op taakgedrag en 
schoolresultaten. Dit heeft geleid tot de ontwikkeling van een aantal 
trainingsprogramma's om motivationele processen positief te beïnvloeden. Deze 
programma's suggereren dat een positieve verandering in motieven gerelateerd aan 
prestatie ertoe zullen leiden dat de schoolresultaten meer in overeenstemming komen 
met de vaardigheden van de leerling. De meeste programma's concentreren zich op het 
verduidelijken van een aantal algemene concepten uit diverse prestatiemotivatie 
theorieën. Hun doel is om motivationeel gerelateerd gedrag van kinderen te veranderen 
door deze concepten te verduidelijken. In feite leren de kinderen om zich te gedragen als 
het ideale prototype van een succes-gemotiveerd individu. Tot nu toe wordt door geen 
enkel programma gebruik gemaakt van de positieve effecten die veranderingen in taak 
condities, zoals het geven van cumulatieve informatie over taakuitvoering of het geven 
van externe beloningen voor correcte taakoplossingen, kunnen hebben op motivationeel 
relevant taakgedrag. 
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Stellingen bij het proefschrift The influence of external rewards and performance 
feedback on dynamic aspects of task motivation' van M.J.M. Houtmans. Nijmegen, 
1989. 
1. Het feit dat de auteurs van het dynamics-of-action model hun theoretische 
concepten niet relateren aan begrippen uit de werkelijkheid impliceert dat de theorie 
moeilijk toetsbaar is (dit proefschrift en Heckhausen (1980a). Motivation und 
Handeln. Lehrbuch der Motivationspsychologie. Bertin: Springer Verlag.) 
2. Het feit dat een psychologische theorie en de meetinstrumenten met betrekking tot 
de concepten van de theorie niet uit dezelfde psychologische traditie afkomstig zijn 
hoeft geen belemmering te vormen voor vruchtbaar onderzoek. 
3. Leerkrachten kunnen het taakgedrag van kinderen (in het bijzonder het taakgedrag 
van faalangstige kinderen) positief beïnvloeden door een duidelijk verband aan te 
brengen tussen de beloning voor een correcte taakoplossing en de 
moeilijkheidsgraad van de taak. (Dit proefschrift) 
4. Het taakgedrag van kinderen kan positief worden beïnvloed door de aanbieding 
van uitgebreide informatie over de taakprestaties telkens nadat een aantal taken is 
opgelost. (Dit proefschrift) 
5. De consummatorische kracht zoals gedefinieerd in het dynamics-of-action model, 
die de tendentie om aan een taak te blijven werken vermindert, levert een verklaring 
voor het feit dat bij het schrijven van artikelen, boeken en proefschriften de ervoor 
staande tijd vaak ruimschoots wordt overschreden. 
6. In een tijd van steeds weer nieuwe bezuinigingen op universitaire begrotingen staat 
de materiële opbrengst van een promotie voor de promovendus in de sociale 
wetenschappen in geen verhouding meer tot de inspanning die het kost om een 
proefschrift te schrijven. De promovendus dient derhalve uitsluitend intrinsiek 
gemotiveerd te zijn. 
7. Het begrijpen van het verloop en de werking van psychologische processen is geen 
voldoende voorwaarde om deze processen vervolgens te beïnvloeden. 
8. Promoverende vrouwen zijn nog steeds eerder uitzondering dan regel en fungeren 
daardoor tegen wil en dank als 'lichtend voorbeeld' voor hun sexe-genoten. Zij 
dienen ervoor te waken dat deze extrinsieke motivatie-bron geen afbreuk doet aan 
hun intrinsieke motivatie. 



